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Abstract 
    On April 30, 1803, the Jefferson administration purchased French Louisiana.  Initially American 
lawmakers rejoiced at the prospect of American domination of the Mississippi River.  Yet within a 
few short months this optimism was replaced with uncertainty and alarm as lawmakers faced the 
task of incorporating Lower Louisiana into the Union.  As Americans tackled the many unintended 
consequences of the Louisiana Purchase, Louisianans also had to confront the ramifications of the 
landmark acquisition and the encroachment of a new American government in their lives.  From 
1803 to 1815, American lawmakers and Louisianans embarked on a parallel journey to incorporate 
Lower Louisiana into the political, social, and cultural infrastructure of the young republic.   
    The American part of this historic journey has been well documented as many historians explore 
how American lawmakers passed key legislation and implemented programs of Americanization to 
bring Lower Louisiana into the Union.  Louisianans’ perspective, however, has remained quite 
secondary.  By exploring the lives of individual Louisianans, this project examines how they too 
shaped the incorporation of Lower Louisiana and how their class, race, and ethnicity influenced 
their participation in that process.  In highlighting the experiences of Creole elite families, prominent 
political figures, and Lower Louisiana’s free people of color, it becomes clear that Louisianans 
employed vital strategies of negotiation to sufficiently assimilate to gain American citizenship and 
acceptance, while also preserving vital aspects of their French identity.  By utilizing tools such as 
political activism, military service, and the conversation of attachment, Louisianans came into the 
Union on their own terms and ultimately created a Franco-American culture that still pervades 
Louisiana today.   
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Introduction:  “A Beloved First Mistress”:  Setting the Stage for a Franco-American Culture 
in Lower Louisiana 
 
      On December 20, 1803, Pierre Clément de Laussat, the French colonial prefect for Louisiana, 
left his home rehearsing in his head the order of events that would transpire that day.  As he 
walked through the streets of New Orleans, he not only noticed the uncharacteristically warm 
weather, but also the group of French commissioners, military officials, and loyal citizens that 
followed closely behind him.  As he hurried to City Hall, Laussat looked upon familiar administrative 
buildings, local businesses, as well as balconies full of French women and children gathering for 
the upcoming ceremony.  Laussat and his entourage passed by American soldiers lined in 
formation along the Place d’ Armes as the sound of drums beat in the distance.  Upon arriving at 
City Hall, Laussat exchanged pleasantries with American commissioners including newly-
appointed territorial governor William C.C. Claiborne.1  Laussat, Claiborne, and American General 
James Wilkinson made their way to the City Hall balcony overlooking a large crowd who had come 
to watch the official transfer of French Louisiana to the United States.    
   In a solemn moment, spectators watched as the French flag was lowered and replaced by the 
American stars and stripes.  When the two flags met in the middle there was a brief pause as 
cannon fire marked the momentous event.2   Following the flag raising ceremony, Governor 
Claiborne addressed the crowd congratulating them on “an event so advantageous.”  He welcomed 
                                                 
     1 William C. C. Claiborne was born in Sussex County, Virginia in 1775.  In 1794, he moved to Tennessee and 
served on the state’s Supreme Court until 1797 when he was elected to the House of Representatives.  After several 
years in Congress, he was appointed the Governor of the Territory of Mississippi in 1801.  In October of 1803, he and 
General James Wilkinson were assigned commissioners to take possession of Lower Louisiana from France.  Later 
that year he would be appointed the official governor of the Orleans Territory.   
 
     2 Pierre Clément de Laussat, Memoirs of My Life to My Son During the Years 1803 and After, Which I spent in 
Public Service in Louisiana as Commissioner of the French Government for the Retrocession to France of That Colony 
and for Its Transfer to the United States, ed. Robert D. Bush  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 
90.   
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Louisianans as fellow countrymen and promised them the benefits and privileges of American 
citizenship.  He went on to encourage Louisianans to foster a strong attachment to the United 
States and to become acquainted with the American political apparatus so that they and their 
children would one day “appreciate the intrinsic worth of the Government transmitted to them.”3   
   The day’s festivities culminated with dinner, dancing, and a string of loquacious speeches.  The 
final toast of the evening brought Spanish, French, and American diplomats together in a “toast to 
the three nations” accompanied by an orchestra of cannon fire.4   Late that evening Governor 
Claiborne sent a letter to Secretary of State James Madison happily reporting “that we are now in 
possession of this City.”5  This atmosphere of merriment and show of international friendship in 
reality masked the feelings of anxiety, apprehension, and anguish Americans and Louisianans 
shared regarding the Louisiana Purchase.   
     Most Americans first learned of the Louisiana Purchase in June 1803 when newspapers such 
as the Boston Independent featured such bold headlines as “Louisiana Ceded to the United 
States!”6  Following months of negotiations and rumors of a possible war, the Jefferson 
administration had peacefully secured not only New Orleans, but all of French Louisiana.  Many 
celebrated the purchase hoping that it would ensure American economic and political mastery of 
North America.  Congressman David Campbell of Tennessee jubilantly commended the Jefferson 
administration for securing free navigation of the Mississippi River and an “immense and fertile 
                                                 
     3 William C.C. Claiborne to a Large Assemblage of Citizens in the Grand Salee of the City Hall, 20 December 1803,   
The Letter Books of William C.C. Claiborne, 1801-1806, ed. Dunbar Rowland  (Jackson: Mississippi State Archive, 
1917), I: 309-10.   
 
     4 Laussat, Memoirs of My Life, 90-91. 
 
     5 Claiborne to James Madison, 20 December 1803, Letter Books, I: 306.   
 
     6 Boston Independent, 20 June 1803.   
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country.”7  Many others shared Campbell’s pleasure and admiration.  Yet apprehension soon 
tempered this excitement as many American lawmakers were confronted with the daunting task of 
incorporating a large foreign population into the United States.  Pennsylvania Representative John 
Lucas, for example, expressed serious reservations regarding Lower Louisiana’s foreign 
population.  He believed Louisianans’ colonial past infused them with despotism, rendering them ill-
prepared for a republican government.8   Lucas’s perceptions reveal how many congressional 
members came to the realization that the constitutionality of the purchase and the task of 
incorporating such a diverse population into the Union engendered many challenges to the fragile 
republic.   
     In Lower Louisiana the news of the purchase also generated an assortment of reactions.  For 
the majority of inhabitants, Creoles born under the French and Spanish colonial regimes, the 
purchase shattered their hopes of living under the rule of their mother country.  For Lower 
Louisiana’s Spanish, German, Acadian, and free black population that had adopted the French 
language, culture, and legal and political institutions, the transfer created feelings of displacement 
and trepidation over an uncertain future.  The cession treaty between the United States and France 
did, however, offer some assurances for concerned Louisianans.  The third article of the treaty 
guaranteed them a quick and easy incorporation into the United States, stating that Louisiana 
inhabitants “shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted, as soon as 
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, 
                                                 
 
     7 Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805  (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), 325. 
 
     8 1st Congress, 2nd sess., Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 1789-1856  (New York: D. Appleton & Company), 
III: 145-147.  John Lucas was born in France and moved to Pittsburg in 1784.  He later became a district judge in the 
Louisiana District serving until 1820.      
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advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.”9  It also provided protection of private 
property and promised that Louisianans would be extended the same rights guaranteed all 
Americans.  While such measures allowed many inhabitants to take solace in the prospect of living 
under a free government, there still remained many more who resented the new American 
presence and the threat it posed to their French heritage.   Although the events of December 20 
appeared to mark the peaceful transfer of French Louisiana to the United States, they also ushered 
in a twelve-year long struggle for American lawmakers and Louisianans to incorporate Lower 
Louisiana into the ideological, cultural, and political infrastructure of the United States.   
    Historians have produced a prolific historiography examining this incorporation process and its 
impact on the United States.  Everett Somerville Brown’s The Constitutional History of the 
Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1812 examines the major constitutional questions raised by the 
unprecedented acquisition, providing valuable insight into the larger political issues occurring within 
the young republic and how lawmakers attempted to redefine the bounds of the Constitution to 
accommodate the purchase.  Beyond constitutional history, many historians examine the Louisiana 
Purchase and its impact on American expansion.  In This Affair of Louisiana, Alexander DeConde 
argues that the acquisition of Louisiana was not just a case of good fortune, but rather a byproduct 
of a strong expansionist ethos inherited from early Anglo-American settlers.  In Filibusters and 
Expansionists, Frank Owsley and Gene Smith contend that the Louisiana Purchase planted the 
early antecedents to Manifest Destiny, perpetuating Thomas Jefferson’s vision of an “empire of 
liberty.”  These works demonstrate how the Louisiana Purchase served as a harbinger for further 
American expansion.  More recent works explore how the Louisiana Purchase redefined ideas of 
                                                 
 
     9 Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Article III, 30 April 1803.  Found in 
Records of U.S Government; Record Group II: National Archives.     
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American identity.  Peter Kastor’s The Nation’s Crucible explores “the way the Louisiana Purchase 
shaped people’s conception of what it would mean to be American and a nation.”10  Kastor’s 
methodology opens many new channels of inquiry concerning not only Louisiana, but also the early 
republic.  The purchase of a vast amount of land containing an ethnically diverse population was 
unprecedented in American history.  Such a monumental event brought many new challenges to 
national values and institutions that historians need to further address.   
    These works have greatly enhanced the field of Louisiana history.  Yet they tend to focus on how 
the Louisiana Purchase affected American policies, ideas, and aspirations, while overlooking the 
experiences of Louisianans.  Although these studies include key Louisiana leaders and events, 
they fail to examine and address how Louisianans from different socio-economic, ethnic, and racial 
backgrounds transitioned from French and Spanish colonial rule to life in the American republic.  
Coming at such a precarious time in American history, the incorporation of Lower Louisiana forced 
American lawmakers and Louisiana inhabitants to embark on a parallel course of self-discovery.  
The American path has been well documented, while Louisianans’ journey has remained 
secondary.  The following chapters will illustrate how Louisianans actively took part in the 
incorporation of Lower Louisiana and how their class, race, and ethnicity shaped their participation 
and influence in that process.  This work examines how Louisianans responded and adapted to the 
new American government and actively negotiated a place for themselves in the young American 
republic, ultimately creating a Franco-American culture that still pervades Louisiana today.  
**** 
                                                 
     10 Everett Somerville Brown, The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1812  (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1920); Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana  (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976); 
Frank Owsley and Gene Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821  (Tuscaloosa: 
The University of Alabama Press, 1997); Peter J. Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the 
Creation of America  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).     
 6 
     To fully understand the challenges Louisianans faced during the territorial period, one must first 
understand how the confluence of a century of migration, settlement, and ethnic and racial 
blending characterized colonial Louisiana.  In 1504, French explorers claimed the vast expanse of 
Canada for the French Crown.  Nearly a century passed before the French managed to erect a 
permanent settlement in Quebec.  By the 1660s, French settlers learned from their Indian allies 
that a great river bisected the continent from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.  Control of such a 
strategic waterway would greatly enhance France’s position in the imperial struggles for North 
America.  A French exploration party set out from Quebec in 1673, following the Mississippi River 
to its mouth located at the 33rd degree of latitude.11  Robert de LaSalle, ten years later, made 
another voyage down the Mississippi River naming the land where the great waterway met the Gulf 
of Mexico Louisiana in honor of King Louis XIV.  Hoping to attract settlers to its newest southern 
colony, the French Crown in 1718 granted John Law a twenty-five year contract to send 6,000 
white settlers and 3,000 slaves to Louisiana.  Under Law’s Mississippi Company, hundreds of 
French families made the voyage to the swamps and fertile farms lands of Louisiana.  These first 
settlers made their new homes in New Orleans, Natchitoches, and Alexandria.  Immigration to the 
new colony proved erratic and at times stagnant, never quite reaching the Crown’s initial hopes.  
By 1765, the colony’s population stood at only 5,556 inhabitants.12  
    Following the Seven Years’ War, France lost most of its North American possessions including 
Canada to Great Britain and Louisiana to Spain.  Life under the Spanish colonial regime changed 
                                                 
     11 Francois Barbe-Marbois, The History of Louisiana: Particularly of the Cession of That Colony to the United States 
of America  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, org. pub. 1830, reprint 1977), 104-103. 
 
     12 Lewis William Newton, “The Americanization of French Louisiana: A Study of the Process of Adjustment Between 
the French and the Anglo-American Populations of Louisiana, 1803-1860”  (Ph.D. diss., Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1929), 6-7.  
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very little for many Louisiana inhabitants as Spanish officials were unsuccessful in supplanting the 
predominance of the French language and culture.  The port in New Orleans continued to draw 
traders and merchants from up and down the Mississippi River, including Anglo-American 
businessmen from the Northeast.  Beginning in 1769, a prolific flour trade between Philadelphia 
and New Orleans marked the first extensive Anglo-American presence in the Spanish colony.  By 
the 1790s, American merchants monopolized the incoming and outgoing trade in Louisiana and 
soon relocated their families and businesses to New Orleans and other Mississippi trading ports.13  
Southeastern planters also found the rural areas of Louisiana and the West Florida parishes ideal 
locations for expanding their enterprises.  Planters from Georgia and the Carolinas were drawn to 
the isolated northern tip of Louisiana to expand their sugar and cotton operations.14  Some Anglo-
Americans migrated to Louisiana seeking more then just economic prosperity; a small group of 
Catholics from Pennsylvania moved to Opelousas in search of a religious haven.  Anglo-Americans 
found their connections to Lower Louisiana quite advantageous during the Revolutionary War.  
Merchants from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia utilized the port of New Orleans to ship 
needed supplies to Continental forces, while British sympathizers migrated to a small English-
speaking settlement just above Baton Rouge to escape the war.15 
     In 1795, Spain and the United States solidified their mutual commercial interests by signing the 
Treaty of San Lorenzo.  The treaty granted American merchants free rights of navigation on the 
Mississippi River and unrestricted deposit at the port of New Orleans.  Just five years later, 
                                                 
     13 Dolores Egger Labbe, “The Encouragement of Foreigners: A Multicultural Population in a New Land,” The 
Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, ed. Dolores Egger Labbe  (Lafayette: University of 
Southeastern Louisiana, 1998), III: 543.   
 
     14 Ibid., 543.   
 
     15 Newton, “The Americanization of French Louisiana,” 24-25. 
 8 
however, this partnership crumbled as Spanish leaders began negotiations with France for the 
retrocession of Louisiana.  The Treaty of San Ildefonso returned Louisiana to France and shattered 
American aspirations for unrestricted commercial access to the port of New Orleans and the 
Mississippi River.  The return of France to North America also posed a potential threat to continued 
American migration into the lucrative region.   
    These events created a sense of urgency for American lawmakers.  Some advocated peaceful 
diplomacy and the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida, while more aggressive 
congressional leaders argued that war was the only method of securing American commercial 
interests.  President Thomas Jefferson himself asserted bellicosely that “the day that France takes 
possession of New Orleans ….  we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.”16  
Ultimately, Napoleon solved Jefferson’s dilemma by agreeing to sell his North American colony.  
Facing an impending war with England and a massive slave revolt in St. Domingue, Napoleon 
looked to sell French Louisiana as a means of securing much-needed funds to finance his dreams 
of European dominance.  Although, on their diplomatic mission to France, American 
representatives James Monroe and Robert Livingston were only instructed to purchase New 
Orleans and West Florida, on April 30, 1803, they bought all of French Louisiana for $15 million.17 
    Along with a vast amount of land, the United States also acquired Lower Louisiana’s diverse and 
alien population.  The most numerous inhabitants were Creoles who resided in urban centers such 
                                                 
 
     16 Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, 18 April 1802, Thomas Jefferson Writings, ed. Merrill Peterson  (New 
York: The Library of America, 1984), 1105.   
 
     17 The American government agreed to pay $11.5 million and forgave $3.5 million in debt that France owed the 
United States from the Quasi-War (1798-1801) to equal the $15 million dollar price tag for French Louisiana.  French 
Louisiana consisted of 530 million acres of land.  It includes the modern-day states of Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota and portions of North Dakota, Minnesota, Texas, Colorado, Wyoming, 
and New Mexico.   
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as New Orleans and on plantations in rural areas such as Attakapas and Natchitoches.  A small 
Spanish population also resided in Lower Louisiana, yet its numbers remained low throughout the 
colonial period.  Two distinct groups of Spaniards remained prevalent in Louisiana.  The first group 
settled near Attakapas and renamed the area New Iberia.  A larger group, from the Canary Islands, 
established themselves in small settlements outside New Orleans.  These Spaniards managed to 
maintain their native language and customs, unlike their counterparts living in New Orleans who 
were more inclined to speak French.18  
     Colonial Louisiana also served as a place of refuge for displaced peoples.  The Acadians, 
descendants of French Acadians in Canada, migrated to Lower Louisiana following the Seven 
Years’ War.  From 1764 to 1803, nearly 2,500 Acadians dispersed throughout Attakapas, 
Opelousas, and in the Bayou Lafourche, later called the Acadian Coast.  Today old Acadian 
settlements make up the famous Cajun country of Louisiana.19   
     Other ethnic groups of European descent were also attracted to Louisiana.  German immigrants 
were some of Lower Louisiana’s first settlers.  They first established themselves along the 
Arkansas River, but later transferred their small settlements to the banks of the Mississippi River.  
Waves of German immigration continued throughout the 1700s, with influxes in 1754 and 1774.  
Most Germans, old and new, made their homes on what Louisianans called the German Coast 
(present day St. Charles and St. John parishes).20  The Irish also sought a new life in Lower 
                                                 
 
     18 Labbe, “The Encouragement of Foreigners,” 541.   
 
     19 Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana  (New Orleans: Armand Hawkins, Publisher, 1885), II: 116, 120-122; Carl 
A. Brasseaux, “The Emergence of Classes in Antebellum Period,” The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in 
Louisiana History, ed. Vaughan Burdin Baker (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 2000), XV: 28-29.  Brasseaux’s 
other work Acadian to Cajun: Transformations of a People, 1803-1877  (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
1992), along with others such as The Cajuns: Essays on Their History and Culture, ed. Glenn R. Conrad (Lafayette, 
LA, 1978) argue that Acadians over time created the Cajun culture of today.  
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Louisiana, settling mainly in New Orleans.  Yet their numbers remained small until the 1830s and 
1840s.  Many worked alongside American merchants on the docks and commercial houses of the 
thriving port city, while others took on menial jobs for the Creole elite.21   
    Lower Louisiana also contained a distinct racial mixture.  The first African slaves arrived in 
Louisiana in 1719 along with French settlers in John Law’s Mississippi Company.  As the slave 
population steadily grew over the next several decades, it took on a unique role in colonial 
Louisiana.  Ill-prepared for the harsh conditions of the wilderness and lacking a strong defense 
force, white settlers relied heavily on slaves to provide much needed labor and military protection.  
By 1739, French colonial officials created a permanent company of slave soldiers to assist in 
combating neighboring Indians.22      
    Within a decade of settlement, free people of color appeared in colonial Louisiana.  While little is 
known about the origins of these free blacks, over time their numbers steadily grew.  Much like 
their slave counterparts, free people of color were also recruited into the French military to fight in 
Louisiana and other colonial outposts.  These free black militiamen were even allowed to serve 
under black officers.23  Lower Louisiana’s free black population continued to grow under the 
Spanish regime.24  Spanish officials helped to enhance these numbers through the O’Reilly Laws 
that codified the practice of coartacion which allowed slaves to purchase their freedom from 
                                                                                                                                                 
     20 Newton, “Americanization of French Louisiana,” 11-12.   
 
     21 Labbe, “The Encouragement of Foreigners,” 539.   
 
     22 Alice Moore Dunbar-Nelson, “People of Color in Louisiana,” Creole: The History and Legacy of Louisiana’s Free 
People of Color, ed. Sybil Kein  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 10;  Kimberly S. Hanger, 
Bounded Lives, Bounded Places: Free Black Society in Colonial New Orleans, 1769-1803  (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997), 118. 
 
     23 Dunbar-Nelson, “People of Color in Louisiana,” 11-12.   
 
     24 Ibid., 12.   
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imperial courts rather than from benevolent masters. 25  Spanish policies also granted free blacks 
more rights and freedom.  Free blacks could arrange contracts, own and transfer property, and 
bring suit in civil litigation.  Such privileges allowed many free blacks to accumulate enough wealth 
to own thriving businesses that contributed to the commercial vitality of New Orleans and adjoining 
areas.  Besides participating in the commercial activities of colonial Louisiana, free blacks 
continued to serve in the military.  The Spanish recruited more free black militiamen than their 
French counterparts by extending them the right of fuero, a set of military privileges that included 
the right to carry weapons and receive the same pay and retirement benefits as white soldiers.26  
These favorable policies placed free people of color in a middle stratum in between white 
Louisianans and slaves.  By the time of the Louisiana Purchase, Lower Louisiana possessed not 
only a bourgeoning free black population, but also a distinct three-tiered racial hierarchy.     
    Despite colonial Louisiana’s ethnic and racial patchwork, by 1803 most inhabitants spoke 
French, adopted French cultural mores, practiced Catholicism, and adhered to civil law.  Yet these 
strong ties to French colonial traditions and institutions created an assortment of problems for 
Louisianans during the territorial period.  American lawmakers expected Louisianans to cultivate 
not only a political but also a cultural attachment to the United States.  Although many Louisianans 
looked forward to receiving the political and economic benefits that the Louisiana Purchase 
imparted, they did not expect that such rights should come at the expense of their cultural identity.  
Here rests the central dilemma facing Louisianans: As American lawmakers demanded that they 
relinquish ties to their colonial customs, language, and way of life, Louisianans were forced to find 
                                                 
 
     25 Ibid., 25.  
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ways of demonstrating sufficient assimilation to gain American approval, while preserving their 
French identity.   
    To illustrate the experiences of Louisianans and their attempt to create a Franco-America 
culture, this project will focus on the lives of individuals.  By examining specific Louisianans one 
can gain a better sense of how they responded to such challenges and employed different 
techniques in order to integrate into the American system without surrendering aspects of their 
French heritage.  These individuals have been selected based on their activities in the social, 
political, and economic landscape of territorial New Orleans as well as their inclusion in various 
social-economic, ethnic, and racial groups.  Each chapter will feature the life of one or several 
individuals in order to examine how these factors determined their level of participation in the 
incorporation process.  Although each chapter highlights the life of certain individuals, the 
experience of the larger group that they represent is not overlooked—rather these individuals serve 
as characters that exemplify the shared experience of different Louisianans.   
    The following chapters explore the years between 1803 and 1815.  The United States purchased 
French Louisiana in April 1803, so naturally this is where the story begins.  Although the territorial 
period ended in 1812 when Louisiana became an American state, I have decided to extend this 
study to the Battle of New Orleans.  I argue that statehood was not a product of American 
lawmakers’ willingness to bring Louisiana into the Union, but rather an expedient wartime measure.  
Statehood, therefore, failed to secure Louisianans’ acceptance as Americans, and as war with 
Great Britain seemed imminent many Americans continued to question the loyalty of their newest 
countrymen.  Only after the Battle of New Orleans did Americans accept and welcome Louisianans 
as true citizens.  Moreover, the Battle of New Orleans reveals how Louisianans used loyal military 
service as another vehicle of negotiation that allowed them to shape their place in the Union. 
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    The central geographic focus of this study is New Orleans which served as the social, political, 
and economic nexus of Louisiana and was the backdrop for the major events of the territorial 
period.  Consequently some groups are excluded from this study including the many Indians living 
in Lower Louisiana as well as Louisianans in rural parishes.  They played some role in the 
incorporation of Lower Louisiana; however, the availability of sources and time in large part 
determine their absence here.  This project examines the lives of historical participants who had 
the greatest ability to shape the incorporation process.  Although recent scholarship demonstrates 
that slaves had a certain amount of control over their private lives through kinship networks and 
religion, they were deprived of the ability to influence public affairs or access instruments of power.  
For this reason, a discussion regarding slaves and the incorporation of Lower Louisiana is not 
present.   
   Furthermore, Lower Louisiana’s rich ethnic and racial composition often makes identifying 
various groups quite complex.  For the sake of clarity, I need to explain the terminology used 
throughout this project.  As previously mentioned, Creoles made up the majority of inhabitants 
residing in Lower Louisiana.  The term Creole has become a hotly contested term in the historical 
community.  Creole derives from the Portuguese word crioulo meaning a slave of African descent 
born in the Americas.  Yet in Louisiana, Creole took on a much different connotation following the 
Louisiana Purchase.  Used as an ethnic distinction, the label Creole came to differentiate those 
born in Louisiana of French or Spanish descent from Americans.  Creole, therefore, came to 
designate a native identity to combat the encroachment of Americans in territorial Louisiana.27  
Over time, however, white Creoles wanted to distinguish themselves further from Creoles of color 
                                                 
     27 Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., “Creoles and Americans,”  Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization, ed. Arnold R. 
Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 138.    
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and began referring to themselves as the ancienne or ancient population showcasing their 
ancestral ties to white French and Spanish settlers.  In the following chapters, the term Creole and 
ancients will be used interchangeably in discussions regarding native-born white Louisianans.28   
    By rigidly defining Creole, I have intentionally excluded free people of color from this category.  
Although many historians consider Lower Louisiana’s free people of color to be Creoles, since they 
too were born in colonial Louisiana, I have decided to refer to them as free blacks or libres.  Under 
the French and Spanish regime, free people of color were called gens de couleur libre while gens 
de couleur was the name designating African slaves.  The cornerstone of their racial identity rested 
in the word libre, meaning free in both French and Spanish.  Since libre characterized their free 
status and separation from the slave population, free blacks often referred to themselves simply as 
libres.  Following their lead, I will continue the use of this term throughout my discussion of Lower 
Louisiana’s free people of color.   
    In trying to be precise in identifying the historical characters that make up this project, I have run 
the risk of almost being too specific.  I have been careful not to refer to white or black Louisianans 
as Americans.  Although the cession treaty between the United States and France guaranteed 
Louisianans immediate citizenship and the constitutional rights apportioned to all Americans, I 
hesitate to lump them together with natural-born or naturalized American citizens.  Since the bulk 
of this work aims to illustrate how Louisianans shaped and manipulated the incorporation process, I 
have intentionally separated Creoles and free people of color from Americans as a means of 
highlighting Louisianans’ specific activities from those of their American counterparts living in the 
territory.  Therefore, in this work, American refers exclusively to either those natural-born or 
                                                 
     28 Ibid., 138-139.   
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naturalized Americans living in the United States or those in the territory that moved to New 
Orleans before or after the Louisiana Purchase.   
**** 
    Although this project focuses on the experiences of Louisianans, it would be incomplete without 
mentioning American involvement in the incorporation process.  Chapter Two, therefore, examines 
the major political events of the Orleans territorial period.  It will center largely on the territorial 
government and policies Washington lawmakers implemented in Lower Louisiana.  This chapter 
reveals how most Americans looked askance at Louisiana’s foreign population and their ability to 
become true Americans.  Yet such misgivings required lawmakers to define what made a “true” 
American.  In turn, congressional members had to devise a plan or process to “Americanize” 
Louisianans and a means to judge their progress and suitability for citizenship.  Since the major 
policies and regulations created by Washington lawmakers would be the very things that 
Louisianans confronted and even combated during the territorial period, this chapter provides a 
historical framework for the rest of the project. 
    Following the explanation of the American perspective, the rest of this work will focus solely on 
four groups of Louisianans exemplified by key individuals.  Chapter Three highlights the political 
careers of Edward Livingston and Daniel Clark.  After having a successful political career in New 
York and in the Jefferson administration, Livingston’s involvement in an alleged money laundering 
conspiracy forced him to relocate to New Orleans shortly after the Louisiana Purchase.  Unlike 
Livingston, Daniel Clark had lived in Lower Louisiana since 1786.  Besides setting up a thriving 
shipping business, Clark also worked for Spanish Governor Don Esteban Miro.  As the United 
States began negotiations for the acquisition of Louisiana, Clark was appointed the American 
consul to New Orleans and worked vigorously to assist Washington lawmakers in securing the 
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coveted port of New Orleans.  After the Louisiana Purchase, Clark’s cordial relations with the 
American lawmakers soured when President Jefferson failed to appoint him the territorial governor 
of the newly-created Orleans Territory.  As the United States took possession of Lower Louisiana, 
both Livingston and Clark allied themselves with the ancient population and soon became the 
leaders of a growing anti-American faction.  The territorial government erected by the 1804 
Governance Act left many Creoles disappointed by their low grade of territorial status and the lack 
of a representative government.  They also disparaged the Governance Act’s prohibition on the 
importation of slaves into the territory.  Many Louisianans viewed this provision as a violation of 
their most basic rights since the nationwide prohibition would not go into effect until 1808.  Creoles 
also bewailed the excessive use of English instead of French in government documents and public 
proceedings as well as the introduction of common law into their court system.   
    Mostly for their own self-interest, Livingston and Clark became unexpected advocates for the 
Creole cause.  Using his experience as a former politician, Livingston provided much needed 
insights into American political thought.  He drafted the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana 
(1804), which outlined Louisianans’ main grievances with the territorial government.  Livingston 
ensured that the memorial would appeal to American sympathies by invoking revolutionary rhetoric 
from the Declaration of Independence.29   Besides drafting several petitions, Livingston used his 
legal expertise to help Creoles fight for the continuation of civil law.  As Livingston provided vital 
political ammunition for Louisianans, Clark used his longtime influence to antagonize the Claiborne 
administration and to incite anti-American feelings.  He even took his resistance campaign to the 
floor of Congress, serving as the Orleans territorial delegate in 1806.  Although it seems strange to 
                                                 
     29 Julien Paul Vernet, “Strangers on Their Native Soil”: Opposition to United States Territorial Government in 
Orleans, 1803-1809”  (Ph.D. diss,. Syracuse University, 2002), 129. 
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dedicate a chapter about Creole resistance to two Americans, in actuality without the support of 
Americans such as Livingston and Clark, Creoles would have had little visible organized 
resistance.  Handicapped by limited education as well as knowledge of American republican 
institutions, Creoles needed allies to aid them in their struggle.   
    As Livingston and Clark exemplify Louisianans’ path of resistance, Julien Poydras represents 
the more accommodating stance that many Creoles adopted.  Born in France, Poydras made his 
way to New Orleans via St. Domingue in 1768.  Once in New Orleans, he began a trading business 
that stretched from Baton Rouge to St. Louis.  Poydras’s business interests kept him closely tied to 
New Orleans and he soon befriended Governor Claiborne.  In 1804, Claiborne appointed Poydras 
to the Board of Directors for the new Bank of Louisiana and to the territory’s Legislative Council.  
He served as president of the council for three years.  In 1809, Poydras moved to Washington D.C. 
to serve as the Orleans territorial delegate to Congress.  Upon his return in 1812, he was elected 
the president of the constitutional convention responsible for drafting Louisiana’s new state 
constitution.   
    Chapter Four examines Poydras and his fruitful political career during the territorial period.  
Although many Creoles were active members of Livingston and Clark’s anti-American faction, 
some also shared Poydras’s belief that the key to Louisiana’s success rested in working with 
American officials for a common purpose.  Many Louisianans, through Poydras’s urging, hoped to 
provoke change through cooperation rather than resistance.  By accepting key positions in the 
Claiborne administration, Poydras became quite influential in territorial policymaking that helped to 
promote Louisianans’ interests.  More importantly, he served as a vital link between the American 
government and ancient Creoles.  Poydras proves to be a complementary figure to Livingston and 
Clark.  Their paths and careers were parallel in many ways even though they were almost always 
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at odds politically.  They all represent the myriad of political strategies Creoles used to shape the 
incorporation process.   
    As the early chapters examine the more public forum of New Orleans politics, Chapter Five 
highlights the personal experiences of Creole families by exploring the life of the Favrots.  Pierre-
Joseph Favrot’s ancestors arrived in Louisiana in 1732.  His father, Claude-Joseph, served as a 
second lieutenant in the French Army.  Pierre-Joseph would go on to serve in the Spanish military, 
reaching the rank of captain.  Following the Louisiana Purchase, Pierre-Joseph ended his thirty-
year long military career and became a full-time planter and slaveholder.  The life of Pierre-Joseph 
Favrot provides an excellent example of how Creole families made the transition from French and 
Spanish colonial rule to life in the American republic.  His extensive correspondence with his wife, 
children, extended family, and friends reveals the strategies French elites utilized to secure their 
status under the American system, while still remaining closely tied to their French heritage.   
Pierre-Joseph’s children Louis, Philogene, Josephine, and Octavine all grew to maturity during the 
territorial period.  He constantly instructed them on how to adapt to the new American presence 
while also ensuring that they did their part to assimilate into their new country.   
    Beyond public matters, the family itself remained Pierre-Joseph’s central focus.  Both at home 
and in their correspondence, the Favrots continued to communicate in French.  They also 
remained strong Catholics and celebrated French holidays such as Mardi Gras.  Moreover, they 
maintained strong ties with extended family to reinforce their French colonial roots and family 
status.  The Favrot family shows how publicly many Louisianans did their part to assimilate into the 
American system while privately, within the enclave of the family, clinging to their French identity.     
    Much like the Favrots, Lower Louisiana’s free black population also faced many challenges to its 
colonial heritage.  Libres were forced to overcome unique obstacles in their quest for assimilation.  
 19 
They not only had to combat Americans’ strong white supremacist ideology, but also struggled to 
maintain their former colonial rights.  Governor Claiborne and other American officials saw 
Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy as one of the most troubling issues facing the new territorial 
government.  In 1806, territorial officials passed a new Black Code in hopes of establishing the 
same strict racial barrier found elsewhere in the United States.  The primary aim of these laws was 
to solidify white supremacy within the territory while gradually forcing free blacks to a subordinate 
position.  Within a few years, the new Black Code created a society of whites and non-whites 
leaving very little room for free people of color. 30  
    Chapter Six of this project focuses on the struggle of libres, demonstrating how race played a 
vital role in determining how some Louisianans participated in the incorporation process.  Despite 
their gradual marginalization in the political and social landscape of territorial New Orleans, libres 
made substantial efforts to maintain their colonial privileges.  Kimberly S. Hanger’s Bounded Lives, 
Bounded Places argues that during the colonial period free blacks used several strategies to 
express their autonomy.  Through a variety of kinship relationships, real and fictive, free blacks 
were able to enlarge their economic and social standing.31  Moreover, such bonds often provided 
free blacks with opportunities to interact with white society and secure valuable allies.32   
Archdiocese and census records reveal that this practice continued during the territorial period as 
libres attempted to cultivate beneficial kinship ties that improved their position in an increasingly 
hostile environment.  Militia service also provided free blacks many advantages.  Although 
American officials within the territory seemed reluctant to arm libres, Governor Claiborne allowed 
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two battalions of free black troops to remain intact.  According to Hanger, “Militia service provided 
free blacks in New Orleans … with an important instrument for political expression as a corporate 
body, an avenue for social advancement, and a means by which to gain honor, prestige, and 
recognition.”33  As in the colonial period, free blacks in territorial New Orleans hoped that their 
loyalty and noble military service would gain them respect and a means to negotiate their status.     
    The life of Noel Carrier Jr. illustrates the experience of New Orleans libres in the territorial 
period.  Carrier’s father, Captain Noel Carrier, had an eventful career as a black officer in the 
Spanish military.  He also gained notoriety as a leader in the libre community.  With his father’s 
death just one year after the Louisiana Purchase, Noel Jr. faced the challenge of maintaining the 
privileges his father and other libres enjoyed.  Noel Jr. employed political activism to secure a 
military position and turned to kinship networks to reinforce his status and the vitality of the libre 
community.  The younger Carrier’s activities reveal how free blacks continued to use the same 
strategies of self-preservation during the territorial period as they did during the colonial era.  In 
many ways, men like Noel Carrier Jr. would invoke the legacies left by their fathers, hoping to 
secure a legitimate place as free men in the United States.   
    The project’s concluding chapter focuses on the Battle of New Orleans.  The Battle of New 
Orleans was a watershed event in American history—especially for Louisianans. Louisianans’ 
sacrifice at the concluding battle of the War of 1812 earned them national recognition as heroes 
and ended their twelve-year long struggle to gain acceptance as true American citizens.  In 1812, 
Louisiana joined the Union as the newest American state.  Yet Americans continued to question if 
Louisianans were loyal American citizens.  These suspicions only intensified as a British invasion 
of New Orleans seemed imminent.  Many, including Governor Claiborne, feared that Louisianans 
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might join the British or assist the Spanish in conquering Louisiana.  In the midst of such 
accusations and suspicions, Louisianans joined together in the fall of 1814 to prepare the city for 
an attack.  Civil and military organizations worked in unison to procure ammunition and repair 
fortifications.  Louisiana militia and volunteer units from all over the state mobilized for war.  
Concomitantly, Louisianans ardently professed their loyalty and attachment to the United States.  
By the time General Andrew Jackson arrived in New Orleans, he was greeted by Louisianans who 
were ready, willing, and able to defend their new country.     
    Immediately following the victory at Chalmette, American attitudes toward Louisianans changed.  
Many welcomed Louisianans with open arms as countrymen, seeing their gallant efforts during the 
Battle of New Orleans as an indication of their loyalty and affection.  Furthermore, in the chaotic 
weeks leading to the historic battle, the major characters of this project--and the groups that they 
represent—came together to defeat a common foe and marched forward to take their rightful place 
in the young American republic.  Although Daniel Clark died mysteriously in 1813, Edward 
Livingston and Julien Poydras came together to create the Committee of Defense, hoping it would 
allow Louisianans to show their loyalty.  Louis and Philogene Favrot, coming from a strong military 
lineage, did not hesitate to fight for their new country.  For libres like Noel Carrier Jr., the Battle of 
New Orleans allowed them to prove that they too were citizens of the American republic, and many 
hoped their military service would help secure the status their ancestors once enjoyed.  The Battle 
of New Orleans, therefore, provided another means for Louisianans to negotiate their place in the 
Union and gain acceptance in the great American family.   
    Yet more importantly, the Battle of New Orleans and the acceptance it imparted showed how 
Louisianans were successful in creating a Franco-American culture.  For years, American 
lawmakers and Louisianans fought over what was required of them to become American citizens.  
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At the end of the day, valor on the battlefield helped secure what political protests, fighting in the 
streets, harsh editorials, and petitions alone could not: Louisianans gained acceptance because 
they were loyal.  Even libres gained short-lived accolades for their gallant efforts and show of 
devotion to the United States.  It did not matter if Louisianans spoke French or continued to 
practice civil law; what mattered was that they showed that they were willing to sacrifice their lives 
to protect the United States.   
**** 
    Today Americans love to joke about the many idiosyncrasies of Louisianans who still practice 
civil law, call counties parishes, and suck the heads of crawfish.  Tourists continue to flock to New 
Orleans to take in the unique cemeteries, French architecture, beignets, and Mardi Gras.  Street 
signs still have French names and balconies, like the ones Laussat passed centuries before, still 
overlook festivities in the streets.  Yet what few realize is that many of these famous anomalies 
were formed in the years of toil and struggle by territorial Louisianans who actively and often 
aggressively negotiated their place in the American republic.  In 1837, one Louisianan explained 
his state’s unique contours and culture by explaining that “a country is like a beloved first mistress: 
you can abandon her, you may love another, but you can never forget her.”34  This statement 
accurately portrays the impact Louisianans had on the incorporation process.  Territorial 
Louisianans made the needed sacrifices to become Americans citizens, yet they never forgot or 
abandoned their French cultural ties. Ultimately, they found a balance between their old and new 
country and created a distinct Franco-American culture that is still celebrated today.   
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Chapter One:  “The greatest curse that could at present befall us”: Making True Americans 
in Lower Louisiana 
 
    On October 25, 1803, New York Representative Samuel Mitchill walked through the streets of 
Washington D.C.  Although the fall breeze sent a chill down his spine, he decided to take the 
scenic route to the Capitol in hopes of clearing his mind.  When he had heard the news of the 
Louisiana Purchase just a few months before, he applauded the calculated and appropriate 
measures utilized by the Jefferson administration in acquiring land that yielded endless benefits to 
the young nation.  As the Eighth Congress reconvened in early October, the unprecedented 
purchase turned the Capitol into a political war zone.  Federalists assaulted President Thomas 
Jefferson’s abuse of executive power, while Republicans defended the diplomatic prowess of their 
fearless leader.  Yet even the most ardent Jeffersonian could not deny that the Louisiana Purchase 
engendered many questions and challenges.  As many of his congressional counterparts fought 
over the constitutionality of the purchase or succumbed to partisan bickering, Mitchill became 
consumed with one important question—How were American lawmakers going to incorporate 
Lower Louisiana’s foreign population?1   
    A famous doctor and renowned scientist, Mitchill hoped that his keen sense of reason would 
help him find solutions to this pressing concern.  For weeks he pondered the new congressional 
impasse from all perspectives.  He felt conflicted about Louisianans’ future in the United States, 
fearing the ramifications of allowing a foreign population into the Union while also worrying that 
                                                 
     1 Samuel Mitchill described his reaction to the Louisiana Purchase in a letter he wrote to a friend in January 1804.  
This letter can be found in Transactions of Oneida Historical Society at Utica  (Oneida Historical Society, 1898), 166-
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depriving Louisianans of basic rights would prove an imprudent and perhaps a dangerous  
decision.  As he walked past city buildings and meandered down unfamiliar streets, Mitchill soon 
approached the Capitol ready to divulge his plans for Lower Louisiana.  Little did he know that on 
this day he would change the scope of the Louisiana debates and Louisianans’ fate.        
    News of the Louisiana Purchase hit American newspapers in the summer of 1803 and 
immediately created a rush of enthusiasm and excitement.  The National Intelligencer featured a 
poem that referred to Louisiana as a land “overflowing with milk and honey” that would serve as a 
new frontier for freedom and opportunity.  Many American citizens and congressional leaders alike 
fashioned grand visions of American commercial prosperity and economic domination.  
Massachusetts Representative Jacob Crowninshield, for instance, contended that “we have 
acquired this country … that offers immense advantages to us as an agricultural and commercial 
nation.”2  Even President Jefferson’s archrival Alexander Hamilton could not deny the importance 
of the acquisition, claiming that it provided the United States “unmolested” navigation of the 
Mississippi River.3   
    Just months later, however, this initial enthusiasm was eclipsed by apprehension as Congress 
confronted unprecedented questions engendered by the Louisiana Purchase.  Just a few days 
after the Eighth Congress convened, Delaware Senator Samuel White bemoaned the United 
States’ land acquisition, asserting that “this new, immense, unbounded world … will be the greatest 
curse that could at present befall us.”4  White’s statement seems quite contrary to earlier reactions, 
yet it reveals an unexpected downside to the Louisiana Purchase.  The economic and commercial 
                                                 
     2 National Intelligencer (Washington D.C.), 25 January 1804, Debates of Congress, 8th Congress, 1st sess., III: 68.      
 
     3 New York Evening Post, 5 July 1803.   
 
     4 Debates of Congress, 8th Congress, 1st sess., III: 10.     
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advantages the purchase rendered undoubtedly made it essential to American prosperity, but 
coupled with these benefits came many questions regarding its constitutionality and how to 
incorporate Louisiana’s diverse foreign population into the Union.  These issues soon dimmed the 
initial fanfare of the purchase while intensifying partisan rivalries and concerns over the stability of 
the young republic.   
    Following the speedy ratification of the cession treaty with France, the constitutionality of the 
Louisiana Purchase consumed congressional deliberations.  At the center of the debate was the 
question of whether or not the Constitution authorized lawmakers to acquire territories beyond the 
nation’s original borders.  Attention centered on how to interpret Article IV, Section 3 of the 
Constitution which stated, “New States may be admitted by Congress, into the Union…Congress 
shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”5  As it made no mention of acquiring 
new territories, congressional members undertook the task of interpreting this provision.        
    Constitutional questions regarding the purchase proved divisive, pitting a Federalist minority 
against a strong Democratic-Republican (or simply Republicans) Congress.  Jefferson’s 
ascendancy to the presidency in 1800 fostered strong Federalist suspicions of a political 
conspiracy.  The Louisiana Purchase exacerbated these fears.  Unable to defeat Republicans with 
votes, Federalists exploited the Louisiana debates in hopes of challenging Jefferson’s growing 
power.  In turn, the deliberations engendered a partisan rift that exposed the dwindling power of the 
Northeast but also Federalists’ fears regarding the long-term implications of the Louisiana 
Purchase.     
                                                 
     5 The Constitution of the United States, Article IV, Section 3.    
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    Concomitantly, lawmakers had to decide how to prepare Louisianans for statehood.  On that 
cold October day, Mitchill began these proceedings by suggesting that Louisianans undergo an 
“apprenticeship to liberty” that would serve as a probationary period to give them time to cultivate 
the skills necessary to be good Americans.  Mitchill’s plan met bipartisan support and helped 
shaped the Governance Act of 1804 that established the contours of Louisianans’ territorial 
government and incorporation process.  Partisan animosities subsided as both Federalists and 
Republicans harbored serious reservations regarding Louisiana’s diverse population and their 
desire and readiness to become Americans.   
    The precedents set by the Eighth Congress left a lasting imprint on American history.  The 
constitutional issues reconciled by congressional leaders alleviated future apprehensions regarding 
American expansion and also solidified conceptions of citizenship.  The many congressional 
deliberations and acts passed, furthermore, had a lasting impact on the lives of Louisianans.  They 
exposed the strong misgivings lawmakers had about Louisianans and would condition their future 
relationship and interactions.  Moreover, lawmakers set specific criteria and expectations for 
Louisianans that would shape the incorporation process and territorial period.  Ultimately, the 
Eighth Congress sought to address Mitchill’s important question regarding Louisianans’ future 
while making true Americans in Lower Louisiana.   
**** 
    Following the official confirmation of the United States’ acquisition of French Louisiana on July 4, 
1803, President Jefferson began making preparations for the incorporation of French Louisiana.  On 
July 17, Jefferson asked Daniel Clark, an American businessman who had lived in New Orleans for 
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nearly sixteen years, to collect information on the ceded land and its inhabitants.6  He sent Clark and 
Mississippi territorial governor William C.C. Claiborne a list of questions regarding French Louisiana’s 
borders, military apparatus, educational facilities, and legal systems.   
    As Jefferson attempted to become more acquainted with the new territory, he also began to tackle his 
own reservations over the constitutionality of the purchase.  During his tenure as Secretary of State, 
Jefferson and his fellow Republicans strongly advocated a strict construction of the Constitution.  For 
Jefferson, the Constitution served as a guide for Americans and their republican government.  To him, 
deviation or loose interpretation only undermined the very substance of the sacred document.  The 
Louisiana Purchase forced Jefferson to reconcile his strong desire to secure access to the Mississippi 
River with his strict constructionist views.  Jefferson finally chose to endorse the purchase, an act that 
the Constitution did not specifically authorize.   
    To alleviate the contradiction between his early beliefs and his executive actions, Jefferson suggested 
adding an amendment to the Constitution that would place the acquisition well within the bounds of the 
Constitution.  As early as January 1803, Jefferson mentioned his plans to Albert Gallatin, admitting that 
“it will be safer not to permit the enlargement of the Union but by an amendment to the Constitution.”7  
Once the Louisiana Purchase treaty was signed Jefferson immediately began preparing this 
amendment.  On August 12, 1803, Jefferson sent a draft to friend Senator John Breckinridge for his 
approval. 8  Days later a sense of urgency consumed the Jefferson administration when rumors 
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circulated that French officials were becoming reluctant to cede Louisiana.9  Jefferson quickly notified 
Breckinridge of the new development and urged him to remain silent about a constitutional amendment 
that could jeopardize a quick ratification of the cession treaty.10  This threat forced Jefferson to abandon 
his hopes for a new amendment.  Jefferson, however, felt assured that Congress’ “good sense of our 
country” would be able to address any constitutional issues the purchase engendered.11  Thus Jefferson 
was unwilling to sacrifice Louisiana for the sake of his own strict constructionist convictions.  Instead, he 
looked to the Eighth Congress to reconcile this constitutional quandary, encouraging its members to 
quickly ratify the cession treaty to secure the vast new territory.12                       
    Heeding Jefferson’s advice, the Senate immediately began examining the cession treaty.  Feeling the 
pressure of expediency, congressional leaders were forced to avoid any major debates on the 
constitutionality of the purchase and ratified the treaty within three days.  Although initial deliberations 
regarding the purchase provoked little debate, the months that followed allowed lawmakers to voice 
their concerns on a variety of issues regarding the acquisition and incorporation of French Louisiana.  
These debates exposed a strong partisan rift in Congress, but also generated vital questions concerning 
the stability of the young nation.  
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    After Jefferson’s election in 1800, Federalist leaders saw their political power dwindling as 
Republicans secured both the presidency and a congressional majority.13  The growing prominence of 
the Republicans convinced Federalists, particularly Massachusetts Senator Timothy Pickering, that 
there existed a Jeffersonian conspiracy to eradicate Federalist opposition.14  One issue that shaped 
Pickering’s suspicion was Jefferson’s assault on the federal judiciary.  The judiciary crisis, which 
claimed the career of one Federalist judge, appeared to Pickering as an effort by Republicans to destroy 
the independent federal judiciary by removing Federalist judges through the impeachment process.15  
Yet, ultimately the acquisition of French Louisiana became the Federalists’ major point of contention 
against the Jefferson administration.   
    Pickering’s conspiracy theories spread amongst Federalist circles.  William Plumer, James Hillhouse, 
Uriah Tracy, and Roger Griswold all came to share similar fears.  This coalition became so convinced of 
a Republican coup that they began making preparations to secede from the Union to save their party.16  
In devising this radical action, Pickering admitted that “I will rather anticipate a new confederacy, exempt 
from the corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic Democrats of the South.”17  This 
                                                 
     13 Malone, Jefferson the President: First Term, 110.  According to Malone, Jefferson exercised unprecedented 
power over the Eighth Congress as congressional leaders passed bills based on his recommendations.  Jefferson also 
used senators such as Breckinridge to ensure that legislation he desired would be introduced and passed in Congress.   
 
     14 Pickering to King, 4 March 1804, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King: Comprising His Letter, Private and 
Official, His Public Documents, and His Speeches, ed. Charles R. King  (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), IV: 364.  
Pickering referred to Jefferson as a “coward” who “could feel an infernal pleasure in the utter destruction of his 
opponents.” 
       
     15 Gerald H. Clarfield, Timothy Pickering and the American Republic  (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1980), 220-224.  John Pickering was the Federalist judge removed from office.  Judge Samuel Chase, in early 1805, 
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     16 King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, IV: 347-349.  Also see King to General Hamilton, 24, February 
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Federalist members of the Eighth Congress provides insight into the supposed Jefferson Conspiracy and Pickering’s 
secession plans.      
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confederacy was to include the New England states, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  
Moderate Federalists empathized with their political brethren, but most saw separation as impractical 
and quite detrimental not only to the Federalist Party but also to the nation.  Rufus King, Alexander 
Hamilton, and John Quincy Adams all expressed disapproval of Pickering’s calls for secession.  These 
moderate Federalists ignored the proposed confederacy, dooming it to failure.18    
    It is difficult to ascertain Jefferson’s real intentions or the validity of Pickering’s accusations.  Jefferson 
did, however, express his desire to unite moderate Federalists with Republicans, while eradicating the 
menacing presence of radical Federalists like Pickering who he viewed as political insurgents.19  During 
the Louisiana debates, Jefferson mocked Federalist accusations of a political conspiracy, contending 
that Pickering and his Federalist coalition created a Republican straw man made “of certain Jacobinical, 
atheistical, anarchical, imaginary caricatures … created to frighten the credulous.”20   
    As plans for a northern confederacy subsided, Federalist leaders continued to lament the 
acquisition of French Louisiana.  In his personal correspondence, John Quincy Adams bewailed 
the Louisiana Purchase, predicting that it would “diminish the relative weight and influence of the 
Northern section.”  Like his Federalist counterparts, he believed that states emerging from the new 
territory would enhance the clout of the slave South.21  Adams feared that this rising slave power 
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would emasculate northern political influence in Congress and destroy the economic welfare of 
New England.  Fellow Northeastern congressional leaders mirrored Adams’s apprehensions.  New 
Hampshire Senator William Plumer was particularly vexed by what he saw as a major threat to 
northeastern political leverage.  He envisioned that the new states carved out of the Louisiana 
Purchase would eventually be more inclined to the interests of the South both politically and 
economically.  Thus the incorporation of Louisiana would serve to “destroy with a single operation 
the whole weight and importance of the eastern states in the scale of politics.”22  Northern 
newspapers articulated this same anxiety, while depicting the Louisiana Purchase as the agent of 
New England’s ultimate demise.  In the Balance and Columbian Repository, a concerned 
Federalist called “Calculator” contended that the new Louisiana territory threatened to undermine 
the economic endeavors of older states.  Calculator expressed alarm that Louisiana “would tend to 
lessen, and finally almost to destroy” northeastern political influence.23   
    To protect Northern interests, Federalists tried to split Republican votes in Congress by adopting an 
unlikely platform centered on a strict construction of the Constitution.  Using this approach, Federalists 
hoped to appeal to more conservative Republicans wedded to old Jeffersonian arguments regarding 
constitutional interpretation.  Federalist opponents were clearly afraid that the purchase would dilute the 
political and economic influence of the Northeastern states.  To cloak this potent concern, Federalist 
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     22 William Plumer’s Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate, 1803-1807, ed. Everett Somerville 
Brown  (London: The Macmillan Company, 1923), 9.  William Plumer served as a Federalist Senator from New 
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Senate.  He provides not only the deliberations occurring during the Eighth Congress, but his own opinions and 
reactions to the Louisiana Purchase and the territorial government.   
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congressional members invoked strict constructionist rhetoric and assaulted Republican attempts to 
evade the Constitution to solidify their own party power.   
    One of the major components of the new Federalist attack centered on Jefferson’s excessive 
use of executive power in invoking the treaty-making power.  According to Article II, Section 2 of 
the Constitution, the president “shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”24  Federalist 
leaders accused Jefferson of exceeding these powers when he promised the immediate 
incorporation of Louisiana inhabitants.  According to Senator Plumer, only Congress could admit 
new states into the Union.25  In Plumer’s view, for Jefferson to guarantee citizenship and statehood 
to Louisianans meant that he intended to bypass the proper channels for admitting new states, 
which the Constitution vested in Congress.  Connecticut Senator Uriah Tracy also expressed 
severe reservations as to whether the treaty-making power actually authorized the president and 
Senate to incorporate Louisiana on the same footing as other American states.  He bluntly 
asserted that from “a fair construction of the constitution … the President and the Senate have not 
the power of thus obtruding upon us Louisiana.”26  Federalists depicted Jefferson as a despotic 
executive who made conscious attempts to evade the Constitution to secure his own agenda.   
    Republican members of the Senate were prepared to defend Jefferson’s actions.  Senator 
Breckinridge reminded his Federalist rivals that the Executive branch was the most appropriate avenue 
to negotiate with foreign diplomats.  Yet, this power, according to Breckinridge, was not without scrutiny 
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since Congress, not the president, ratified treaties and admitted new territories into the Union.27  Virginia 
Senator Wilson Carey Nicholas held similar sentiments, asserting that Jefferson had not exceeded the 
treaty-making power designated to him by the Constitution because Congress would check his actions 
by ratifying and providing the funds for the Louisiana Purchase.28   
    Federalist leaders, furthermore, expressed serious concerns over the vast size of the purchase and 
the sheer practicality of governing a distant territory.  Senator Plumer avowed that adding more spatial 
distance between the populace and the federal government in Washington would only dissolve the 
republic.29  Senator Samuel White prophesied that Louisiana’s fertile, empty lands would draw 
settlement away from the older states, causing settlers to sever ties with the federal government and 
thus alienating their affections to the nation and its principles.30  Federalist leaders thought that the vast 
size of Louisiana would strain the management capacity of the federal government and render the 
republic useless.  In attempts to counter such assertions, Republican congressional leaders argued that 
the addition of French Louisiana strengthened the republic by making it “more safe and more durable.”  
Breckinridge argued that in “proportion to the number of hands you intrust the precious blessings of free 
government to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their preservation.”31  
Breckinridge and other Republican leaders dismissed Federalist arguments over the size of the republic 
as anachronistic and looked to the purchase to strengthen the infant nation.   
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    Federalists also utilized constitutional rhetoric to strike at the heart of the Louisiana Purchase, 
attacking Republicans’ blatant disregard for Article IV of the Constitution.  The article gave Congress the 
power to admit new states at its discretion.  It failed, however, to mention the admission of states 
beyond the original borders of the United States or land ceded by a foreign nation.  Federalist leaders 
argued that the early founders opposed such an acquisition, since they did not specifically mention it in 
the Constitution.  Senator Plumer asserted that the Founding Fathers made no provisions for acquiring 
territory outside the original borders of the nation, thus never contemplating “the accession of a foreign 
people, or the extension of territory.”32  Vermont Representative James Elliot believed the treaty itself 
was unconstitutional, since the “constitution is silent on the subject of the acquisition of territory.” 33  
Republican leaders, however, took a more liberal view.  Virginia Representative John Randolph argued 
that since the founders failed to outline specific American borders, contemporary lawmakers had 
nothing hindering further expansion.  A representative from Massachusetts, Samuel Thatcher, also 
believed that since the Constitution failed to prohibit the acquisition of new territories Congress and the 
American people should resolve the issue together.34 
    In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting arguments, John Quincy Adams tried to convince his 
fellow lawmakers that a new amendment to the Constitution would alleviate the pressing congressional 
quandary.  He strongly believed an amendment allowed Congress, in good conscience, to make the 
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needed appropriations for the purchase and begin incorporating Louisiana into the Union.35  Pickering 
also contended that Louisiana could be incorporated only by a constitutional amendment.  He argued 
that failure to do so proved that Republicans sought to render the Constitution “a convenient instrument, 
to be shaped by construction, into any form that will best promote the views of the operator.”36   As 
Federalist leaders scoffed at Republicans’ disregard for the Constitution, only two Federalists supported 
Adams’s proposal for a new amendment.37  This indicates that Federalists had failed to whole-heartedly 
adopt a strict constructionist platform, but merely used it to disguise real concerns regarding the erosion 
of Northeastern influence.    
    During the first session of the Eighth Congress, the constitutional questions created by the Louisiana 
Purchase touched on many concerns pertaining to the infant nation.  The proper size of the republic, the 
national political balance, and the durability of the Constitution took center stage in both the House and 
Senate.  Federalists and Republicans alike wrestled to find the most appropriate means to decode the 
true meaning of Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution.  Federalists chose to take a strict approach in 
hopes of salvaging their political influence, while Republican leaders abandoned their former misgivings 
about a liberal constitutional interpretation to reap the benefits the purchase imparted.  Ultimately, 
Republicans won this battle as they proceeded with the incorporation process despite the absence of a 
constitutional amendment that sanctioned the purchase.   
    Although the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase proved a potent issue, members of the 
Eighth Congress also had to decide exactly what to do with Lower Louisiana’s ethnically diverse 
population.  Both Federalists and Republicans agreed that Louisianans were not prepared for immediate 
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statehood.  Yet congressional leaders seemed perplexed over what territorial government could assist 
Louisianans in becoming more acquainted with American political and legal institutions.  Concerns over 
the diminishing power of the Northeast or fears over the size of the burgeoning republic were fused with 
apprehensions that Louisianans’ ethnic background and colonial past made them unique and in need of 
a special territorial government that could effectively incorporate them into the young republic.   
**** 
    As Jefferson dealt with the constitutional issues of the Louisiana Purchase and growing Federalist 
unrest, he also began to prepare a government for the newly ceded territory.  He first looked to the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as a useful model.  The one great achievement of the Articles of 
Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance established uniform guidelines for the admission of new states 
into the Union.  Confederation lawmakers looked to the Ordinance to supply a three-step process for 
statehood.  The first grade of territorial status treated territorial inhabitants as subjects under the 
jurisdiction of Congress.  Therefore, lawmakers appointed all territorial officials such as the governor 
and judges.  When a territory’s population reached 5,000 free white males it was elevated to the second 
stage.  Here territorial inhabitants were allowed to form a legislative body and send a non-voting 
delegate to Congress.  During this phase, however, Congress still had the power to appoint top officials 
and veto any territorial legislation.  The third and final stage of the statehood process occurred when the 
territory’s population reached 60,000 people.  At this point, territorial inhabitants could hold a 
constitutional convention and apply for statehood.  Once Congress approved the constitution, the 
territory entered the Union on an equal footing with other American states.38   
                                                 
     38 ”An ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States, North-west of the river Ohio.” Library of 
Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Continental Congress & Constitutional Convention Broadsides 
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    Initially Jefferson hoped to implement the guidelines outlined in the Northwest Ordinance in Lower 
Louisiana.  Having 5,000 free white men, the Orleans Territory should have entered the second stage of 
the statehood process.  Yet as Jefferson received answers to his early inquiries from William C.C. 
Claiborne and Daniel Clark, he developed strong reservations.  Claiborne and Clark both reported that 
the colony had few existing educational programs and that most inhabitants were barely literate enough 
to write their own names.  In his observations, Claiborne concluded that Louisiana’s ignorant population 
needed a well-regulated government that could instruct them on every aspect of American political and 
social life. 39  This new information convinced Jefferson that the Northwest Ordinance would only turn 
Lower Louisiana’s laws “topsy-turvy.”40  Thus Jefferson began looking for a new territorial apparatus that 
could address Lower Louisianans’ special needs and perceived inadequacies.     
    Although the country’s short history provided few constitutional precedents about how to incorporate 
new territories, it did supply lessons on how to absorb immigrants into the Union.  American theories of 
citizenship were adaptations of English ideas concerning the subject-king relationship.  Sir Edward 
Coke’s ruling in the Calvin Case (1608) became the definitive understanding of English subjectship.41  
According to Coke, there existed a reciprocal allegiance between subject and king.  The subject 
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provided his loyalty and service to the Crown in exchange for protection and security.  There existed, 
however, a hierarchy of subjectship based on what type of allegiance one had with the Crown.  For 
those born in England, the bond between subject and king was a natural, self-perpetuating allegiance.42  
These subjects, therefore, received full rights of property ownership and access to certain political 
offices.  For subjects born outside the protection of the King and owing loyalty to another sovereign, 
Parliament could naturalize them or the King could grant royal patents of denization.  Naturalization 
placed aliens on the same footing as natural born subjects, while denization conferred limited rights, 
restricting subjects from owning property and holding pubic office.43   
    In British North America, these early notions of the subject-king relationship became blurred, as 
Anglo-Americans developed their own ideas of subjectship to accommodate their particular colonial 
experience.  The vast size of British North America necessitated a large and constant flow of new 
immigrants to make the colonies secure and economically viable.  As England failed to supply needed 
colonists, Anglo-Americans looked to other European countries to furnish new arrivals.  By the end of 
the seventeenth century, colonial assemblies took it upon themselves to naturalize and incorporate 
these newcomers, eradicating old distinctions between natural-born or denizen subjects and granting all 
new subjects full rights as Englishmen.  Survival and economic expansion, not doctrinal compliance to 
old English standards, dictated colonial policies.44  Parliament’s indifference to colonial naturalization 
policies also allowed colonists to create their own absorption methods with little interference from the 
mother country.  As a result, old European conceptions of subjectship faded as more immigrants 
became assimilated into British North America.      
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    As colonists constructed their individual naturalization policies they also altered Coke’s original 
theories of the subject-king allegiance.  Foreign immigrants’ military service and economic endeavors 
were major factors in the success of British North American colonies.  Native-born colonists soon 
realized that their own lives were improved by naturalizing incoming foreigners who contributed to the 
welfare of the community—creating a common assumption that foreigners who chose to work towards 
the common good justly deserved the same rights as Englishmen.  The allegiance that once existed 
between the King and his subjects was replaced with a communal bond between a community and an 
individual citizen.  This process also included consent and choice.  Since immigrants chose to come to 
certain colonies and contribute to their existence, this choice and commitment signified their right to full 
citizenship in British North America.45  
    With the formation of the Confederation government following the American Revolution, the 
independent thirteen states took over the naturalization duties once exercised by colonial assemblies.  
Qualifications for citizenship varied, yet all states sought to encompass key aspects of the new 
government within their policies.  Ultimately, two main prerequisites for citizenship were consistent in 
every state’s naturalization policy.  First, immigrants had to display a strong attachment to the United 
States, which included taking an oath of loyalty and disavowing affection to another nation.  Second, 
aliens had to demonstrate or obtain a basic knowledge of republican principles.  This usually required a 
probation or apprenticeship period that provided subjects with ample time to become acquainted with 
the intricate workings of the American government.46   
    Under the Articles of Confederation, states held sovereign power over naturalization, yet many 
lawmakers, such as James Madison, began to advocate a national policy to alleviate problems of 
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interstate variations.47  As the Constitutional Convention attempted to provide a federal political system, 
it also worked to devise a standardized procedure for the absorption of immigrants.  Although 
convention delegates failed to pass a comprehensive naturalization policy, they did address the utility of 
providing immigrants a proper probation period.  As evidenced by convention deliberations regarding 
residency requirements for congressional officials, delegates hoped to ensure that immigrants seeking 
office possessed both an attachment for the Union and essential political knowledge.   
    An early draft of the Constitution stated that an individual seeking a seat in the House of 
Representatives needed to have been an American citizen for at least three years while prospective 
senators required four.48  These debates exposed a particular concern regarding the proper time 
allotted an immigrant to foster the needed attachments and political expertise to become a public 
official.  Virginia delegate George Mason asserted that three years failed to supply ample time for a 
subject to sever ties to his mother country.  He feared that naturalized congressional leaders could 
introduce an unwanted foreign presence into the legislature.49  Mason also argued that three years was 
not long enough to ensure that new citizens had become acquainted with the workings of a republican 
government.  Remarks such as these reflect American apprehensions regarding how much time it took 
an immigrant to become a good American.  The final vote revealed that many convention delegates held 
similar concerns as they extended the proposed residency requirement to seven years for 
representatives serving in the House.50    
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    Similar debates occurred when discussing the four-year requirement for those seeking a seat in the 
Senate.  Delegates such as South Carolina’s Charles Cotesworth Pinckney felt that foreign-born citizens 
should be prohibited from the Senate, since this legislative body had foreign and diplomatic powers.  He 
contended that “there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign 
attachments” that could subvert congressional decisions on foreign affairs.51  Gouverneur Morris 
reiterated Pinckney’s warning, arguing that foreign-born citizens would impair the judgment of Senate 
members in dealing with international diplomacy and trade.52  Morris suggested that prospective 
Senators must be citizens for at least fourteen years rather than four.  Convention delegates finally 
compromised and established a nine-year residency requirement for Senate members.     
    The residency issue discussed in the Constitutional Convention exposed many anxieties about 
naturalized subjects and their ability to take part in the republican government while at the same time 
severing their former attachments.  Although the Constitutional Convention set key requirements for 
naturalized citizens seeking congressional office, it would be up to congressional members to create a 
national naturalization policy for the absorption of immigrants.   
    In 1790, Congress passed the first federal Naturalization Act.  The act required all immigrants seeking 
naturalization to have lived in the United States for at least two years.  Many American lawmakers 
argued that a longer tenure of residency was needed for subjects to sever former attachments to foreign 
nations.  To alleviate this concern, the act contained a clause requiring each subject to take an oath of 
allegiance to the Constitution, thus relinquishing all ties to his/her homeland.  Despite this added 
stipulation, most congressional leaders saw the act as too weak to ensure good American citizens.  
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Massachusetts Representative Benjamin Goodhue contended that the new law “made our citizenship 
too cheap,” and proposed a longer residency period for aliens seeking citizenship.  Connecticut 
Representative Benjamin Huntington concurred that only through a probationary period could 
immigrants have “an opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the principles of the Government, and of 
those who are most proper to administer it.” 53  Despite calls for a more stringent policy, the 1790 act 
served as the first of many naturalization laws that sought to secure attached and politically 
knowledgeable citizens.  Over the next ten years, congressional leaders would struggle to find a 
standard process of naturalization that provided immigrants a proper apprenticeship period in which to 
cultivate these vital requirements.   
    International strife in France and the West Indies prompted lawmakers to revise the 1790 
Naturalization Act.  As refugees from revolution-torn France and Haiti sought safe asylum in the United 
States, Washington lawmakers began developing a new naturalization policy in December 1794.54  
Virginia Representative William Branch Giles proposed that each subject seeking naturalization must 
have two witnesses to testify to his/her attachment to the country and good moral character.  He also 
argued that all aliens needed to swear an oath of allegiance to be “attached to a Republican form of 
Government.”55   
    In January 1795, the revised Naturalization Act extended residency requirements for prospective 
citizens from two years to five years.  The act stipulated that these subjects needed to announce their 
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intentions to be naturalized three years before admission.  This allowed subjects time to display their 
knowledge of and attachment to the principles of the Constitution.  Also new citizens were required to 
renounce any previous titles of European nobility and swear an oath of allegiance to the United States.56  
Many Federalist leaders such as Fisher Ames believed that a five-year apprenticeship period was still 
not long enough.  Rather Ames suggested that American lawmakers should “oblige foreigners to wait 
seven years…till their habits as well as interests become assimilated with our own.”57  Even though 
Federalist and Republican congressional members differed over how rigid the naturalization law should 
be, they shared a basic assumption that the federal government had a vested interest in the character, 
knowledge, and attachment of potential citizens.   
    In 1798, Federalist leaders were successful in implementing a more stringent naturalization act as a 
part of the Alien and Sedition Acts.  Moreover, the Federalist Congress used a possible war with France 
to undermine Republican support.58  According to historian John C. Miller, Federalists sought to deplete 
their rivals’ support by attacking the ethnic population that tended to vote in favor of Republicans.59  
They also hoped to keep new immigrants who populated middle or southern states of the country from 
threatening New England’s political influence.  In an effort to eradicate this ethnic threat, Federalists 
utilized the crisis with France to impose a stricter naturalization policy under the auspices of national 
security.  Although the debates regarding the new Naturalization Act and the Alien and Sedition laws 
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illustrated extreme political factionalism, they also mirrored earlier discussions on citizenship and what 
was required for immigrants seeking naturalization.        
    In House deliberations regarding the new naturalization policy, South Carolina Representative Robert 
Goodloe Harper argued that foreigners should never become American citizens, contending that 
“nothing but birth should entitle a man to citizenship in this country.”60  Harper did not wish incoming 
immigrants to be deprived of property rights, but he believed their former attachments to foreign nations 
made them unfit to vote or hold public office.  In May 1798, the new naturalization act passed in both the 
Senate and House.  The act included a fourteen-year residency requirement for those seeking American 
citizenship, stipulating that subjects announce their intent for admission at least five years prior to 
naturalization.  The act also contained a new clause that banned immigrants from belligerent countries 
from seeking citizenship.61  The 1798 Naturalization Act exposed deep-seated fears that incoming 
immigrants would destroy not only the federal government but also American domestic security if they 
were not subject to a longer apprenticeship period.    
    Upon Thomas Jefferson’s election in 1800, the Naturalization Act of 1798 was repealed and replaced.  
The new act reinstated requirements delineated in the 1795 act with a residency requirement of five 
years, requiring subjects to take an oath of allegiance.  The heart of the act still rested on the 
assumption that an apprenticeship period was crucial to allow immigrants time to foster political 
knowledge and an attachment to republican principles.  According to Pennsylvania Representative 
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Michael Leib, this probationary period “was the surest standard by which to test the desire for 
citizenship.”62   
    By 1803, Congress had passed various naturalization policies.  These pieces of legislation reveal a 
common consensus that naturalized citizens had to be loyal and politically competent.  The 
incorporation of Louisiana altered this absorption process.  Previously, American lawmakers extended 
citizenship on an individual basis or to small groups.  Yet in the case of Lower Louisiana citizenship 
would have to be extended to thousands of foreigners at one time.  Congressional leaders began to 
question how best to handle this mass naturalization.  Article III of the cession treaty with France, which 
guaranteed Louisianans immediate incorporation, only exacerbated the difficulty of this task.  Many 
worried about the long-term implications of allowing a population they deemed unfit into the Union.  
Others, however, feared that by depriving Louisianans of citizenship, congressional leaders might force 
their newest inhabitants to look unfavorably on their new government and perhaps incite rebellion.  
Ultimately, congressional members chose to ignore Article III and continued to look at a probationary 
period as necessary for Louisianans.  It is here that Samuel Mitchill, after weeks of contemplation, 
argued that the territorial period was to serve as an “apprenticeship to liberty” that gradually assimilated 
Louisianans into the Union, explaining that:  
It is intended, first to extend to this newly acquired people the blessings of law and 
social order.  To protect them from rapacity, violence, and anarchy….  In this way they 
are to be trained up in a knowledge of our own laws and institutions.  They are thus to 
serve an apprenticeship to liberty; they are to be taught the lessons of freedom; and by 
degrees they are to be raised to the enjoyment and practice of independence.  All of 
this is to be done as soon as possible; that is, as soon as the nature of the case will 
permit; and according to the principles of the Federal Constitution…. Secondly, after 
they shall have been sufficient length of time in this probationary condition, they shall, 
as soon as the principles of the Constitution permit, and conformably thereto, be 
declared citizens of the United States.  Congress will judge of the time, manner, and 
expediency of this.  The act we are now about to perform will not confer on them this 
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elevated character.  They will thereby gain no admission into this House, nor into the 
other House of Congress.  There will be no alien influence thereby introduced into our 
councils.  By degrees, however, they will pass on from the childhood of republicanism, 
through the improving period of youth, and arrive at the mature experience of manhood.  
And then, they may be admitted to the full privileges which their merit and station will 
entitle them to.63   
 
Mitchill certainly tried to find a middle ground.  He hoped to provide Louisianans enough rights to meet 
the most basic requirements stipulated in the cession treaty with France.  He, however, believed that an 
apprenticeship to liberty or probationary period protected the United States from a foreign and “politically 
ignorant” population by allowing Congress to set the incorporation timetable.  Moreover, he hoped that 
such an apprenticeship period would instill Louisianans with the skills to meet crucial requirements for 
American citizenship.     
    Mitchill’s plan soon met the approval of not only Congress but also President Jefferson.  After 
abandoning hopes of using the Northwest Ordinance, Jefferson devised a new, more rigid territorial 
government for Lower Louisiana that he believed would assist Louisianans in becoming true Americans.  
Jefferson’s ultimate plan, modeled after Mitchill’s apprenticeship to liberty, placed Lower Louisiana on 
the lowest grade of territorial status, depriving territorial inhabitants of representation and legislative 
powers.  Fears over Louisianans’ political ignorance and their ties to a “despotic” colonial past rendered 
them, in Jefferson’s eyes, incapable of participating in and appreciating a representative government.64      
    Jefferson looked to Senator Breckinridge to set his plans in motion.  Jefferson stressed the need to 
keep his authorship of the government bill secret.65   On December 9, 1803, Breckinridge submitted 
Jefferson’s plan, appropriately called the Breckinridge Bill, to the Senate for consideration.  As 
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expected, the bill made provisions to divide the purchase into two separate territories.  Everything north 
of the 33rd parallel was to be attached to the Indiana Territory, while Lower Louisiana was to become 
the Orleans Territory.  The legislative powers of the latter were given to the territorial governor and a 
small legislative council appointed by the President.  The bill also prohibited the further importation of 
slaves into the new territory.   
    Debates concerning the Breckinridge Bill illustrate that many lawmakers shared Jefferson’s 
sentiments regarding Lower Louisianans and the type of government they required.  Daniel Clark’s early 
reports and Governor Claiborne’s constant correspondence from the new territory supplied 
congressional leaders further validation that Louisianans were not ready for a republican government.  
In a letter to Secretary of State James Madison, Claiborne contended that “Republicanism among all her 
Friends here will find but few who have cultivated an acquaintance with her principles.”66  Five days 
later, Claiborne reiterated his early opinion, claiming that his contact with the territory’s inhabitants only 
further convinced him that they were unfit for a representative government.67   
    Claiborne’s observations of Louisianans’ political ignorance convinced members of the Eighth 
Congress that Louisianans were too unfamiliar with American institutions to elect competent territorial 
officials.  According to Senator Plumer, any sort of representative government was lost on Lower 
Louisiana inhabitants “who are not only ignorant of our laws, government, and usages under them, but a 
large portion of them wholly unacquainted with our language.”68  Senator Pickering repeated these 
sentiments, claiming that Louisianans were “incapable of enjoying freedom and the blessing of a free 
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government, they are too ignorant to elect suitable men.”69  There was considerable bipartisan support 
for the Breckinridge Bill as Federalists and Republicans agreed that the Orleans Territory needed a long 
apprenticeship period before admission into the Union.           
    With strong concerns about Louisianans’ political capabilities, American lawmakers found it easy to 
abandon the guidelines delineated in the Northwest Ordinance.  Much like President Jefferson, 
members of the Eighth Congress saw the Orleans Territory as too unique to fall under the provisions of 
the 1787 model.  When Ohio Senator Thomas Worthington moved to allow the Orleans Territory to send 
a delegate to Congress, many lawmakers recoiled at his motion.  In the case of the Northwest and the 
Mississippi territories, such a delegate was allowed to take part in congressional debates allowing 
territorial inhabitants a voice in Congress.  When it came to Lower Louisiana, however, many senators 
felt that this precedent was not applicable.  New Jersey Senator Jonathan Dayton claimed that the 
Orleans Territory was a unique territory, thus altering the standard process of territorial representation.  
Dayton avowed that Louisianans were neither guaranteed nor ready for a legislative delegate.70  Many 
members of the Eighth Congress felt that Louisianans were too unfamiliar with American republican 
values to elect or benefit from such a delegate.  
    Not all members of the Eighth Congress agreed that the Breckinridge Bill provided the best 
government for Lower Louisiana.  Some lawmakers felt that it not only violated the rights of the country’s 
newest inhabitants, but that it undermined cherished national values.  Tennessee Senator Joseph 
Anderson asserted that “this bill has not a single feature of our government in it.”  Rather, he saw the act 
as merely a system of tyranny, detracting from a republican form of government.71  Perhaps John 
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Quincy Adams was the strongest opponent of the Breckinridge Bill, believing that such a monarchial bill 
not only deprived Louisianans of their most basic liberties but also threatened to destroy the rights of the 
entire American citizenry.72  Virginia Representative John George Jackson also believed the bill failed to 
perpetuate true American values.  He asked his fellow congressmen, “What will the world say if we 
sanction this principle?  They will say we possess the principle of despotism under the garb of 
Republicans; and that we are insincere.”  Jackson wondered how members of the House could so 
loudly proclaim that all men were created equal while passing such an oppressive, un-American bill.73   
    Despite strong opposition from Anderson, Adams, and Jackson, the Breckinridge Bill passed on 
March 26, 1804.  Its final version entitled “An Act Erecting Louisiana into two territories, and providing 
for the temporary government thereof,” or commonly referred to as the Governance Act of 1804, split 
lands acquired in the Louisiana Purchase into the Louisiana District and the Orleans Territory.74  This 
act also set up the territorial government of the newly formed Orleans Territory, placing legislative 
powers in the hands of the governor and a legislative council appointed by the president.  The judicial 
powers of the territory rested in a superior court of three judges who were also selected by the 
Executive.  The Governance Act made no mention of an elected legislative body for Lower Louisianans 
or the population requirements for future statehood. 75    
    Furthermore, the bill also addressed the future of slavery in the Orleans territory.  According to 
Section X of the Governance Act, “It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to import or bring into 
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the said territory, from any port or place without limits of the United States, or cause or procure to be so 
imported or brought, or knowingly to aid or assist in so importing or bringing any slave or slaves.”76  This 
particular section prohibited the foreign importation of slaves into the territory, a restriction not imposed 
on American slaveholders until 1808.  Article X also limited the domestic slave trade to American 
citizens and Louisianans who had resided in the territory for at least three years.  This added provision 
threatened the economic livelihood of many Louisiana planters and traders.  
**** 
    Although for years to come many Federalists would continue to disparage the Louisiana Purchase as 
an unconstitutional and detrimental acquisition, members of the Eighth Congress adjourned until the 
next congressional session with a sense of relief that “the curse” of Louisiana had temporarily been 
lifted.  French Louisiana had been officially transferred to the United States, the financial appropriations 
for the purchase secured, and the republic remained intact.  Concomitantly, congressional leaders 
looked at the 1804 Governance Act, although uncharacteristically undemocratic, as the ideal 
apprenticeship to liberty.   
   While congressional leaders took a short reprieve from the rigors of office, Lower Louisianans were 
preparing for a heated dispute over the Governance Act and what they viewed as an oppressive 
government that deprived them of their rights as new Americans.  Furthermore, Louisianans were ready 
to reveal their own hopes and aspirations for the incorporation process.  As the debates regarding the 
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Louisiana Purchase subsided in Congress, a new battle emerged between Washington lawmakers and 
their newest inhabitants as Louisianans employed strategies of negotiation to carve out their place in the 
young American republic.      
 52 
Chapter Two: “Designing intrigueing men”:  Creole Resistance and Negotiation in Territorial 
Louisiana 
 
    Territorial Governor William C. C. Claiborne grew accustomed to pacing around his office 
pondering the many issues facing his administration.  Lately he carried the weight of the recent 
Burr Conspiracy that cast doubt on the loyalty of his constituents and the tranquility of his 
precarious territory.  He worried about the Legislative Assembly handicapped by ethnic feuds and 
partisan rivalries.  The territory’s legal code also caused Claiborne grave concern as the battle over 
civil law left the court system in utter disarray.  Yet on this balmy day in June 1807, Claiborne 
paced a straight line with only one thing on his mind: his life.  After slowly walking ten paces, 
Claiborne turned and faced his adversary Daniel Clark.  As Clark shot his pistol, Claiborne fell to 
the ground as a bullet pierced his right thigh.  Clark stood unshaken as his second man, Richard 
Keen, went to check the extent of the governor’s injuries.  Soon spectators carried the wounded 
governor to a boat to take him to the nearest doctor.  Leaving the duel ashamed and in pain, 
Claiborne could not help but wonder how things had come this far.1   
    As Claiborne remained confined to his home unable to walk for nearly a month, territorial 
inhabitants seemed mesmerized by the duel between the troubled governor and one of the 
territory’s most trusted leaders.  Virginian, and recent transplant to New Orleans, Elisabeth House 
Trist narrated the sordid details to her good friend back home.  She explained that the duel 
stemmed from a longtime feud between the two men exacerbated when Clark spread erroneous 
rumors about Claiborne.  She also indicated that Clark’s actions were a result of his growing 
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resentment with the American government.2  Although petty gossip often exaggerates the truth 
behind such events, Trist’s understanding was quite correct.  Months before the duel, Clark made 
his way to Washington D.C. to serve as the Orleans territorial delegate to Congress.  In December, 
he took the floor to express his concerns regarding the state of Lower Louisiana.  There he 
disparaged Claiborne’s ineffective leadership that, he claimed, left the territorial militia in a state of 
disarray.3    
    In the wake of Clark’s comments, Claiborne scurried to uphold the reputation of his 
administration.  In several correspondences with President Jefferson, Claiborne explained that all 
necessary measures had been taken to strengthen the territorial militia.  He went on to expose the 
context of Clark’s fallacious statements, arguing that “there are men in New Orleans whose primary 
object seems to be to embarrass every measure of the Government, at least such as it is my duty 
to execute.”4  In the weeks to come, Clark refused to retract his statements, prompting Claiborne to 
challenge him to a duel.   
    The famous duel was much more than an isolated event that captivated territorial inhabitants 
and bruised the ego of the sensitive and often timid governor.  Rather it served as a culmination of 
an ongoing struggle between Claiborne and territorial inhabitants determined to resist American 
policies.  Claiborne himself always remained cognizant of this growing opposition, yet at times 
misrepresented its true nature.  To Claiborne territorial resistance was not the result of 
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Louisianans’ dislike of the American government, but rather a small group of scheming men set on 
destroying his administration.  Claiborne often spoke of such men.  On one occasion, he explained 
to President Jefferson that “the Natives of Louisiana, are a pacific amiable people much attached 
to this Country, and to peace and good order,” yet he worried that his constituents were susceptible 
to being swayed by “a few designing intrigueing men” who sought to corrupt them.5  Later he 
reiterated his fears to James Madison, contending that “I shall never cease to believe Louisianans 
are an amiable, well disposed people, but I fear they are too easily influenced by the councils of 
men who flatter them.”6   
    The designing men that Claiborne referred to were not native Louisianans, but rather Americans 
living in New Orleans.  These Americans included Claiborne’s duel partner Daniel Clark as well as 
Jeffersonian and former New Yorker Edward Livingston.  In Claiborne’s view, these men constantly 
worked to arouse discontent among Louisianans and orchestrated opposition to American policies.  
Indeed, both Clark and Livingston were the ringleaders to a resistance movement that dominated 
much of Claiborne’s time and led to the fateful duel.   
    Claiborne, however, was often quite naïve in assessing Louisianans’ intentions and participation.  
He remained convinced that Clark and Livingston maliciously encouraged unsuspecting 
Louisianans to resist and stall Americanization and incorporation efforts.  He seemed to believe 
that Louisianans were just too uninformed and trusting to see that they were being adversely 
influenced.  Yet his views reveal his own ignorance.  Although many territorial inhabitants were 
quite happy with aspects of the American government, many harbored serious reservations.  From 
the moment France transferred Lower Louisiana to the United States, Louisianans worried about 
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their future as Americans and the threat it posed to their economic, political, and cultural interests.  
These fears were only exacerbated when the 1804 Governance Act deprived Louisianans of a 
representative government and banned the slave trade.  As Louisianans fought the hated act they 
also worked towards the continuation of civil law.  Louisianans had specific aspirations for the 
incorporation process and did not passively sit back and wait for Washington lawmakers to 
“Americanize” them.  Rather they employed many strategies to shape the incorporation process on 
their own terms.   
     Louisianans often turned to men with experience and knowledge to help them find the proper 
vehicles for negotiation.  Thus the resistance movement that beset Claiborne was much more than 
a creation of a few disgruntled Americans; rather it was an attempt by Louisianans to receive the 
privileges of American citizenship while preserving aspects of their French heritage.  Lacking vital 
political knowledge and experience, these Louisianans turned to people who possessed the skills 
to make their resistant efforts most effective.  Both Clark and Livingston, having former dealings 
with the American government as well as proficiency in French, had the means to communicate 
and guide members of Louisiana’s ancient population.  Therefore, these “designing intrigueing 
men” did not lead Louisianans astray, but rather led them in their attempts to shape the 
incorporation process.  What Claiborne failed to see was that Louisianans were ready and willing to 
negotiate with American lawmakers.  They turned to strong leadership to make this happen and 
were not passive actors swayed by crooks and scamps.   
    That day, as he was carried away from his defeat, Claiborne not only bore years of worry about 
Louisianans’ opposition to his administration, but carried a physical scar of his turbulent contest 
with the anti-American resistance movement.  Although many territorial inhabitants became 
engrossed by the gossip and scandal of the famous event, to Claiborne it meant much more.  He 
 56 
had succumbed to Clark’s trickery and now his reputation and life were put in jeopardy.  Yet even 
on that day, Claiborne remained hopeful that his constituents were loyal to the United States and 
that they were just entranced by men with ulterior motives.  It never occurred to him that 
Louisianans were merely using such designing men to help them negotiate a place for themselves 
in the young republic.   
**** 
    Governor William C.C. Claiborne in many respects could be described as a true optimist.  When 
he accepted his appointment as the governor of the Orleans Territory he recognized that it would 
be an arduous task.  He would not only be in charge of a large ethnically and racially diverse 
people, but he was also responsible for implementing policies to prepare such a population for 
statehood.  Despite his years of loyal service to the American government as a congressional 
member and the former governor of the Mississippi Territory, Claiborne came to his new position 
with many shortcomings.  Many worried that at the age of twenty-eight he lacked vital experience.  
He was largely unfamiliar with Louisianans’ legal apparatus, he knew little of their cultural 
mannerisms, and he did not speak French.  New Hampshire Senator William Plumer ridiculed 
Claiborne’s appointment, claiming that “the office is important & requires a man of talents, 
information, & efficiency.  He has not one of those qualities.”  Even President Jefferson admitted 
that he selected Claiborne because the candidates he found more suitable refused to take the job.7  
Despite these inadequacies, Claiborne remained hopeful that he would obtain a knowledge and 
appreciation for his constituents.  He also believed that Louisianans would gradually become 
accustomed to the American government and accept their place in the young republic.  He 
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constantly conveyed this optimism to Washington lawmakers, assuring them that Louisianans 
possessed the desire to be good Americans and loyal members of the Union.   
    Yet Claiborne’s correspondence also revealed apprehension.  Almost immediately after taking 
possession of Lower Louisiana, Claiborne’s hopes for a smooth transition were dimmed by the 
realties of his new position.  One of Claiborne’s first tasks as territorial governor involved curtailing 
French and Spanish influence lingering within New Orleans.  Marques de Casa Calvo, the former 
Spanish governor of Louisiana, failed to vacate the city following the transfer of Louisiana from 
Spain to France.  Calvo’s presence in the territory caused Claiborne great political distress and 
fueled Spanish opposition to American occupation.  French Colonial Prefect Pierre Clément de 
Laussat also attempted to instigate anti-American sentiments among French and Creole 
inhabitants.  On several occasions Laussat promised Louisianans that Napoleon intended to retake 
Louisiana once he defeated the British in Europe.  Casa Calvo circulated similar gossip, claiming 
Spain hoped to negotiate the exchange of Lower Louisiana for Spanish West Florida. 8  Both 
French and Spanish military forces also loitered around their old posts and barracks until the later 
months of 1804.  This undesired colonial interference created an anxious atmosphere in New 
Orleans and frustrated Claiborne’s efforts to begin the incorporation process.   
    As Claiborne tried to restrain colonial influences, he also confronted persistent complaints from 
his constituents.  Within a month of taking control of Louisiana, Claiborne admitted to James 
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Madison that “a few of the French Officers and Citizens who are here, continue to evidence a 
disorderly disposition; they are mortified at the loss of this delightful Country and seem to foster 
great hatred to the Americans who are here.”9  Claiborne failed to mention that he was one such 
American.  Louisianans intently vocalized their disapproval of their new governor.  They resented 
Jefferson’s appointment of a leader who barely spoke French and possessed little knowledge of 
their legal and political institutions.  James Brown, a member of the Louisiana Superior Court, 
complained that Claiborne was “Ignorant of the languages of the Country,” and labored “under 
great disadvantages, and finds it impossible to withstand the general cry of unpopularity with which 
he is assailed.”10  New Orleans inhabitants also protested Claiborne’s creation of the Court of 
Pleas designed to introduce common law in the territory, while supplanting Louisianans’ civil 
authorities with American judges unaccustomed to their legal procedures and language.   
    As he arbitrated complaints, Claiborne also had to curb ethnic feuds that became commonplace 
in the streets and dance halls of New Orleans.  On one particular night, hostilities broke out 
between American and French partygoers who fought over the choice of waltzes played at a 
dance.  Another such feud took place on Bastille Day as Frenchmen hoisted a French flag and 
sang national songs.  Such festivities angered many Americans who attempted to take down the 
flag.  City authorities arrived before violence ensued, but many left the scene vowing revenge.11  
Spaniards also had their own violent encounters with new residents when an American sailor was 
attacked by a Spanish guard as he passed by Governor Casa Calvo’s house.12  Such ethnic 
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clashes showed Claiborne that perhaps his sheer optimism would not be enough to soothe the 
cultural tensions that existed between ancient Creoles and incoming Americans. Angry 
constituents and lingering colonial officials aggravated Claiborne’s hopes for a smooth transition 
and kept him quite busy.  His first six months in office proved challenging as he confessed to 
Washington lawmakers that “scarcely a week passes by, but something occurs to create anxiety 
and to occasion me trouble.”13  
    Although rumors of a possible Spanish and French takeover as well as ethnic feuds in the 
streets of New Orleans remained common occurrences throughout the territorial period, nothing 
became more troublesome to the hopeful governor than the appearance of a small group of men 
determined to hinder all of his administrative efforts.  At first Claiborne attributed territorial 
dissatisfaction to a group of Frenchmen who lamented the Louisiana Purchase.  Yet soon 
Claiborne recognized the source of discontent came not from a few disappointed Frenchmen, but 
rather an anti-American movement “directed by a few intriguing; Designing Men,” who “Avail 
themselves to excite fear and suspicion.”14   
   Claiborne continued to monitor the burgeoning resistance movement and by the summer of 1804 
he clearly identified his “designing intrigueing men.”  In the months following the transfer of French 
Louisiana to the United States, Louisianans remained anxious to receive a permanent government 
and statehood.  As Washington lawmakers debated the Breckinridge Bill in Congress, Louisianans 
waited for good news.  In early March, before the Governance Act received final approval, 
Louisianans heard that one of the provisions of the bill banned the importation of slaves into the 
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territory.  In response, a Bostonian named Mr. Tupper called a meeting in New Orleans to discuss 
the rumored ban.  At the small gathering, American John Watkins urged territorial inhabitants to 
select a three-man committee to draft a memorial conveying their thoughts and concerns to 
Congress.  Watkins’s proposal was unanimously accepted.15  Although Claiborne saw this meeting 
as a harmless assembly of concerned citizens, he did express concern, claiming that “the success 
which this man Tupper has met with is a strong proof of the mischief a designing unprincipled Man 
may do in Louisiana.”16       
    When the 1804 Governance Act finally passed, it reaffirmed Louisianans’ fears and generated 
scorn.  Louisianans immediately resented their low grade of territorial status as well as their new 
government that deprived them of a voice in their political fate.  In addition, Louisianans 
condemned the prohibition on the slave trade, feeling that it violated their property rights and 
challenged their economic livelihoods.  The Governance Act’s failure to set guidelines for future 
statehood also caused Louisianans grave concern regarding their future in the republic.         
    On June 1, 1804, nearly forty concerned citizens assembled in New Orleans including Mayor 
James Pitot as well as Americans Daniel Clark, Edward Livingston, and Evan Jones.17  The 
purpose of this meeting was three-fold.  First, attendees hoped to make preparations for drafting a 
memorial to Congress regarding the Governance Act.  They selected Edward Livingston and three 
                                                 
     15 Claiborne to Madison, 16 March 1804, Ibid., II: 42-48. 
 
     16 Claiborne to Madison, 10 March 1804, Ibid., II: 25-26.   
     17 Evan Jones was born and raised in New York.  His many commercial interests took him to West Florida where he 
fostered strong bonds with the Spanish colonial government.  Soon his business enterprises took him and his brother 
James to New Orleans where they worked on behalf of Philadelphia and New York merchants.  His presence in New 
Orleans and preexisting ties with the Spanish government earned Jones several commissions in the Spanish militia, 
serving as a sub-lieutenant (1787) and captain (1792).  By 1797, Spanish Governor Gayoso appointed Jones as 
commandant of Lafourche District in Louisiana.  His extensive time in Louisiana and vital connections rendered Jones 
the respect of many Washington lawmakers.  In 1799, Timothy Pickering appointed Jones the American consul to New 
Orleans.  He was later replaced by Daniel Clark.  Vernet, “Strangers on Their Native Soil,” 17-23.      
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other prominent ancient Creoles to undertake this important task.  Next, the assembly decided that 
once completed the memorial would be circulated throughout the territory to procure signatures of 
support.  Finally, they agreed to select three agents to go to Washington and present the memorial 
to Congress.  When the meeting adjourned Livingston and Mayor Pitot personally met with 
Governor Claiborne to disclose the proceedings as well as inform him of Louisianans’ future course 
of action.18   
    Somewhat concerned about Louisianans’ large outpouring of dissent, Claiborne remained 
supportive of their efforts.  He recognized that the Governance Act engendered many complaints.19   
He, however, also remained convinced that the meeting illustrated that certain men sought to 
intensify Louisianans’ anxiety, explaining that “many adventurers … possess revolutionary 
principles and restless, turbulent dispositions;--these Men will for some years give trouble more or 
less to the local Government, and will unquestionably excite some partial discontents.”  He went on 
to argue that “although the Louisianans are by nature as amiable a people as I ever lived among, 
yet for the want of general information they are uncommonly credulous, and a few designing 
intrigueing men may easily excite some inquietude in the public mind.”20   
    As Claiborne hoped to curb political unrest, on July 1, 1804, nearly 140 white New Orleanians 
reconvened and unanimously approved the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana Against the 
Political System Adopted by Congress for Them.  Although assisted by a Creole committee, 
Edward Livingston wrote the bulk of the widely accepted memorial.  He used respectful, but stern 
language.  He also tried to appeal to American sympathies by invoking rhetoric from the 
                                                 
     18  Edward Livingston Papers, MSS C0280, Box 7, Folder 24, Special Collections, Princeton University.        
     19  Claiborne to Madison, 3 June 1804, Letter Books, II: 190-191; Claiborne to Madison, 1 July 1804, Ibid., II: 234.  
     20  Claiborne to Jefferson, 29 May 1804, Ibid., II: 175-176.  
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Declaration of Independence and other revolutionary tracts.  He went so far as to challenge 
Washington lawmakers by asking, “Do political axioms on the Atlantic become problems when 
transferred to the shores of the Mississippi?  Or are the unfortunate inhabitants of these regions 
the only people who are excluded from those equal rights acknowledged in our declaration of 
independence.”21  Livingston presented Louisianans’ grievances touching on issues from statehood 
to the slave trade.  Once his memorial was read aloud, attendees signed it and selected twelve 
agents to take the Remonstrance to citizens throughout the territory.  Daniel Clark, a respected 
resident of New Orleans, led the signature campaign hoping his popularity could generate support 
for the memorial.  His efforts bore fruit when he obtained nearly 2000 signatures.  In one last 
meeting on July 18, Jean Noel Destrehan, Pierre Sauvé, and Pierre Derbigny were selected as 
agents who would carry the completed and signed memorial to Congress.22   
    As Louisianans prepared to send their memorial, Claiborne identified his “designing intrigueing 
men.”  To him Daniel Clark and Edward Livingston served as instrumental leaders in Louisianans’ 
protest efforts against the Governance Act.  Although he had originally believed Livingston had little 
interest in New Orleans political affairs, Claiborne soon had a change of heart.  He informed James 
Madison that “he [Livingston] has late become the warm advocate of the Rights of Louisiana and is 
                                                 
     21 Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana Against the Political System Adopted by Congress for Them, American 
State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C: Gales 
and Seaton), Miscellaneous, I: 397. 
 
     22  Claiborne to Madison, 26 July 1804, Letter Books, II: 269-272; Marietta Marie LeBreton, “A History of the 
Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812”  (Ph.D. diss. Louisiana State University, 1969), 121-122.  The three delegates chosen 
to submit the Remonstrance to Congress were all Frenchmen.  Pierre Derbigny served as an interpreter for 
government officials and later became governor of Louisiana in 1828.  Pierre Sauvé was a French merchant who later 
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English but was a well respected man in New Orleans.  William Dunbar to President Jefferson, 15 October 1804, 
Territorial Papers, IX: 305n.   Upon receiving the three agents in Congress, William Plumer explained that “They are all 
Frenchmen-the two speak our language fluently.  They are all gentlemen of the first respectability in that country.  Men 
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among the most distinguished, and the most active of those who disapprove the measures of the 
Government.”  Claiborne also warned Madison about Daniel Clark, arguing that he “also manifests 
much discontent at the proceedings of the Government.  From the first period of my arrival to the 
present day, Mr. Clark (in conjunction with one or perhaps two other persons) have made great 
exertions to injure me here.”23   
    Within a few more weeks, Claiborne’s opinions turned from frustration to disdain when he 
divulged to members of Jefferson’s administration that “I once thought that Mr. Livingston would be 
an acquisition to Louisiana, where men of Science and political information are so much wanting; 
but now I fear he will become a troublesome member of our political society, and I do sincerely 
regret that he ever left New York.”24  As Claiborne disparaged his major political enemies, he also 
bewailed New Orleans newspapers for being a tool for destruction.  “The citizens of Louisiana 
hereof Strangers to the Liberty of the press cannot well bear with its licentiousness” he confessed 
to Julien Poydras.  He feared that Louisianans were swayed by newspapers that disseminated 
anti-American rhetoric.25       
    Although Claiborne remained certain that Clark and Livingston were out to destroy him, he never 
wavered in his faith in Louisianans.  In his many correspondences with Washington lawmakers, he 
took pains to stress how peaceful and amiable he found his newest constituents.  On one 
occasion, he assured James Madison that “in a few years Louisianans will be among the most 
                                                 
     23 Claiborne to Madison, 3 June 1804, Territorial Papers, IX: 242.   
 
     24 Vernet, “Strangers on Their Native Soil,” 135.   
 
     25 Claiborne to Julien Poydras, 8 August 1804, Letter Books, II: 293-295; Claiborne to General Wilkinson, 10 August 
1804, Ibid., II: 305-306. 
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grateful of our citizens, and admirers of our Union and government.”26  He never could conceive 
that Louisianans sought to oppose or challenge the American government nor stall the 
incorporation process.  He chose, rather, to believe that Louisianans, lacking knowledge and 
experience, were too easily swayed to join resistance efforts.  He depicted Louisianans as being 
almost too naïve to understand that men such as Clark and Livingston were using them for 
malicious purposes.  To truly appreciate Claiborne’s accusations and to assess Louisianans’ 
participation in the growing resistance movement, one must first understand the governor’s political 
adversaries.   
    Born in Sligo, Ireland, Daniel Clark arrived in Philadelphia in 1786, where he lived for several 
months.  He made his way to New Orleans when his uncle secured him a clerking position.  Once 
there he wasted little time in moving up the ranks of New Orleans society, becoming a partner in a 
prominent law firm and making friends with New Orleans elites and Spanish governor Don Estaban 
Miro.  His relationship with Miro eventually earned Clark a position as a secretary in the governor’s 
office.  Soon Clark helped run every aspect of the Spanish regime in Louisiana.  A resourceful, 
ambitious young man, he used his new political connections to render economic profit.  In 1793, 
having entered into a business partnership with a former Philadelphia acquaintance, Clark began 
manipulating Spanish shipping regulations to secure cheaper duties for his new partner and other 
American merchants.     
    In 1798, Clark became an American citizen as his career took an unexpected turn.  When 
American lawmakers organized the Mississippi Territory, Clark was asked to serve as the interim 
consul to New Orleans.  His new appointment allowed him to continue to negotiate advantageous 
trading concessions for American merchants, but also gained him considerable influence with 
                                                 
     26 Claiborne to Madison, 3 July 1804, Ibid., II: 234-236. 
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Washington lawmakers.  By 1802, President Jefferson made Clark New Orleans’ regular consul.27  
Although Jefferson’s appointment honored Clark’s special skills, it also fulfilled the president’s own 
diplomatic agenda.  When the Spanish ceded Louisiana back to the French in 1800, Jefferson 
sought to secure American access to the port of New Orleans as well as information about 
Spanish/French relations.  Perfectly suited to serve as Jefferson’s agent, Clark took great pains to 
represent American interests.  Within months of becoming consul, Clark personally went to France 
to rendezvous with American diplomats Robert Livingston and James Monroe.  There he met with 
French officials hoping to ascertain their intentions.  His time in France convinced him that 
Americans needed to take decisive action to secure New Orleans.  He crafted grand visions of 
Louisianans’ diverse population uniting with American forces to overthrow the French regime in a 
glorious bloodless revolution.28  When he returned to New Orleans in 1803 only to find that the 
French had suspended American trade, he saw his opportunity to make his dreams of a new 
Louisiana come true.  He immediately enlisted the help of Mississippi Governor William C.C. 
Claiborne and General James Wilkinson.  He offered nearly $150,000 of his own money to assist in 
the Louisiana revolt.  Claiborne wavered, unsure of the expedition’s success.29   
    By 1803, Clark had become a trusted friend of the American government and a prominent man 
in New Orleans.  His relationship with Spanish officials gave him insights that advanced both his 
                                                 
     27 A consul is the official representative of the United States in territories belonging to another nation.  The consul’s 
duties often include assisting and protecting American citizens in the territory and maintaining commercial relations.  
Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America  (Washington: U.S. G.P.0.).     
 
     28 Clark was often aggressive in his calls for an American invasion of Louisiana, arguing to James Madison that “the 
Inhabitants … cry out against our temporizing when our dearest interest imperiously call us to embrace the favorable 
moment for acting and they see it pass and themselves on the point of falling under the lash of government they detest 
and whose cause they may be afterwards by a military force obliged to sacrifice their lives, by bearing arms against 
whom they now invite as delivers.” Quote found in Vernet, “Strangers on Their Native Soil,” 25-26.   
 
     29 Ibid., 28.  Confident in his cause, Clark tried to reassure Claiborne by putting his estate in trust to be divided 
amongst them if the expedition indeed failed.   
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political and economic career.  Moreover, his attempts to help Americans secure Louisiana, 
although often unorthodox, earned him the appreciation of Washington lawmakers.  In the months 
following the Louisiana Purchase, Clark continued to help the Jefferson administration.  Utilizing his 
extensive knowledge of Lower Louisiana, he submitted several reports providing information on 
everything from the colonial militia to Indians.  He even took time to write down suggestions 
regarding the type of government necessary for Louisiana’s diverse population.  He instructed 
American lawmakers to “bear in mind that the People of this country are an assemblage of all 
nations most of whom have no idea of a good government, are only kept in order by the Hand of 
Power, are excessively ignorant and maybe easily imposed upon, therefore there will be the 
greater necessity for being prepared for any event whatever.”30  Clark’s relations with the Jefferson 
administration positioned him to be a key leader in the Orleans territorial government—or so he 
thought.   
    In October 1803, Jefferson appointed William C.C. Claiborne the governor of the Orleans 
Territory.  Needless to say Clark was far from thrilled.  Although he never openly admitted it, Clark 
harbored aspirations of becoming territorial governor.31   Personal ambitions aside, Clark also 
questioned Claiborne’s ability to handle his new appointment.  He was particularly unimpressed 
when Claiborne failed to take the initiative to seize New Orleans several years before.  Being 
                                                 
     30 Daniel Clark to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1803, Territorial Papers, IX: 28-47.  Clark also sent Jefferson 
An Account of the Indian Tribes in Louisiana, where he listed the location and population of local tribes.  See Vernet, 
“Strangers on Their Native Soil,” 35.  Quote found in Michael Stephen Wohl, “A Man in Shadow: The Life of Daniel 
Clark” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1984), 82.   
 
     31 Benjamin Morgan to Chandler Price, 11 August 1803, Territorial Papers, IX: 7-9.  According to Morgan, “Clark 
swears he will hold no office now the object of his wishes is compleat.  I know better, he expects to be made a member 
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his statement, arguing that “I have good reason to believe he wishes to be appointed governor of this country and 
suppose interest will be made for him by his friends Philad.” 
.   
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passed over for a position that he so clearly deserved would be a constant source of resentment 
for Clark that continued to grow during the territorial period.32   
    Unlike Clark, Edward Livingston was a new transplant to the Crescent City.  Originally from New 
York, Livingston came from one of the United States’ most prominent political families.  His brother 
Robert was a member of the Continental Congress, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, 
and one of the diplomats that secured the purchase of French Louisiana.  Instrumental figures in 
the Democratic-Republican Party in New York, both Livingston brothers became trusted supporters 
of Thomas Jefferson.  Despite his longtime friendship with Aaron Burr, Edward cast one of the 
deciding votes in the New York congressional delegation that helped Jefferson capture his first 
presidential victory.33  During his six-year tenure in the House of Representatives, Edward 
continued to advance the Republican agenda.  His efforts were soon rewarded when President 
Jefferson appointed him as the United States District Attorney.  In that same year he also became 
the mayor of New York City.  Both jobs provided an ample salary that allowed the younger 
Livingston to continue to enhance his family’s political prestige.34     
    At times the rigors of holding two demanding political positions took their toll on Livingston’s 
administration.  In the District Attorney’s office, he placed a clerk in charge of the collection of 
federal taxes.  However, he failed to regulate the clerk’s activities and financial handlings.  Soon an 
                                                 
     32 American National Biography  (New York: Oxford University Press) IV: 920-921.  There exists no collection of 
Clark’s papers or correspondence.  For a biographical sketch of Clark see John S. Kendall, “The Strange Case of Myra 
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“Philadelphia-Spanish New Orleans Trade in 1790s” Louisiana History 2 (1961).  General James Wilkinson once 
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     33 Edward Livingston Papers, MSS C0280, Box 80, Folder 8; William B. Hatcher, Edward Livingston: Jeffersonian 
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annual audit revealed that the clerk stole nearly $40,000 for his own personal use.  Livingston’s 
leadership skills and reputation were soon put into question as many wondered if the District 
Attorney knew about the scandal.  Livingston assumed full responsibility for the missing funds and 
tirelessly tried to pay them back.  As he succumbed to yellow fever, his political allies in the 
Jefferson administration called for his removal.  By August 1803, Livingston submitted his 
resignation as District Attorney and mayor.35  Facing a federal investigation and accusations of 
financial misconduct, the one-time feted New Yorker found himself a political outcast and in need 
of a change of venue.     
    When Americans learned about the Louisiana Purchase, many heralded this new unbounded 
world as a land of opportunity.  Livingston could not escape the buzz about the United States’ 
newest acquisition.  As his brother Robert disclosed many intimate details regarding Lower 
Louisiana’s endless advantages, Edward was lured by the promise of new economic possibilities 
and the escape Lower Louisiana had to offer.  As the U.S. District Court met to decide his fate, 
Livingston sailed for New Orleans with nothing more than $1000 he borrowed from his brother and 
hopes for the future.36   
    Livingston quickly acclimated to his new surroundings.  His refinement, former wealth, and 
knowledge of French allowed him to integrate into New Orleans society with ease.  He even 
managed to meet and wed Madame Louise Moreau de Lassy, a French refugee from St. 
                                                 
     35 Ibid., 93-97.  Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin was Livingston’s most vocal opponent.  He called for his 
resignation almost the moment the scandal was revealed.   
 
     36 In the months following the Louisiana Purchase, many Americans viewed Louisiana as a new frontier where 
fortunes could be made.  Many newspapers proliferated this idea.  See National Intelligencer, 25 January 1804.  In this 
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Edward Livingston, 97-99.  The U.S. District Court, New York District, ruled that Livingston was to pay $100,000.    
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Domingue.  This union allowed Livingston to enhance his standing in Creole society and gain 
valuable allies within the community.   Livingston’s career also prospered.  Within two months of 
his arrival in New Orleans, he defended nearly twenty-nine cases before the Governor’s Court, 
putting him in direct contact with Claiborne.37  Claiborne welcomed Livingston’s presence in New 
Orleans, informing James Madison that “my former Congressional acquaintance Edward 
Livingston, is now in New Orleans, and has acquired considerable influence among the inhabitants, 
he manifests the best disposition towards the Government, and a desire to render my 
administration pleasing and the present state of things acceptable to the people.”38  That same 
month, Claiborne appointed Livingston to the Board of Regents of the newly-formed Bank of 
Louisiana.  In this capacity he mingled with New Orleans’ most prominent men including Pierre 
Sauvé, Nicholas Girod, and Americans Benjamin Morgan, Evan Jones, and John McDonough.  
Livingston’s duties as regent enhanced his standing in New Orleans and indicated that Claiborne 
initially looked to him as an important ally.   
     Although longtime loyal servants to the American government, by the later months of 1804 
Clark and Livingston’s involvement with the Remonstrance made them designing men.  In a letter 
to James Madison, Claiborne argued that “Mr. Clark is an Enemy of the Government in the United 
States.”39  He went on to caution President Jefferson that “There is no doubt here, but that Messrs 
Livingston & Clark are the Leaders of a opposition to me, & their ill-will is excited by a knowledge 
                                                 
     37 Charles Havens Hunt, Life of Edward Livingston  (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1864), 113.  Livingston 
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     38 Claiborne to Madison, 10 March 1804, Letter Books, II: 25-26  
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which they have of my dislike of them and all their measures … they are also great Intrigu’ers and 
will probably do me injury (by their writings) in the United States.”40   
    Although Claiborne’s assessment of the two Americans was quite correct, many questions 
remain regarding their motivation.41  Clark presents a special dilemma since not even a year before 
the Remonstrance he told President Jefferson that Louisiana’s diverse population needed a rigid 
territorial regime.  So why did he fight the Governance Act that provided the type of government he 
once advocated?  The obvious answer rests in Clark’s resentment over Claiborne’s appointment as 
governor.  It seems only natural that Clark chose to antagonize the man that ruined his 
gubernatorial dreams.  Yet historians have also other explanations.  Michael Stephen Wohl sees 
Clark’s involvement in the Remonstrance as a means to further his chances for political office.  If 
Clark sided with Louisianans in their struggle against Congress, he could gain valuable allies.  
Knowing that Louisianans would eventually receive the right to vote in their own elections, he 
hoped that early support of their cause could earn him their political support in the future.  Clark 
also had a vested interest in the success of the Remonstrance since he himself imported African 
slaves to New Orleans.  It appears that hopes for revenge coupled with economic self-interest 
drove Daniel Clark to lead Louisianans on a path of resistance.42 
    Edward Livingston’s participation in the Remonstrance, however, proves a bit more difficult to 
comprehend.  Livingston left New York under a cloud of suspicion and with a massive debt.  He 
originally hoped to go to New Orleans to remake his fortune and salvage his reputation.  It would 
seem logical, therefore, that he would assist American officials in Lower Louisiana in order to 
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regain the trust of President Jefferson and those who questioned his character.  Even his friend 
John Armstrong warned him about getting too involved in local politics.  Armstrong believed that 
the Remonstrance only served to distance Louisianans from American lawmakers.  To save his 
own political career, he urged Livingston to abstain from writing petitions and memorials and to 
leave such matters to Louisianans “who have more time and more money than yourself.”  
Armstrong wanted Livingston to focus his energy on his family and creating a successful law 
practice that would alleviate his financial woes.43   
    Despite Armstrong’s warnings and the possibility of further political alienation, Livingston did not 
abandon Louisianans’ cause.  Further examination reveals that Livingston’s motivation came from 
various sources.  According to historian William Hatcher, it is possible that Livingston harbored 
some ill-will towards Claiborne.  Early in their careers both Claiborne and Livingston served as 
representatives in the Seventh Congress.  Obviously, after that their careers took a much different 
course as Livingston arrived in New Orleans as a political pariah while Claiborne resided as 
governor.  This, perhaps, engendered jealousy as Livingston worked to rebuild his career.  Hatcher 
also believes that Livingston’s affinity for the Louisiana cause was just in his nature.  In his earlier 
political career, Livingston seemed to always side with the underdog, having long supported the 
Republicans.44  It seems more conceivable, however, that Livingston supported Louisianans 
because they were his future clientele.  He chose to align himself with those who promised to 
assist him in his own fight for financial prosperity and political leadership.  Whatever their 
motivation, Clark and Livingston were ready to challenge the American government and the 
Claiborne administration and encouraged Louisianans to do the same.   
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    As Louisiana delegates carried the Remonstrance to Congress, Claiborne hoped that his 
dealings with “designing intrigueing men” had subsided.  Yet he soon learned that his battle with 
the resistance movement had just begun as Clark and Livingston continued their assault on the 
American regime.  In February 1805, Congress revised the 1804 Governance Act by providing 
Louisianans with self-government through a bicameral Legislative Assembly.45  The amended act 
gave Louisianans a long-desired representative government, yet it also gave Clark new 
opportunities to arouse further resistance.  One of the jobs vested in the new Legislative Assembly 
was the selection of the territory’s delegate to Congress.  Although Governor Claiborne secretly 
hoped that Dr. John Watkins, a longtime friend, would receive the appointment, Creole delegates 
chose Clark to go to Washington in their stead.46   
    Basking in his new appointment, Clark believed his election illustrated Louisianans’ disdain for 
Claiborne.  He smugly confessed to General James Wilkinson that “My nomination has been a 
severe shock to W C.C. C and his Gang, they are much chop-fallen, and all the first Characters & 
best men here have united against them.”47  On a more personal level, Clark’s new job gave him 
the perfect opportunity to continue his campaign against Claiborne in Congress.  In the months 
leading to his departure for Washington, Clark sought to gather as much ammunition as possible.  
He collected correspondence he had with members of the Legislative Council as well as editorials 
written by New Orleans citizens.  He also enlisted the assistance of General James Wilkinson who 
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had worked closely with Claiborne since his days in the Mississippi Territory.  Clark asked the 
general to provide him with any information that could be used against Claiborne, arguing that “you 
have it in your power to serve the people you preside over essentially by giving me such 
information respecting the state of things.”48   
    Once Clark took his seat in Congress he wasted little time in staging his assault on Claiborne 
and his administration.  In December 1806, Clark stood before the Senate and criticized Claiborne 
for making the territorial militia useless.  He accused Claiborne of alienating white militiamen in 
favor of the Battalion of Free People of Color, arguing that “The people of the Orleans Territory had 
offered their services to the United States, and had been disregarded by the man put over them, 
and a preference given to another corps.”49  That same month Clark wrote Livingston updating him 
on events in the Senate.  Clark almost seemed pleased to report that “Claiborne is universally 
despised and the greatest part of the new members of the Senate have assured me individually 
that they only voted for him after a long delay because they found no one else willing to accept the 
Government.”50  This statement indicates Claiborne was the topic of many of Clark’s conversations 
with Washington lawmakers and that he found an audience for his anti-Claiborne rhetoric.     
    As Clark attempted to agitate political opposition, Livingston focused much of his attention on 
helping Louisianans fight to maintain their French heritage.  The territory’s legal system proved one 
of the most pressing issues facing both Louisianans and Washington lawmakers.  When Pierre 
Clément de Laussat took control as the colonial prefect of Louisiana, he abolished all existing 
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     49 Annals of Congress, 9th Congress, 2nd sess. 215.  Also see Vernet, “Strangers on Their Native Soil,” 213 & 230.       
 
     50 Clark to Livingston, December 1806, Edward Livingston Papers, MSS C0280, Box 7, Folder 27.   
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Spanish courts and neglected to put French substitutes in their place.  Washington lawmakers and 
Governor Claiborne, therefore, made early efforts to provide Louisianans with a stable legal 
system.  Jefferson himself hoped to introduce common law in the territory, seeing this as a vital 
step in Louisianans’ incorporation process.51  Jefferson and Claiborne, however, learned that 
creating a more Americanized legal system would be a strenuous undertaking.   
    In the early months of his administration, Claiborne established a nine-member Court of Pleas to 
deal with minor civil and criminal cases.  He also set up the Governor’s Court designed to deal with 
civil actions and appeals from the Court of Pleas in cases involving more than $500.  Finally, he 
created county courts to hear civil and criminal complaints.52  The 1804 Governance Act furthered 
Claiborne’s efforts by making provisions for a Superior Court of three judges to be appointed by the 
President, as well as inferior courts with judges selected by the governor and the Legislative 
Council.  The act also required all courts to adhere to aspects of common law such as trial by jury 
and the writ of habeas corpus.  When the new government took effect in October 1804, the 
Legislative Council divided the territory into twelve parishes, each with one judicial district and a 
judge appointed by the governor.53     
    Despite Claiborne’s early efforts, the judicial system remained in utter disarray.  Lawmakers 
found it hard to fill benches since most Creole judges did not understand the new legal code.  In 
addition, many Creole legalists declined appointments out of disgust with common law.  Historian 
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Mark Fernandez finds that out of the forty judicial appointments Claiborne made, only four were 
native Louisianans.54  As they faced the growing encroachment of American judges in their 
courtrooms, Louisianans found common law procedure perplexing.  Civil law was based on general 
doctrines set forth by legislation and doctrinal writing, while common law centered on court 
decisions, which represent precedents for other laws and cases.  Accustomed to written petitions, 
Creoles found the adjustment to oral arguments in open court difficult, especially with the language 
barrier.  Historian George Dargo finds that even judges were “uncertain of what codes they are to 
decide, wavering between the civil and common law, between the forms of French, Spanish, and 
American jurisprudence.”55   
    Shortly after his arrival in New Orleans, Edward Livingston found the territory’s legal system 
inadequate.  In a concerned letter to his brother, Livingston explained that in any given court one 
encountered “ordinances in English mixed with those of his predecessors in Spanish and French, 
the laws of Castile, the Customs of Paris, the Leyes de Patidas, les Edits du Roi, the Statutes of 
the United States and the omnipresent Common Laws of England.“56   Sympathizing with 
Louisianans, Livingston wished to aid territorial inhabitants in their struggle to maintain their 
colonial legal traditions.  His knowledge of the civil code and French placed him in the ideal 
position to serve as Louisianans’ spokesmen.  To prepare a compelling defense for civil law, 
Livingston translated the Corpus Juris Civilis in hopes of finding solutions to Claiborne’s deficient 
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court system.  Concomitantly, he began drafting the Practice Act of 1805 that introduced simple 
modes of procedure throughout the territory.57   
    Livingston also hoped to provide Louisianans with important tools to fight for the continuation of 
civil law.  The 1805 Governance Act, much like its predecessor, remained vague on the territorial 
legal system, only stating that legal procedures needed to follow common law practices.  Both 
members of the ancient population and Louisiana lawyers interpreted the provision as mandating 
the practice of English common law.  Yet Livingston took a different approach, contending that the 
law already in force in Louisiana was Roman, not English, thus the phrase “common law” really 
meant the “common law of Louisiana,” not England.  Superior Court judge John Prevost agreed 
with Livingston’s interpretation, pledging to maintain civil law since it was the common legal 
procedure of the Orleans Territory.  As Livingston supplied Creoles another means to combat the 
intrusion of common law, he also worked alongside Judge W. Brown to prepare the territory’s civil 
and criminal codes.  Ultimately, Edward Livingston staked a vested interest in Louisianans’ legal 
system and sought to help them preserve civil law even if it was by a case of mere semantics.58     
    In the early years of the territorial period, Clark and Livingston proved worthy political 
adversaries to the Claiborne administration.  They helped Louisianans craft the Remonstrance, 
they sought to protect civil law, and they united many members of Louisiana’s ancient population in 
opposition to the American government.  Their resistance, however, reached new heights in 1806 
as both Clark and Livingston found themselves involved in a mutinous scheme.     
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    Aaron Burr first arrived in New Orleans in July 1805.  He stayed for nearly three weeks making 
the rounds amongst New Orleans’ finest.  He stayed several days with Edward Livingston and his 
family, attended a dinner hosted by Daniel Clark, and met with Governor Claiborne.59  Burr also 
became acquainted with members of the Mexican Association.  The association emerged not long 
after Americans took control of Lower Louisiana to facilitate the conquest of Spanish Mexico.  
Many members of the ancient population joined the association hoping that a liberated Mexico 
would secure Louisiana’s borders and promise future economic prosperity.60   
    Nearly a year later, Burr finalized his plan for a military expedition to capture New Orleans and 
Mexico.  Burr’s encounters with prominent Creoles and the Mexican Association convinced him 
that Louisianans would prove useful allies in his plan.  As he secured financial and naval support 
from British Minister Anthony Merry and military backing from General James Wilkinson, Burr felt 
assured of his success.  He planned to move towards New Orleans in the summer of 1806, 
mobilizing 500 to 1000 men along the way.  Once he and his men rendezvoused with Wilkinson at 
Natchez they would descend upon New Orleans.  From there they would utilize British naval 
blockades as well as money from New Orleans banks to complete their conquest of Mexico.61   
    Most Louisianans knew little of Burr or his impending expedition.  New Orleans’ designing men, 
however, were instrumental figures in Burr’s initial plans.  Although he would deny even really 
knowing Burr, there exists considerable evidence that implicates Clark in the Burr Conspiracy.  
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Immediately after entertaining Burr in New Orleans in July 1805, Clark spent two months in Vera 
Cruz on a supposed business trip.  While in Mexico, Clark met with Spanish officials while 
ascertaining information regarding the strength and location of Mexican military units.  Upon 
returning home he informed General Wilkinson that he acquired valuable knowledge.62  Clark made 
a second trip to Vera Cruz in February 1806.   
    Along with his questionable business trips to Mexico, Clark also made several statements 
throughout his career that indicated his approval and interest in the conquest of Mexico.  Orleans 
territorial secretary John Graham recalled a conversation where Clark admitted that he did not 
approve of a government expedition to Mexico.  Graham did, however, remember that Clark 
expressed “himself willing to join in such an enterprise, undertaken and carried out by 
individuals.”63   It is apparent that Burr considered Clark an ally, even going so far as to make him a 
key figure in the execution of his expedition.  In correspondence with Minister Merry, Burr indicated 
that Clark would inform British naval personnel when to lift their blockade once New Orleans had 
been secured.64  To give Clark such an integral role in his plan, Burr must have received 
assurances of his full support.    
    Much like Clark, Livingston was quite friendly with Burr and perhaps his expedition.  Livingston 
first met Burr during his early political days in New York.  They fostered a strong friendship that 
became strained when Livingston voted for Jefferson in the Election of 1800.  When Burr first came 
to New Orleans his first stop was to see Livingston.  This visit turned out to be much more than a 
nostalgic meeting among old friends.  Years before when Livingston fell on hard times, Burr loaned 
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him $2000.  During his visit, Burr informed Livingston that he had transferred his debt to Dr. Erick 
Bollman, a longtime business associate.65  Nearly a year later, Bollman traveled to New Orleans to 
gather reconnaissance for Burr.  While there he met with Livingston to make arrangements for the 
repayment of his debt.  It is perhaps here when Livingston learned of Burr’s plan and even offered 
his support.   
    Outside of their individual interactions with Burr, both Clark and Livingston fostered ties with the 
Mexican Association.  The ancients involved in the association were the same men Clark and 
Livingston consorted with in resisting American policies.  Although they both denied membership in 
the Mexican Association, Clark and Livingston had enough indirect contact with the organization to 
know of Burr’s scheme.   
    Aaron Burr never came to New Orleans as a liberator.  General James Wilkinson exposed the 
conspiracy, leading to Burr’s arrest in January 1807.  Yet Clark and Livingston’s former dealing 
with Burr and their connection to the Mexican Association put them in a precarious position.  Upon 
turning on Burr, General Wilkinson attempted to distance himself from the conspiracy.  To create a 
much needed diversion, he fashioned himself the protector of New Orleans bent on purging the city 
of Burrites.  On December 14, 1806, he unlawfully arrested many of Burr’s associates including Dr. 
Bollman.66  Louisianans expressed outrage over Wilkinson’s brute force and blatant disregard for 
the due process of law.  New Orleans judges scurried to issue writs of habeas corpus to protect 
Bollman and other detainees, but they too were soon arrested.  As many judges and lawyers sat in 
jail, Edward Livingston took it upon himself to stop Wilkinson’s “reign of terror” by suing for writs of 
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habeas corpus on behalf of Dr. Bollman and his lawyer James Alexander.67   His efforts made him 
Wilkinson’s next target as the general accused Livingston of treason.  Before the Superior Court, 
Wilkinson claimed he had proof of Livingston’s involvement in the Burr Conspiracy, which included 
a written affidavit from a Dr. W. Rogers.  Livingston demanded to see the affidavit which Wilkinson 
failed to ever produce.68  Livingston was soon released and cleared of all charges, but he remained 
determined to alleviate doubts of his innocence.  On December 26, 1806, he circulated An Address 
to the Public in order to explain his relationship with Burr and Wilkinson.  That same day he signed 
an affidavit swearing that “he hath never had any communication, written or verbal, direct or 
indirect, with Aaron Burr or other persons whom he knows or has reason to suspect”69   
    As Livingston sought to prove his innocence, Clark found himself in a bitter war with General 
Wilkinson.  In an attempt to clear his own name, Wilkinson publicly exposed Clark’s involvement in 
the Burr Conspiracy.  Now one of the territory’s most trusted leaders faced public scorn and 
serious accusations.  Clark emphatically denied Wilkinson’s charges and began drafting Proofs of 
the Corruption of General James Wilkinson and His Connexion with Aaron Burr.  Here he provided 
a detailed account of how Wilkinson helped orchestrate Burr’s failed expedition.  More importantly, 
Clark used Proofs to absolve himself of any connection with Burr.  He explained the details of his 
one and only encounter with the former vice president, exclaiming that he only met with Burr out of 
respect for Wilkinson who arranged the dinner.  Clark went on to point out that many New 
Orleanians entertained Burr on his first trip to New Orleans, including Governor Claiborne.  Clark 
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also spent considerable time explaining his trips to Vera Cruz, mocking public assumptions that 
they were anything more than business trips.  Clark concluded Proofs swearing that he would 
never risk his fortune, friends, character, or political career for a treasonous plot.70   Although 
Wilkinson continued to implicate him in the scandal, Clark was never indicted nor tried for treason.   
    Since the Burr Conspiracy, historians have dissected every correspondence, meeting, and 
accusation to ascertain the extent of both Clark and Livingston’s involvement.  Paul Vernet, for 
example, finds that Clark abandoned the scheme long before Burr’s descent on New Orleans.  It 
appears that Clark lost interest in the expedition once he became a congressional delegate.  
Vernet argues that it was at this time that Clark attempted to disassociate from Burr, seeing public 
office as more important than any expedition to Mexico.  Clark further showed his loyalty to the 
United States when he informed ancients Pierre Derbigny and Joseph Bellechasse of the plot and 
encouraged them to support the American government.71  Even Governor Claiborne, who once 
identified Clark as one of Burr’s main agents, believed Clark to be loyal, confessing that “I find 
nothing to justify an opinion, that he is a Party in the existing conspiracy. “72    
    As historians probe for evidence that might explain Clark and Livingston’s involvement in the 
Burr Conspiracy, it seems more fruitful to examine how this particular event fit into the context of 
their ongoing battle with the American government.  Both men spent years undermining not only 
Claiborne, but American policies throughout the Orleans Territory.  The Burr Conspiracy supplied 
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them the opportunity to continue their dissent, realizing that an expedition would further draw into 
question Claiborne’s leadership skills.  Their own political aspirations also explain their dealings 
with Burr.  Both Clark and Livingston sided with disgruntled Creoles in 1804 as a means to secure 
political support.  Their continued contact with territorial inhabitants and the Mexican Association 
perhaps convinced them that Louisianans were predisposed to follow Burr in his attempt to rid 
Lower Louisiana of the American government.  Their support of Burr, therefore, would allow them 
to remain in the good graces of the most prominent men in New Orleans who they looked to for 
political support.  No matter their motivation or involvement, the Burr Conspiracy marked the 
beginning of the end for Claiborne’s designing men.  After years of leading Louisianans’ resistance 
efforts, Clark and Livingston lost their audience as Creole politicians took matters into their own 
hands.  
**** 
    Governor Claiborne faced a formidable threat in Clark and Livingston.  Both exerted strong 
influence over the territory and continued to frustrate his attempts for a peaceful transition in Lower 
Louisiana.  These men served as the vocal leaders of a resistance movement that stalled and 
impaired Americanization and incorporation efforts.  What Claiborne failed to understand and 
appreciate was the extent of Louisianans’ involvement.  True, Clark and Livingston orchestrated 
many resistance efforts, yet behind every memorial, editorial, and attack were Louisianans.  
Although Claiborne usually attributed Creoles’ support to the devious ways of agitators who 
swayed their opinions, a closer look at Louisianans’ resistance reveals that they fought unfavorable 
American policies willingly and often exploited the experience and popularity of resistance leaders 
to achieve such goals.  Ultimately, Clark and Livingston’s actions represented Creole efforts to 
negotiate with American lawmakers.     
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    In the months leading to the official transfer of Lower Louisiana, Louisianans had an assortment 
of feelings and concerns.  Many lamented the fact that they would never live under mother France.  
Others felt the displacement from having switched regimes three times in less than four years.  
Louisianans also had many practical concerns regarding their future as Americans.  To ascertain 
his new constituents’ thoughts and questions, Claiborne sent his special agent, Dr. John Watkins, 
on a tour throughout the territory.  Above all, Watkins found that “No Subject seems to be so 
interesting to the minds of the inhabitants of all that part of the Country, which I have visited as that 
of the importation of brute Negroes from Africa.”  Watkins also discovered that Louisianans desired 
a permanent government and “to enter [the Union] immediately into all the benefits and advantages 
of a State Government.”73  
    Furthermore, Louisianans conveyed their own hopes for the incorporation process.  Etienne 
Boré, the mayor of New Orleans, personally wrote President Jefferson to inform him that 
Louisianans anxiously awaited a new government to ease the confusion of the regime change.  He 
also hinted that Louisianans expected the Orleans Territory to become a state as soon as their 
population totaled 60,000 as the Northwest Ordinance stipulated.  In the meantime, Boré explained 
“we shall be given what you call your Second degree of Government: it is the continual object of 
our hopes and of our conversation among all Louisianans.”  He also disclosed Louisianans’ 
bitterness over the excessive use of English in Claiborne’s administration which left many feeling 
alienated.74    
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    The territory’s legal system also remained a potent concern for Louisianans who wished to retain 
civil law, as evidenced by New Yorker and longtime New Orleans resident, Evan Jones.  In his 
Hints of Evan Jones: Administration of Justice, he discussed the chaotic state of Lower Louisiana’s 
court system and urged American officials to appoint judges to hear civil cases in order to maintain 
colonial legal traditions.  Jones urged American lawmakers to make such legal concessions to 
Louisianans, ensuring that they would “induce the inhabitants at large, to regard the people of 
America, rather as their fathers & brothers, than as their masters or tyrants.”75   
    The observations put forth by Watkins, Boré, and Jones provide valuable insights into 
Louisianans’ desires for the incorporation process.  They sought the same property rights that 
other Americans enjoyed with the continuation of the slave trade.  They also wanted a territorial 
government that gave them a chance to participate and enjoy American republican institutions.  
Louisianans wanted statehood and to be full members of the republic.  More importantly, they 
wanted all of this while maintaining their French language and civil law.76  Undoubtedly, 
Louisianans’ hopes were dashed when the 1804 Governance Act did none of this.  The act also 
subtly addressed the legal issue by giving judicial powers to a Superior Court.  Section 5 of the 
Governance Act stipulated that in criminal cases trial by jury would be used and Orleans 
inhabitants would be extended the writ of habeas corpus.  Although these judicial procedures were 
universal in common law, they were unfamiliar to Louisianans.  Finally, Congress made little 
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mention of the lingual discrepancies found in the territory.  The Governance Act of 1804 thus 
largely ignored Louisianans’ requests.77   
    Although early efforts to protest the Governance Act came from Americans such as Tupper and 
Clark, Louisianans soon united to present their grievances to Congress.  Even though they 
selected Edward Livingston to draft the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana, this document 
illustrated what they truly felt.  In the opening lines they expressed their joy of becoming American 
citizens which “implied every thing we could desire, and filled us with that happiness that arises 
from the anticipated enjoyment of a right long withheld.”78   The Remonstrance showed 
disappointment that Congress failed to approve immediate statehood as Article III of the cession 
treaty with France stipulated.79  It also exposed Louisianans’ disgust that they were demoted to 
second-class citizens with no say in their government or the same rights as Americans.  These 
inadequacies of the Governance Act prompted Louisianans to ask “what valuable ‘privilege’ of 
citizenship is allowed us?”80        
    The Remonstrance also reproached American lawmakers for their assumptions regarding 
Louisianans’ capacity for self-government.  Aware that congressional members based most of their 
opinions on reports submitted by American travelers and diplomats, Louisianans contended that 
“we have been represented as too ignorant to exercise it [self-government] with wisdom, and too 
turbulent to enjoy it with safety.”81  They criticized congressional leaders for allowing these 
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erroneous depictions to justify a despotic territorial government.  They hoped that further 
knowledge of territorial inhabitants would prove that they deserved and were ready to receive the 
benefits of citizenship.   
    Finally the Remonstrance attempted to once more convey Louisianans’ most important 
demands.  The memoralists insisted that the people should directly choose territorial governors, 
secretaries, and judges.82  They also requested that all court and legislative records be printed in 
French and English to oblige all territorial inhabitants.  They ended their memorial by strongly 
encouraging American officials to take prompt action to make the Orleans Territory into a state.83     
    The Remonstrance demonstrated Livingston’s eloquence and craftsmanship, yet it was 
Louisianans’ sentiments that filled its pages.  It was their concerns, their desires, and their 
frustrations put before Congress.  When it came to this early protest, Louisianans used Livingston 
to make their resistance efforts more potent.  Why not turn to someone who understood the 
American government?  Why not seek assistance from a man proficient in French and English who 
could clearly convey their grievances?  Ultimately, Louisianans supplied Livingston with the 
content, as he merely composed a document that American lawmakers could understand.     
    As Louisianans used Americans such as Livingston and Clark to draft and circulate their 
memorial, they made their own efforts to fight the hated Governance Act.  Mayor Boré asked the 
New Orleans Municipal Council to formally protest the act, contending that it was a complete 
violation of the principles of the Constitution and an “infringement on the natural rights of the 
people of the territory and of the third article of the treaty of cession.”  Despite Boré’s impassioned 
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argument, municipal officials refused, prompting the mayor to resign his post in anger.84   Other 
prominent Creoles followed Boré’s example including Colonel Joseph Bellechasse, commander of 
the New Orleans militia, and Pierre Derbigny, the Secretary of Registrars.  Initially Bellechasse 
blamed poor health for his resignation, while Derbigny confessed to Governor Claiborne that more 
“powerful motives” prompted his departure from the government.  The fact that both men resigned 
the same day as Boré indicates that they worked in unison to show their discontent for the 
Governance Act.85   
    As Claiborne dealt with the loss of key government officials, he soon turned his attention to 
helping Jefferson staff the thirteen-member Legislative Council.  Both Claiborne and Jefferson 
hoped to select members from Louisiana’s ancient Creole population as well as leading Americans.  
Jefferson’s nominations illustrated this desire as his list included Creoles such as Etienne Boré, 
Bellechasse, Pierre Derbigny, Pierre Sauvé, and Noel Destrehan and Americans John Watkins, 
Benjamin Morgan, Evan Jones, and Daniel Cark.  Jefferson’s plan soon backfired as Derbigny, 
Destrehan, and Sauvé all withdrew their names since they would be in Washington presenting the 
Remonstrance when the Council convened.  Other nominees, including Boré, Jones, and 
Bellechasse, emphatically rejected Jefferson’s nomination in protest.     
    Claiborne seemed puzzled by the ancients’ refusal to serve in the government.  He immediately 
blamed Livingston, contending that “Mr. Ed. Livingston has found that their acceptance would 
betray a Dishonorable Inconsistency, and the opinions of those who advised and wrote the 
Memorial.”  Jones did little to dispel Claiborne’s conclusions, personally writing the governor to 
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inform him that “I cannot therefore, with any Degree of consistency accept an office, under a law, of 
which I have from the beginning so openly exprest my Disapprobation.”  Many of Jefferson’s 
appointments were men who had some connection to the Remonstrance.  It seems that many 
declined to serve in order to make their campaign against the Governance Act more believable.   
    Jones’s rejection letter, however, demonstrates that he was not just influenced by Livingston, but 
made a personal decision, arguing that “I was born an American—I glory in that name—In defense 
of that happy land which gave me birth … I cannot consent, for any consideration, to do an act, 
which I think subversive to the rights and liberties of my fellow Citizens!” 86  Jones believed that by 
serving in the Legislative Council he was acquiescing to a government that violated his most 
cherished American principles.  He felt so confident in his actions that he sent his resignation letter 
to New Orleans newspapers for all to see.  He provided an example that his ancients counterparts 
followed.  Many chose to boycott the Legislative Council, an institution that would enforce policies 
they scorned.87   
    Louisianans also used their pens to articulate disapproval of unfavorable American policies.  In 
August 1804, Boré provided his own commentary on the Governance Act when he circulated a 
letter that Congress wrote to the inhabitants of Quebec in October 1774.  The thirty year old 
document, written by Henry Lee, stressed that subjects had the “grand right” to have a share in 
their government by representatives chosen by them and to live under laws that they approved.  
Anything less, Lee argued, was tyrannical.  Boré used the letter to expose Congress’ hypocrisy in 
giving Louisianans a government that Lee and other Americans deemed “tyrannical” just years 
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before.  Boré went on to encourage Louisianans to examine the “relation there is between the 
present situation of the Inhabitants of Louisiana, and that of Canada at the time when Congress put 
them in mind of their rights and privileges.”88   
    As the Governance Act received plenty of criticism, Claiborne himself was not immune from 
published attacks.  In View of the Political and Civil Situation of Louisiana, from the Thirtieth of 
November 1803 to the First of October 1804 by a Native, an anonymous author argued that the 
Claiborne administration left Louisiana in a state of disarray.  Attacking his leadership skills, the 
author contended that “Governor Claiborne fell as it were from the clouds, without knowledge of the 
country, its inhabitants, their manners, their customs, their very language, or their laws made his 
bad administrative system worse.”  View also assaulted the governor’s inadequate policies that 
challenged Louisianans’ French heritage.  It ridiculed the creation of the Court of Pleas that 
embarrassed and excluded Louisianans who did not speak English.  The judges appointed to the 
court also had little knowledge of civil law, which only complicated the chaotic court system.  
Ultimately, the anonymous author argued that Claiborne’s administration made Louisianans 
“STRANGERS ON THEIR NATIVE SOIL!!89     
    Pierre Derbigny also took time to present his views on Claiborne before he departed for 
Washington with the Remonstrance.  His Esquisse de la Situation Politique, which openly scorned 
the governor, became one of the most widely published pamphlets in territorial Louisiana.  He 
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disparaged Claiborne’s weak policies that made the militia ineffective.  He also bewailed 
Claiborne’s appointments and the fact that the governor conducted all official business in English.  
Derbigny seemed particularly vexed by Claiborne’s handling of the legal system, asking his readers 
to “Imagine the astonishment of the peaceful but ignorant citizen, when a sheriff or Constable, 
came to give him court orders of a new variety, in a language which he didn’t understand.  Imagine 
the difficulties of the judges themselves who had the vaguest idea of these strange forms, that they 
were supposed to follow and that had to be combined with the Spanish laws.”90   
    The press soon became a vital outlet for Louisianans to disseminate their grievances.  Editorials 
and pamphlets coupled with political boycotts proved Claiborne’s assessment of Louisianans’ 
involvement in the resistance movement incorrect.  Not only did Creole leaders express their 
opposition on their own volition rather than through Clark and Livingston, but used their seats in the 
Legislative Assembly as another vehicle of resistance.   
    The first Orleans House of Representatives met on November 4, 1805.  Members pledged an 
oath of allegiance to the United States and selected Jean Noel Destrehan as speaker of the 
House.91  The majority of elected representatives were Creoles, including those that originally 
rejected Jefferson’s nomination to the Legislative Council in 1804.  The predominance of these 
Creole legislators illustrates that Louisianans hoped to use ancient politicians to further resistance 
efforts.  These Creole delegates soon flexed their new political might in submitting nominations for 
the upper Legislative Council.  Despite Claiborne’s suggestion that the council represent all 
districts and ethnic groups in the territory, House members nominated men exclusively from New 
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Orleans and all but two were ancient Louisianans.92  More specifically, four of the ten nominees 
were vocal critics of Claiborne while others had strong attachments to Livingston and Clark.   As 
Jefferson and Claiborne attempted to appoint what they considered loyal Louisianans to the 
Legislative Council, House members created a Legislative Assembly monopolized by ancient 
Creoles.93   
    The first piece of legislation Creole delegates passed through the House of Representatives was 
an act that stipulated that anyone holding other government offices was not permitted to serve in 
the Legislative Assembly.  Although this act appeared as an attempt to impose some form of 
checks and balances within the territorial hierarchy, in reality it targeted Claiborne supporters since 
many Americans and pro-American Creoles were already serving in government posts.  Seeing 
this as an attempt to challenge his administration, Claiborne vetoed the bill.94   
    The Legislative Assembly soon became a battleground as ancient Creoles sparred with the 
determined governor.  Claiborne’s reports to Washington revealed that his constant feuds with 
Creole delegates rendered the Legislative Assembly virtually useless.  “The territorial Legislature 
makes but little progress in dispatch of Business,” Claiborne confessed to President Jefferson.95  
Despite his frustrations, Claiborne remained steadfast in his fight against a Creole assembly 
determined to circumscribe his administration.96     
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    As Louisianans exploited their new political power to combat the new American government, 
they also used their new representative government to preserve their most cherished traditions.  
Like so many of their constituents, members of the Legislative Council bewailed Claiborne’s 
haphazard judicial policies and campaigned for the continuation of civil law.97  One of their earliest 
efforts came in the form of a proposed memorial to Congress opposing sections of the 1805 
Governance Act dealing with common law.  Representative Hazure Delorme recommended that 
the memorial demand the “repeal of that part of the act … as provides for the introduction of 
common law, owing to the great confusion it will introduce in the courts of justice.98  Although this 
resolution was postponed, it reveals that the Legislative Assembly remained determined to stall the 
introduction of common law as long as possible.   
    Members of the legislature continued their efforts by proposing several pieces of legislation that 
sought to keep colonial legal traditions in place until lawyers drafted a new civil code.  Most of 
these acts were vetoed by Governor Claiborne.  Undeterred, in March 1806, legislators passed a 
bill that protected civil law.99  Immediately Claiborne vetoed the measure, arguing that it was “a 
useless measure, and one that might prove injurious.”  Hearing of the governor’s veto, Creole 
                                                 
     97  Outside New Orleans, territorial inhabitants also disparaged the new legal system.  In November 1805, a group 
of rural inhabitants published Instructions from the Inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans to Their Representatives in 
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reforms suggesting simplified procedures, limits on juries in civil cases, and the termination of the circuit function of the 
Superior Court.   According to George Dargo, this document reveals that the debate was not confined to New Orleans 
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councilmen Pierre Sauvé, Noel Destrehan, and Joseph Bellechasse resigned.  Soon Pierre 
Derbigny proposed the immediate dissolution of the entire Legislative Assembly and it was quickly 
adjourned.100   
    Delegates composed a manifesto to justify their actions to Congress.  Here Creole lawmakers 
argued that they dissolved the legislature because of Claiborne’s persistent vetoes that made their 
efforts useless.  They also used the manifesto to further crusade for the continuation of civil law, 
contending that “The most inestimable benefit for a people is the preservation of its laws, usages, 
and habits.  It is only such preservation that can soften the sudden transition from one government 
to another.”101  Creole delegates went on to provide strong legal and constitutional arguments in 
favor of civil law.  To them, Article 4 of the 1805 Governance Act granted Louisianans the right to 
keep their own laws in force as long as they did not contradict the Constitution when it stated that 
“The laws which shall be in force in the said territory at the commencement of this act, and not 
inconsistant with the provisions thereof, shall continue in force, until altered, modified or repealed 
by the Legislature.”  The delegates went on to conclude that the “laws” mentioned in the Article 4 
included civil law, arguing that:  
It is evident that they are the old laws which were in use in this country before its 
cession to the United States of America.  For Congress took care to apply to us all 
of the common law which it considered indispensable to prescribe for us to the end 
that our regime might not conflict with that which is in force in all the States of the 
Union, that is to say, the right to be judged by one’s peers and the writ of habeas 
corpus, the two great palladiums of civil liberty.  In this regard we cannot change 
anything of what Congress has thus, constitutionally, determined; but it is clear 
that regarding all the rest we are free to adopt or to reject any of the common law 
which shall appear proper to us.     
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Creole delegates took a compromising stance, acknowledging that there were aspects of common 
law that needed to be applied in Louisiana courts.  They, however, contended that outside the “two 
great palladiums of civil liberty,” Congress could not “deny that advantage to us of remaining under 
a system to which we are accustomed.”102    
    As territorial legislators used the manifesto to preserve their old legal traditions, they exploited 
the opportunity to discuss lingual issues that had long plagued the territory, explaining that:   
The present composition of the courts, the judges presiding over them and the 
jurists who plead before them being almost all strangers to the French language 
and still more so to the language in which the greater part of the laws of this 
country are written, the very scarcity even of the elementary authors who deal with 
them, everything renders indispensable the adoption of a measure which tends to 
place within the reach of all citizens, both in the French and the English language, 
a complete collection of the laws governing us.”103   
 
Since the creation of the Orleans Territory, Louisianans sought to maintain two vestiges of their 
colonial past: civil law and the French language.  By using political boycotts to dissolve the 
Legislative Assembly, Creole lawmakers brought some of their most overlooked concerns to the 
forefront.   
    Before the Legislative Assembly disbanded, delegates appointed James Brown and Louis 
Moreau Lislet as jurisconsults “whose duty it shall be to compile and prepare, jointly, a Civil Code 
for the use of this Territory.”104   Despite Claiborne’s veto, the assembly moved forward by setting 
up a code committee to work alongside Brown and Lislet. Their tireless efforts paid off.  On March 
31, 1808, hoping to appease his constituents, Governor Claiborne signed the Digest of Civil Laws 
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Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans, marking a pivotal turning point in the territorial period.  
After years of toil and political manipulation, Louisianans resolved long-standing legal issues and 
secured one of their most cherished French institutions.  Concomitantly, they learned valuable 
lessons about the incorporation process. The 1804 Governance Act, in many respects, made 
Louisianans passive actors in the story of the Louisiana Purchase.  It relegated them to second-
class citizens and neglected their most basic and potent concerns.  Despite obvious handicaps, 
Louisianans refused to sit back and be “Americanized.”  Rather they chose to employ resistance 
and political activism to negotiate with American lawmakers.   
**** 
    Nursing his gunshot wound, Governor Claiborne lamented the outcome of his duel with Daniel 
Clark.  For years Clark worked tirelessly to destroy Claiborne’s reputation and now he could boast 
that he defeated the governor in an old-fashioned duel.  Yet what Claiborne failed to realize was 
that he would emerge as the true victor.  In the months following the duel, Clark’s stint as 
Louisiana’s most trusted leader came to an end as territorial inhabitants bewailed him for shooting 
the governor.  Edward Livingston faced similar contempt as his economic aspirations put him in 
direct conflict with Louisianans and their beloved legal system.  By 1808, both Clark and Livingston 
had fallen from grace.   
    Clark’s downward spiral began during the Burr Conspiracy.  Despite his emphatic denials and 
the publication of his Proofs, territorial inhabitants could not shake their suspicions of their longtime 
leader.  Also they resented the fact that Clark’s involvement often caused Americans to mistrust all 
Louisianans.105  Clark’s resistance efforts went too far and alienated him from the people he once 
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helped.  Livingston also faced his own decline.  In 1807, he purchased a tract of land in the Batture 
St. Mary.  Hoping to increase the value of his property, Livingston made preparations to build a 
levee, dig a canal, and erect a dwelling.  New Orleans residents were outraged, having long used 
the Batture as a communal plot for all city dwellers.  The Batture dispute put Livingston at odds 
with Louisianans.  In his many legal battles over his new property, Livingston also attacked major 
components of Louisianans’ legal traditions.  The one-time advocate of civil law despised its use in 
court when it did not serve his own interests.  As the Batture controversy waged on for several 
years, Louisianans gradually turned away from Livingston.106   
    In the early years of the territorial period, Louisianans lacked the experience or knowledge to 
combat the hated Governance Act, forcing them to turn to Clark and Livingston who took the lead 
in their resistance efforts.  Over time, however, Louisianans’ reliance on Clark and Livingston 
lessened as they took matters into their own hands.  They used the power of their pens to enhance 
resistance efforts while also drawing national attention to their aspirations for the incorporation 
process.  Louisianans also learned how to exploit their growing political power in the Legislative 
Assembly.  Voters chose Creole officials to make their demands into law.  Creole lawmakers used 
their political offices to undermine their unpopular governor and challenge unfavorable American 
policies.  They also used boycotts and manifestos to shape public policy and preserve their most 
cherished colonial traditions.  Far from being passive actors or manipulated by “designing 
intrigueing men,” Louisianans were a people ready to create and employ vital strategies for cultural 
self-preservation and assimilation.  As they sharpened their negotiation skills, Creole politicians 
soon learned that resistance was only one means to deal with American lawmakers.  
                                                 
     106  Ibid., 233-242.  For a complete description of the Batture Controversy see Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana. 
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Chapter Three:  “Real and Pretended Patriots”: Shifting Creole Strategies of Negotiation in 
Territorial Politics 
 
    On March 4, 1809, Julien Poydras stood before the Legislative Council to deliver his last speech 
to the governing body he had addressed many times before.  On this day, he bid farewell to 
Louisianans as he looked forward to heading to Washington D.C. to serve as the Orleans territorial 
delegate to Congress.  The Creole businessman, planter, and politician looked upon his fellow 
councilmen with hope and gratitude.  He encouraged them to continue to work with American 
lawmakers and promised to make Louisiana statehood his top congressional priority.  Although he 
was dressed more like a common artisan, his audience acknowledged his elite status and 
prominence in the Orleans Territory.  A transplant from France, Poydras had come far from his 
humble beginnings as a French soldier and traveling peddler.  As one of Louisiana’s wealthiest 
planters, Poydras spent years accumulating property and slaves as well as establishing merchant 
stores and shipping companies.  He also built an impressive political resume which included his 
three-year tenure as the president of the Legislative Council.  His support of the Claiborne 
administration earned him the respect of Americans, while his stellar reputation gained the 
confidence of Louisianans.  As he came to the end of his final speech, Poydras could not help but 
marvel at how far Louisianans and the Orleans Territory had come.1      
    Much had changed in Lower Louisiana since Poydras first became president of the Legislative 
Council in 1804.  Louisianans had gained self-government and were on the path to statehood.  
They resisted the intrigues of Aaron Burr and secured the passage of the Digest of Civil Law.  
Notably absent from the New Orleans political scene were Daniel Clark and Edward Livingston.  
The Burr Conspiracy and Batture controversy took their toll on the one-time resistance leaders.  By 
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October 1808, Clark lost his congressional seat to Poydras and failed to secure a single 
nomination for any vacant legislative position.  Even Governor Claiborne enjoyed more pleasant 
relations with the Legislative Assembly, happily reporting to James Madison that “the Louisianans 
begin to distinguish between the real and pretended Patriots, & I persuade myself, that the hitherto 
great influence of certain unprincipled Americans will very soon be at an end.”2  Creole politicians 
also seemed to have undergone a profound transformation.  From their legislation to their 
encounters with American lawmakers, they demonstrated a much more cooperative posture.     
    Although Clark and Livingston’s departure from the New Orleans’ political scene seems logical in 
the wake of their recent indiscretions, the Legislative Assembly’s new attitude is harder to explain.  
What caused Creole lawmakers, once bent on resisting and stalling American policies, to be more 
willing to work with American lawmakers?   Had the issues that once generated scorn 
disappeared?   Despite the appearance of a new political landscape in the Orleans Territory, in 
reality what had really changed were Louisiana leaders’ strategies.  Louisianans always remained 
mindful of their precarious position.  No matter their disdain regarding the Governance Act or their 
hatred for common law, at the end of the day they desired American citizenship.  Although 
resistance proved a useful tool, Louisianans realized that it could only be used sparingly so as not 
to jeopardize their chances for statehood.  Therefore, they often turned to cooperation as a means 
of negotiation.  By working with American lawmakers, Creole politicians often offset their resistance 
to unfavorable policies.  One of the reasons Poydras was so revered was because he encouraged 
and helped Louisianans in their cooperation efforts.  His career and political approach guided 
Louisianans in their attempts at accommodation.  Ultimately, Louisiana leaders employed the 
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strategy that best suited their interests at a particular time.  Although the abrasive nature of political 
resistance seemed to overwhelm and disguise politicians’ accommodating stance, they used 
resistance and cooperation interchangeably to shape the incorporation process.   
    Creoles’ shifting strategies became even more important as the Eighth Congress demanded that 
Louisianans undergo an “apprenticeship to liberty.”  Article III of the cession treaty with France 
guaranteed Louisianans citizenship and they expected the Jefferson administration to fulfill this 
promise.  In 1803 American lawmakers, however, felt that Louisianans’ colonial past, cultural 
differences, and political inaptitude rendered them ill-prepared for statehood.  Instead of allowing 
Louisianans to join the Union, Washington lawmakers hoped to devise an apprenticeship program 
that gave Louisianans time to fulfill the requirements for American citizenship.  The Eighth 
Congress looked to the 1804 Governance Act to do just that, providing a well-regulated territorial 
government.  Furthermore, lawmakers turned to several vehicles of Americanization to enhance 
the aims of the act while remedying Louisianans’ perceived deficiencies.   
    Washington lawmakers and the Claiborne administration tried to devise programs most suitable 
to help Louisianans make the needed transition.  They decided that education and military service 
provided the ideal conduits.  Governor Claiborne possessed a strong faith in the power of 
education, contending that “I consider that the diffusion of information among this people is so 
essential to their political happiness and to the Welfare of the American Government.”3  Like many 
early American leaders, Claiborne valued education as a means of creating Louisiana citizens 
schooled in the virtues of republicanism.  He also looked to militia service as a key component of 
the Americanization process that promised to instill his constituents with a sense of civic duty and 
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attachment to the United States.  Ultimately, these vehicles of Americanization promised, 
lawmakers hoped, to instill Louisianans with the skills to assimilate and become ideal Americans.   
    As Congress handed down a set of guidelines for the incorporation process, it was left to 
Creoles to determine the best strategy that allowed them to fulfill lawmakers’ demands while also 
preserving their French identity.  Political activism and resistance proved a potent tool that allowed 
Louisianans to manipulate territorial policymaking.  It allowed them to negotiate the contours of the 
1804 Governance Act to gain self-government.  It also supplied them a means to reject aspects of 
Americanization programs that they deemed contrary to their French cultural identity.  In turn, 
cooperation allowed Louisianans to work with American lawmakers and demonstrate their 
willingness to assimilate enough to gain the benefits of American citizenship.   
    One important aspect of Creole leaders’ accommodation efforts rested in the conversation of 
attachment or open professions of loyalty and affection.  Despite lingual barriers as well as cultural 
and political differences, both lawmakers and Louisianans were fluent in this discourse, both 
understanding its value and influence on Lower Louisiana’s incorporation process.  For 
Louisianans, the conversation of attachment allowed them to verbally show their allegiance to the 
United States and their affection for American political institutions.  No matter how much they 
resisted or clung to their French heritage, attachment provided Louisianans an avenue through 
which to bolster their claims for citizenship.  Concomitantly, American lawmakers equated 
Louisianans’ right to citizenship with their pledges of loyalty and affection.  As American lawmakers 
and Louisianans worked towards bringing the Orleans Territory into the Union, the conversation of 
attachment served as their primary dialogue.   
    As Poydras made his way to the nation’s capital, he left the Orleans Territory confident that Creole 
politicians had developed sophisticated skills of political negotiation.  They demonstrated an ability to 
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use both the art of resistance and cooperation and were articulate in the conversation of attachment.  As 
Louisianans determined their best response to Washington lawmakers’ assimilation demands, these 
strategies enhanced Creole leaders’ ability to shape the incorporation process to fulfill their own needs 
and interests.  Ultimately, Creole politicians’ use of shifting strategies allowed them to fashion 
themselves as true patriots crusading for American citizenship while preserving their French heritage.     
**** 
    On January 2, 1804, Isaac Briggs wrote to President Thomas Jefferson congratulating him on 
the Louisiana Purchase.  He also took the time to show his approval of Jefferson’s choice of 
William C. C. Claiborne as territorial governor.  Despite his cordial tidings, Briggs also conveyed his 
concerns regarding Lower Louisiana.  He criticized the Spanish regime and the aristocratic class 
for allowing Louisiana to fall to “Despotism and Licentiousness.”  Briggs, however, seemed more 
concerned about Louisianans’ expectations for American citizenship.  He contended that, “The 
people, as is usual in all cases of great and sudden change, are unreasonable in their expectations 
…. They expect unbounded license in many of their vicious, luxurious and oppressive habits, and 
at the same time, the full fruition of all those blessings of Republican liberty.”  He hoped that 
Governor Claiborne would exercise caution in addressing these unrealistic demands and that all 
lawmakers would remember that “considerable time is necessary to change, radically, long 
established habits.”4   
    Briggs’s comments illustrate the difficult task facing American lawmakers in dealing with Lower 
Louisiana.  Since the British colonial period, Anglo-Americans attempted to devise methods of 
naturalization and assimilation within their borders.  A newly independent United States, however, 
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necessitated that the federal government assume this role.  Congressional leaders crafted 
legislation that provided a universal naturalization policy that encompassed colonial procedures 
with American notions of citizenship.  As federal lawmakers sifted through varying interpretations 
and redefined ideas of “Americaness” in the new republic, they deemed obtaining knowledge of 
republican principles and displaying a strong attachment to the United States as the premiere 
prerequisites for citizenship.  As the Louisiana Purchase forced Washington lawmakers to mass-
naturalize a diverse population, they continued to cling to these time-honored requirements hoping 
that they would ensure Louisianans’ successful incorporation into the Union.    
    Congressional lawmakers, as discussed in Chapter Two, created the 1804 Governance Act to 
safeguard the republic from what they deemed a politically ignorant population.  The act also 
provided Louisianans with an “apprenticeship to liberty” that sought to give them ample time to 
fulfill the cherished preconditions for American citizenship.  However, the Governance Act lacked 
important features of Americanization.  It failed to provide Louisianans opportunities to participate 
in self-government.  It also largely overlooked the implementation of programs that could assist 
Louisianans in understanding their role as Americans or giving them the means to cultivate a 
greater attachment to the United States.  Recognizing these deficiencies, Washington lawmakers 
and the Claiborne administration worked together to create policies to complement the Governance 
Act and enhance Louisianans’ incorporation period while also allowing their “long established 
habits” to dissipate.  Yet creating effective Americanization programs proved a massive 
undertaking.  What types of programs or policies could “Americanize” a diverse population?  How 
much time was necessary to allow Louisianans to undergo the “apprenticeship to liberty” 
congressional leaders deemed necessary?  Washington lawmakers and Governor Claiborne 
contemplated such questions and crafted an incorporation blueprint that Claiborne presented to his 
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newest constituents in his first formal address on December 20, 1803.  The new governor began 
by welcoming Louisianans as brothers and countrymen.  He assured them protection of their 
liberty, property, commerce, and religion.  “In return for these benefits,” Claiborne reasoned, “the 
United States will be amply remunerated, if your growing attachment to the Constitution of our 
Country, and your veneration for the principles on which it is founded, be duly proportioned to the 
blessings which they confer.”   
    Claiborne’s speech provides insights into how he and American lawmakers envisioned 
Louisianans’ apprenticeship to liberty.  The governor wasted little time in stressing the importance 
of Louisianans’ attachment and loyalty.  He indicated that the most basic American rights came 
only as Louisianans showed their growing acceptance of the United States and its most cherished 
principles.  More importantly, he instructed Louisianans on how they could Americanize and foster 
this attachment by cultivating “with assiduity among yourselves the advancement of Political 
information.”  He went on to suggest that Louisianans “should guide the rising generation in the 
paths of republican economy and virtue; you should encourage Literature, for without the 
advantages of education your descendants will be unable sufficiently to appreciate the intrinsic 
worth of the Government transmitted to them.”5  In Claiborne’s inaugural address he stressed the 
two basic requirements for American citizenship and promised to give his constituents the means 
to fulfill them.     
    As his speech indicates, Claiborne’s early thoughts turned to education.  Before the official 
transfer of French Louisiana to the United States, both Daniel Clark and Claiborne submitted 
reports regarding Lower Louisiana’s deficient education system.  According to Clark, only one 
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public school existed in New Orleans, and Claiborne expressed concerns that most of the 
population remained illiterate.6  After assuming his role as governor, he became even more 
distressed over the territory’s school system.  He admitted to James Madison that “the greater part 
of the people are deplorably uninformed.”  Claiborne blamed the Spanish colonial government but 
also Louisianans themselves for their lack of education.  He argued that “Frivolous diversions seem 
to be among their primary pleasures, and the display of Wealth and the parade of power constitute 
their highest objects and admiration.”  He found that such priorities left little room for education 
amongst the majority of the population.7  Claiborne hoped to remedy these inadequacies by 
providing Louisianans with more educational opportunities.  In January 1804, he attempted to enlist 
the help of Washington lawmakers, arguing that “I would think it wise policy in Congress to 
appropriate one hundred thousand dollars annually for the encouragement of education in 
Louisiana.”8  Claiborne’s request reveals that he hoped to infuse Louisianans with more than just 
literacy, but looked to a public education system as a means of Americanization.   
    Early American leaders shared a strong faith in education, insisting that an educated citizenry 
served as the foundation for a virtuous republican society.  Perhaps the most prominent advocate 
for a free public school system was Thomas Jefferson, who attempted to implement such a plan in 
his home state of Virginia.  In a “Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge” (1779) he 
outlined a three-step educational program.9  Children would be sent to elementary school at public 
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expense.  The most promising young men would further their education at a grammar school that 
taught an advanced curriculum of Greek, Latin, geography, and arithmetic.  Only the brightest 
young men would advance to the state college Jefferson hoped to erect.10  Jefferson’s theories 
were revolutionary at the time, advocating universal and state-sponsored education for all free 
white young men.        
    Jefferson’s strong faith in education stemmed from his belief that “every government 
degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone.  The people themselves therefore are 
its only safe depositories.”  To ensure the citizenry upheld its duties to society, Jefferson contended 
that “their minds must be improved to a certain degree.”11  Education ensured that American 
citizens actively prevented the corruption and tyranny of a bad government.  In a letter to George 
Wythe in 1786, Jefferson reiterated this sentiment, claiming that education provided the foundation 
for “the preservation of freedom, and happiness.”12 
    Jefferson’s proposals met only a lukewarm reception.  The establishment of the University of 
Virginia was the only portion of his plan that came to fruition, but not until 1818.  Many states 
adopted bills to promote elementary education, yet only a few northeastern legislatures 
implemented Jefferson’s three-tiered educational program.  Massachusetts, for example, passed a 
law in 1789 requiring towns with fifty or more families to set up an elementary school, while towns 
consisting of 200 or more families were responsible for establishing a grammar school.  In New 
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York, the state legislature supplied annual subsides for education to be divided among each 
community.13 
    Other prominent Americans shared many of Jefferson’s early affirmations regarding education in 
the republic.  Noah Webster saw education as a key element in the evolution of a distinct American 
character.  By teaching the country’s youth about republican principles, they would in turn harbor a 
greater affection and “an inviolable attachment to their country.”14  Webster also saw an educated 
citizenry as synonymous with good government, asserting that “Education, in a great measure, 
forms the moral characters of men, and morals are the basis of government.”15  Pennsylvania 
physician Benjamin Rush, known most notably for his contributions to American medicine, left 
scores of pamphlets, letters, and speeches dealing with a variety of social and political issues 
facing the young republic.  Rush dedicated much of his attention to the importance of education in 
the growing nation.  In his essay Education Agreeable to A Republican Form of Government, Rush 
contended that only through education could the country’s youth become more accustomed with 
and committed to republican principles.  He hoped that a federal university would allow future 
leaders to be schooled in all aspects of republicanism.  According to Rush, such a university would 
“convert men into republican machines” which in turn ensured that these leaders performed “their 
parts properly in the great machine of the government of the state.”16   
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     14 Noah Webster, “On Education of Youth in America,” Essays on Education in the Early Republic, ed. Frederick 
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and E.T. Andrews, 1790), 1-37. 
     
     15 Ibid., 64. 
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    The educational theories of Jefferson, Webster, and Rush illustrate the indispensable place of 
public education in the young republic.  More importantly they demonstrate why Claiborne and 
other American leaders looked to education as an important tool in Lower Louisiana.  They hoped 
a new public school system would provide Louisianans lessons in republican principles and 
enhance feelings of attachment and civic duty.17   
    In May of 1804, Claiborne requested federal funds and land from President Jefferson to 
establish new schools.18  He also looked to the new Legislative Council to further his educational 
plans.  He begged Louisiana lawmakers to provide money and land for schools in order to “rear up 
our children in the paths of science and virtue, and to impress upon their tender hearts a love of 
civil and religious liberty.”19  Claiborne’s request convinced the Legislative Council to pass “An Act 
To institute a University in the Territory of Orleans” in April 1805.  The opening lines of the act 
reveal that Louisiana lawmakers shared Claiborne’s faith in the power of education:  
Whereas the independence, happiness, and grandeur of every republic, depend, under the 
influence of Divine Providence, upon the wisdom, virtue, talents and energy of its citizens and 
rulers.  And whereas learning hath ever been found the ablest advance of genuine liberty, the 
best supporter of rational religion, and the source of the only solid and imperishable glory, which 
nations can acquire.  And considering that in a commonwealth, whose humble citizens may be 
elected to the highest public office, the knowledge which is required for a magistrate should be 
widely diffused.20  
  
The act made provisions for territorial officials to establish the University of Orleans.  Governor 
Claiborne was vested with the powers to appoint a Board of Regents to handle the details of the college.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
     17 In colonial Louisiana the church oversaw the education of young children.  For further reading see Rodney Cline, 
Education in Louisiana: History of Development  (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 1974); Edwin Whitfield 
Fay, History of Education in Louisiana  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898); Lena Lopez Emanuel, 
“Education in Colonial Louisiana”  (M.A. Thesis, Tulane University of Louisiana, 1894).   
 
     18 Claiborne to Jefferson, 29 May 1804, Letter Books, II: 174-175. 
 
     19 Louisiana Gazette, 7 December 1804.   
 
     20 Ibid., 25 June 1805.   
 108 
The bill also stipulated that the regents were responsible for establishing parish schools throughout the 
territory.  These schools would provide elementary education for Louisiana children in French, English, 
grammar, and arithmetic.  To provide the financial support for the university and parish academies, a 
lottery, held twice a year, would raise funds for the new school system.21   
    Within months, the newly-appointed Board of Regents convened to organize a fund-raising lottery.22  
The lottery began on December 17, 1805, offering 10,000 tickets in hopes of raising at least $30,000 for 
the new university.23  As the Board of Regents attempted to raise money for a school system, the 
territory’s Legislative Assembly worked towards providing public lands in and around New Orleans for 
schools and administrative buildings.24   
    As the Claiborne administration attempted to erect schools, it also worked towards reorganizing what 
little existed of the colonial militia.  Claiborne hoped that, much like education, militia service could 
facilitate the Americanization process and aid Louisianans in becoming more American.  In 1804, Daniel 
Clark reported that the City Battalion consisted of 500 men including an artillery company of 120 men, 
and two separate mulatto companies with nearly 300 free blacks.  In adjoining districts Clark estimated 
that Natchitoches County contained one infantry and one cavalry unit while the counties extending to 
the German Coast and Iberville totaled ten companies of 1,000 men.25  With Lower Louisiana’s close 
proximity to Spanish Texas and Florida, Claiborne realized that a stronger defense force was needed.  
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     22 Ibid., 19 July 1805.   
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Also persistent rumors of a French or Spanish takeover made domestic defense imperative.  Security 
measures aside, Claiborne had ulterior motives for reorganizing the militia—engendering Louisianans’ 
attachment to the Union.     
    Anglo-American tradition placed a high premium on the citizen-soldier.  According to historian 
Lawrence Cress, English political theorists like John Trenchard and James Harrington shaped American 
perceptions regarding civil-military relations.26  Radical Whigs waged a literary war against the ominous 
presence of a standing army.  These early writers depicted standing armies as the vehicles of 
oppression used by the Crown to control the masses.  Cress contends that James Harrington’s 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) marked the beginning of anti-army rhetoric that radical Whigs, and 
later North American colonists, adopted.  Harrington argued that a landowner’s attachment to his 
property gave him a vested interest in the defense of the state that professional soldiers lacked.  Radical 
Whig ideology glorified the citizen-solider, looking to the militia to curb the oppression of standing armies 
and tyrannical leaders.     
    There existed an ideological war between the radical Whigs and their more moderate counterparts.  
Moderate Whigs possessed a liberal view of civil-military relations, arguing that that a standing army, 
not citizen-soldiers, provided the best protection for the state.  They believed that Parliamentary control 
ensured the Crown could not use the army as an abusive tool.  This English debate was transplanted to 
British North America and remained a lively point of contention among Anglo-American leaders.   
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    During the early years of North American colonization, Anglo-Americans espoused the moderate 
Whig interpretation.  Many colonists saw a standing army as both necessary and essential for protection 
from Indians and foreign invaders.  The Seven Years’ War, however, served as a major turning point in 
colonial ideology.  The presence of British soldiers in Boston and along the frontier made many colonists 
equate military occupation with the taxes imposed by the Crown.  In contrast, colonial pamphlets and 
essays depicted the citizen-solider, who gallantly fought for his liberty, as the torchbearer of colonial 
patriotism.  By the revolutionary period, Anglo-Americans embraced the radical Whig interpretation.   
    Following the American Revolution, American leaders continued to celebrate the merits of the militia 
over a professional fighting force.  Militia service became one of the cornerstones of republican virtue 
and the pinnacle of civic duty to one’s community.  In 1793, House deliberations regarding the reduction 
of the army reveal sentiments that were emblematic of how many American leaders and their 
constituents viewed civil-military relations in the young republic.  House members such as Virginia 
Representative Josiah Parker preferred citizen-soldiers who had a personal stake in the security of the 
country rather than paid professionals who were “collected from the stews and brothels of the cities who 
had none of the spirit or principles of the honest yeomanry.”  Parker further argued that professional 
soldiers fought for monetary rewards and not “with a good cause” like militiamen.27   
    For advocates of the militia, the Revolutionary War provided sufficient examples of the sacrifice and 
success of the citizen-solider.  North Carolina Representative John Steele recollected victories at 
Cowpens, King’s Mountain, and Hanging Rock, all battles “fought by freemen … men attached to the 
Revolution from principle, men who were sensible of their rights and fought for them.”28  For many 
                                                 
     27 Debates in Congress, 2nd Congress, 2nd sess., I: 406.      
 
     28 Ibid., 413.   
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American lawmakers, the citizen-solider not only provided domestic security but protected the republic 
against oppressive standing armies.   
    Governor Claiborne believed that militia service could instill Louisiana landowners with a vested 
interest in the republic and further their attachment to the United States.  The territory’s Legislative 
Council shared his feelings.  On April 10, 1805, it took steps to reorganize the territory’s defenses.  “An 
act for the regulating and governing the Militia of the Territory Orleans” designated twenty-four militia 
districts for New Orleans and adjoining parishes that incorporated every free, able-bodied man between 
sixteen and fifty.  The act also outlined the internal organization of each district.  Regiments were to 
have at least one company of grenadiers, light infantry, and troop of horse each.  Officers were required 
to muster their forces anywhere from two to four times a year.  Fines were imposed on those who 
refused to attend and participate in musters.29  Concomitantly, Louisianans began forming their own 
volunteer units.  The Legislative Council drafted qualifications and criteria for such companies, requiring 
volunteer units to have at least thirty men who supplied their own weapons.30  In November, Claiborne 
happily reported the progress the militia made over the preceding months.  He gave positive marks to 
several companies of Orleans Volunteers and to the Orleans Troop of Horse.31 
    Once organized and functional, the Orleans territorial militia served as a slave patrol.  Militiamen 
volunteered for night watches of surrounding plantations, looking for suspicious slave activity.  This 
short tenure as a patroller exempted a soldier from musters and other militia duties anywhere from six 
months to a year.  However, slave patrollers were not always enough to ease fears of slave 
insurrections.  As a precautionary measure, Governor Claiborne called out entire militia units to patrol 
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their districts in case of rebellion.  On one occasion, he requested that the Point Coupee militia, along 
with a small regular force, stay on constant watch to prevent a rumored slave uprising.32   
    Militiamen in the Orleans territory were not only used as slave patrollers, but also as a police force to 
maintain public order.  Ethnic feuding in city streets and at seasonal dances made militiamen a 
permanent fixture in New Orleans nightlife.  In January 1804, Claiborne stationed a militia detachment at 
the Ballroom to “tend to the preservation of good order.” 33  This general order followed a disturbance 
that occurred at one nightspot.  Allegedly, Frenchmen in attendance were offended by the playing of 
Contra Danse Anglaise, which they felt celebrated their British foes.34  At other dances, duels often 
resulted when song selections seemed to favor one ethnic group over another.  To alleviate this 
recurring problem, Claiborne stationed militiamen at every public dance, while requiring ballroom 
owners to adhere to a strict playlist that alternated French quadrilles, English quadrilles, and waltzes.35   
    Despite minor successes in militia organization, Claiborne and his advisors still faced many obstacles 
in creating an effective defense force.  In October 1805, Henry Hopkins, the Adjutant General of the 
Orleans territory, reported to Claiborne that the two major problems plaguing the militia were 
demographics and ethnic composition.  Hopkins contended that geographic constraints restricted the 
readiness of militia units.  Dispersed settlements and militia districts extending to both sides of the 
Mississippi River made musters and organization virtually impossible.  Within the city of New Orleans, 
Hopkins found that the heterogeneous population posed its own problems, as linguistic barriers 
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undermined unity and company cohesion.  Cultural prejudice among ethnic groups also hindered militia 
camaraderie and strict discipline.  Many French and Spanish natives refused to muster with one 
another, uniting only in resentment of Claiborne’s insistence that Americans, not Creoles or Spaniards, 
serve as brigadier generals.36   
    Claiborne’s programs intended to foster attachment and provide Louisianans with a vested 
interest in the United States.  Yet Louisianans’ Americanization process was far from complete.  
Washington lawmakers also did their part to assist Louisianans in ascertaining knowledge of 
republican principles.  As Louisianans protested the 1804 Governance Act, congressional leaders 
began to reconsider the hated bill.  As early as August 1804, President Jefferson encouraged 
American lawmakers to revise the original Governance Act in order to provide Louisianans with 
self-government.  Jefferson’s request seems quite strange considering his initial concerns 
regarding Louisianans’ political capabilities.  In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson revealed his 
true intentions, admitting that his earlier feelings about Louisianans had not changed.  Rather, 
Jefferson feared that despite the dangers of extending self-government to an ignorant population, 
the alternative was much more threatening to the nation.  Jefferson contended that if lawmakers 
continued to deprive Louisianans of basic American rights, they would turn away from the United 
States, leaving them “the pretext of calling in a foreign Umpire between them & us.” 37  By providing 
Louisianans with a representative government, Jefferson hoped to curb discontent among the 
Orleans citizenry.     
    Heeding Jefferson’s urgings, both the House and Senate appointed special committees to draft a new 
Louisiana government bill.  Although committee debates reveal that lawmakers wanted Louisianans to 
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undergo a more extensive naturalization period, they also demonstrate that many congressional 
members believed that self-government was necessary.38  More importantly, they, like Jefferson, 
believed Louisianans’ loyalty depended on providing Orleans inhabitants with concessions.  Self-
government seemed an appropriate dispensation.  One House member even argued that “by permitting 
her [Orleans Territory] inhabitants to form their own regulations, the voice of discontent would be 
diminished [if it exists], and the people bound to us by the strong ties of gratitude and interest.”39   
Besides curbing disloyalty, congressional leaders realized that self-government would allow Louisianans 
to elect competent officials and to participate in American republican institutions.   
    On February 18, 1805, the Senate sent a revised government bill, modeled after the Northwest 
Ordinance, to the House for approval.  On March 1, the House passed the 1805 Governance Bill.40  
The new bill extended Louisianans self-government through a bicameral legislature consisting of a 
territorial House of Representatives with twenty-five delegates elected by the people to work 
alongside the Legislative Council, still to be appointed by the President.  The act also stipulated 
that when the territory consisted of 60,000 free inhabitants it would be admitted into the Union as 
an equal state.  The 1805 Governance Act, therefore, elevated the Orleans Territory to the second 
grade of territorial status and provided guidelines for future statehood.41   
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    As the new territorial government took effect on July 4, 1805, American lawmakers and 
members of the Claiborne administration felt assured that they had created an ideal apprenticeship 
period that consisted of a territorial government and Americanization programs that could help 
prepare Louisianans for citizenship and statehood.42  Yet over the course of the next few years, 
these programs failed to have their intended effects.   
    The first territorial House of Representatives met on November 4, 1805.  Members of the 
territory’s ancient population, as discussed in Chapter Three, monopolized seats using their new 
political power to forward their resistance agenda.  They not only sparred with Governor Claiborne 
over the territory’s legal code but ensured Creole dominance of the legislative body.43  Although 
designed to align Louisianans with republican values, the territory’s new representative 
government only served to polarize the ancients and Americans.  As the new Legislative Assembly 
often exacerbated tensions within the territory, the education system also fell into disarray.  In a 
speech opening the second session of the Legislative Assembly in March 1806, Governor 
Claiborne indicated that all initial preparations for the school system produced dismal results.  
Claiborne blamed the lack of public support for this failure.  He also looked to the Legislative 
Assembly for assistance, contending that “Those in power should esteem it an incumbent duty to 
make such provisions for the improvement of the minds and morals of the rising generation as will 
enable them to appreciate the blessing of self-government and to preserve those rights which are 
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destined for their inheritance.”44  Claiborne urged legislative officials to implement educational 
programs similar to those existing in states such as New York that placed citizens in charge of their 
children’s education.45  Answering Claiborne’s plea, the assembly passed “An Act to provide for the 
establishment of public free schools in the several counties of the Territory.”  The bill made the 
heads of each family responsible for the erection and support of parish schools.46  
    For the next two years neither the 1806 act nor the University lottery engendered much support or 
funds for public education.  Judging from advertisements in the Louisiana Gazette, private schools and 
individual tutors were more successful than public schools.  As early as 1805, Francis Hacket set up an 
English school on Bienville Street.  His curriculum consisted of reading, writing, and arithmetic.  He also 
provided private lessons for those needing individual instruction.47  Such advertisements were 
commonplace in New Orleans papers and provided inhabitants with tutors who catered to all ethnic 
groups and trades.  In February 1808, the Louisiana Gazette announced the establishment of a new 
French School located on South Charters Street.  The instructor, M. O’Duhigg, offered French and 
English lessons as well as private tutoring.48  Judging by the variety and steady upsurge of these 
advertisements, it seems logical to conclude that there existed a high demand for private schools and 
tutors.  Francis Hacket continued to announce his services in the October 20, 1809 edition of the 
Louisiana Gazette, indicating that he experienced at least moderate success in teaching the children of 
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the territory.49  It appears that territorial inhabitants looked to private schools and personal tutors, 
perhaps seeing American public schools as too financially burdensome.  More importantly, many 
Louisianans ignored Claiborne’s educational programs, fearing the cultural implications a revamped 
American curriculum could have on their French heritage and traditions.   
    The Legislative Assembly also did very little to advance Claiborne’s educational program.  Between 
1806 and 1808, the public school system was overlooked as territorial lawmakers focused on the legal 
system and the Burr Conspiracy.  In 1807 the University lottery was revoked and by 1808 the parish 
school program was abandoned in favor of a new education act passed on March 16, 1808.  In this act, 
the judges of each parish were to appoint a committee of the most respected men in the parish to 
organize schools.50  Again this bill generated little results.  In an address to the Legislative Assembly in 
January 1809, Claiborne himself admitted the failure of his education program, expressing his doubts 
that any act would “produce the desired effect.”   The only real success of Claiborne’s system was the 
University of Orleans.  By November 4, 1811, the university opened with an enrollment of seventy 
students.51   
    As Claiborne’s public school system fell short of his initial hopes, the reorganization of the territory’s 
militia also brought its fair share of disappointments.  Following the militia reorganization act in August of 
1805, Claiborne immediately sent orders for all districts to activate their units.  Claiborne and Colonel 
Henry Hopkins personally traveled throughout the territory to assist each district in setting up its militia 
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and commissioning officers.52  In a speech given to the Legislative Assembly in March 1806, Claiborne 
expressed satisfaction with the overall progress of militia reorganization.  He believed, however, that 
fines and punishment for insubordination were much too weak, indicating that there existed problems in 
implementing strict adherence to service.53    
    A few months later, Claiborne’s early approval of the militia was put to the test over a 
Spanish/American border dispute.  While turbulent negotiations over the exact western boundary 
between the Orleans Territory and Texas continued, Spanish Texans crossed into Louisiana threatening 
the territory’s peripheral parishes.  As a precautionary measure, Governor Claiborne called out the 
Natchitoches and Rapides militia units only to find them in utter chaos.  Claiborne attributed this disarray 
to the ancient Louisianans who failed to display “the same degree of patriotism” found amongst 
Americans in these counties.  Claiborne expressed his belief that many of these ancients still possessed 
strong affection for Spain and that “in the event of War, they would probably be disposed to take a 
neutral Stand.”54  These initial worries soon faded as militia units throughout the territory eventually 
mobilized to defend the western frontier.  The border dispute demonstrated that the newly reorganized 
territorial militia, although slow, could meet the call to arms.  In contrast to his previous assessment, 
Claiborne now praised the efforts of ancient Louisianans who fought their former colonial caretakers, 
asserting that “this display of patriotism affords me, much satisfaction, and has rendered this, among the 
happiest days of my life.”55       
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    As the militia remained successful in policing the Orleans Territory and curbing rumored slave revolts 
and ethnic feuds, it was not devoid of its defects and weaknesses.  Following the Spanish-American 
border crisis, Claiborne continued his call for militia reform.  He seemed particularly concerned about 
the scarcity of arms and the lack of discipline among militiamen.  In January 1807, he urged the 
Legislative Assembly to impose stiffer punishments and fines for those who failed to attend required 
musters and military parades.56  Just two years later, a reevaluation of the Orleans territorial militia 
revealed that the territory’s ethnic composition and dispersed settlements continued to inhibit effective 
military organization.  Henry Hopkins still found problems, insisting that, “in every street you will 
encounter native Americans, native Louisianans, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, Germans, and 
Italians.  Let a company of Militia be assembled, & there is no one language in which the word of 
command can be given that will be intelligible to all.” 57  Indeed, the same ethnic diversity that plagued 
the formation of the education system and hindered solidarity in the Legislative Assembly also made 
effective militia organization virtually impossible.  Moreover, Hopkins claimed that lax fines and 
punishment for insubordination remained persistent problems.58  Finally in 1811, after a major slave 
insurrection in New Orleans, territorial officials implemented Claiborne’s proposed reforms by requiring 
musters for all militia units and raising fines for insubordination from one dollar to seven. 59      
    Beginning in 1805, the Claiborne administration implemented key legislation that endeavored to 
assist Louisianans in becoming more American.  Self-government, public education, and militia service 
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were all used as a means to teach Louisianans about republican principles while also fostering 
attachment to the United States.  These mechanisms, however, yielded dismal results.  The bicameral 
legislature often exacerbated ethnic tensions existing between Louisianans and Americans.  The parish 
school system was nonexistent, while the Orleans University struggled to keep its doors open.  
Concomitantly, militia organization remained impaired by the ethnic composition and the dispersed 
nature of the territory.  As techniques of Americanization failed to have their intended outcomes in the 
Orleans Territory, American lawmakers grew more frustrated that Louisianans failed to accept programs 
that seemed so vital to the incorporation process.  By their estimations Louisianans resisted all attempts 
to Americanize, leaving many lawmakers to wonder if Louisianans wanted to become true Americans.   
**** 
    By American standards Louisianans failed to undergo the proper process of Americanization.  
For Washington lawmakers, Louisianans’ apprenticeship to liberty was an all or nothing situation.  
For Louisianans, however, it was far from black and white.  Louisianans, undoubtedly, resisted 
aspects of Claiborne’s programs by choosing to send their children to private tutors or neglecting 
required militia musters, but that did not mean that they were indifferent or actively trying to 
undermine their assimilation.  Rather Louisianans made conscious efforts to accommodate 
lawmakers and the Claiborne administration—just not always in the way American lawmakers 
desired.  As Louisianans adopted the antics of resistance leaders, their political boycotts, critical 
editorials, and intense feuds in the Legislative Assembly revealed the extent of their disdain for 
many American policies.  Such powerful protests and abrasive demonstrations of dissent, 
understandably, were tantalizing to national newspapers and troublesome to lawmakers.  This 
resistance, however, often masked Creole politicians’ more subtle efforts to oblige and cooperate 
with Washington lawmakers.  The same Legislative Assembly that served as an ethnic 
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battleground also passed Americanization programs including the education and militia acts.  It 
heeded Claiborne’s requests for a public school system and militia and used every legislative 
session to improve these institutions.  Louisiana lawmakers also took every opportunity to utilize 
the conversation of attachment to bolster their claims of loyalty and affection as well as their desire 
to be good members of the Union.  Where Americans often saw ambivalence, Louisianans saw 
themselves using cooperation as a means to ensure that their incorporation promoted their goals 
and aspirations and Washington lawmakers’ requests for assimilation.  
    Creole politicians’ accommodating efforts can largely be attributed to the work of Julien Poydras.  
Unlike many ancient Creoles, Poydras believed cooperation, rather than resistance, allowed 
Louisianans to shape the incorporation process.  His constant urgings and guidance often 
countered resistance tactics used by Clark and Livingston and provided Louisianans another 
means to negotiate their place in the Union.     
    Born in France, Julien Poydras made his way to Louisiana from St. Domingue in 1768.  Once in 
New Orleans he began a small trading business along the banks of the Mississippi River.  His 
peddling endeavors allowed him to amass a small fortune which he quickly invested in property.  In 
1784, he purchased a stretch of land in Pointe Coupee.  Along with a new plantation, Poydras set 
up a merchant store in the small outpost.  His good reputation and many business connections 
allowed his store to thrive.  Between 1784 and 1803, he purchased property in West Feliciana 
Parish, West Baton Rouge, and in the city of New Orleans.  As the United States took possession 
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of Lower Louisiana, Poydras acquired another large stretch of land in Point Coupee that made up 
the bulk of his historic Alma Plantation.60   
    Beyond his merchant enterprises, Poydras was also one of the Mississippi Valley’s largest 
planters.  His early agricultural endeavors centered on indigo and cotton cultivation.  Along with his 
massive landholdings, Poydras also invested in slaves.  Based on 1820 census records, he owned 
over 3,820 slaves on his Pointe Coupee plantation alone.61  In 1795, his Alma plantation was the 
site of one of colonial Louisiana’s worst slave rebellions.  Away when the revolt occurred, Poydras 
was distressed by the matter and disappointed over the loss of some of his most trusted slaves.62    
    Although Poydras made his home in Louisiana, he remained in contact with family and friends in 
France.  He even carefully monitored the events of the French Revolution.  At one point he became 
so distraught over the radical turn of the revolution that he admitted to a friend that “what I have 
heard from France, has left me too disgusted to even think anymore about it other than with 
horror.”63  His French ties, of course, left Poydras elated by the retrocession of Louisiana to the 
French.  Upon hearing the news, he took the opportunity to write colonial Prefect Pierre Clément 
                                                 
     60 Brian J. Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 1-16.  Poydras served in the French Army when 
he was captured by the British.  After three years in captivity he escaped by stowing away in a ship bound for St. 
Domingue.     
 
     61 Julien Poydras to Mr. Dulcide Barran, 12 October 1799; Julien Poydras to Mr. Dematerre, 20 December 1799; 
Julien Poydras, Private and Commercial Correspondence of An Indigo and Cotton Planter, 1794-1800,  Special 
Collections, Tulane University; Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 19.     
 
     62 Julien Poydras to Mr. Dela Landes Poydras, 15 February 1796, Private and Commercial Correspondence; 
Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 20-24.  Erupting in the wake of the slave insurrection in St. 
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Indians encouraged the revolt.  No matter the cause, slaves on Poydras’s plantation refused to plant the corn and 
leading black slaves conducted meetings at night regarding an uprising.  Although Poydras was in Philadelphia on 
business at the time, local Pointe Coupee authorities uncovered the plot and began patrolling plantations and 
conducting interviews.  Between April and May of 1795, authorities arrested over sixty slaves.  After another week of 
trials, fifty-seven slaves and three whites were convicted.  Ultimately, twenty-three slaves were hung while another 
thirty-one were flogged and sent to do hard labor in Mexico and Florida. 
 
     63 Julien Poydras to Mr. Dematerre, 20 December 1799, Private and Commercial Correspondence.    
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de Laussat to welcome him to his new post and to give him valuable information regarding Lower 
Louisiana’s climate and geographical contours.  He concluded his letter, affectionately proclaiming 
“May this sweet reunion forever tighten the bonds of blood, friendship, and devotion that always 
made our homeland dear to us.”64   
    Poydras’s years in Louisiana failed to dim his attachment to France.  He must have been quite 
disappointed when France’s tenure in Lower Louisiana was cut short by the Louisiana Purchase.  It 
would seem only natural that he would resort to resistance against the American government, the 
same government that brought his hopes for a French reunion to an end.  But he did not.  Poydras 
emerged as a leading pro-American politician in territorial Louisiana and helped guide 
Americanization efforts, believing that cooperation would secure Louisianans statehood while 
protecting their French heritage.     
    By the time the United States purchased French Louisiana, Poydras had made a name for 
himself as a trusted leader and businessman throughout Lower Louisiana.  His many connections 
kept him closely tied to affairs in New Orleans and he soon befriended Governor Claiborne.  
Finding Poydras to be a “worthy man, of honest reputation, and good information,” Claiborne 
looked to him as a valuable Creole ally.65  Also his proficiency in English allowed Poydras to bridge 
the gap between Claiborne and his French-speaking constituents.  Hoping to exploit Poydras’s 
strengths, Claiborne appointed him to the Board of the Directors of the Bank of Louisiana in 
January 1804.  At its inaugural meeting, Poydras was elected president of the board, a position he 
                                                 
     64 Julien Poydras to Pierre Clément de Laussat, 22 July 1803, Selected Writings of Julien Poydras, ed. Julie 
Eshelman-Lee  (Fort Collins: Creole West Productions, 2004), 111-112.  Poydras hoped to give Laussat insight about 
Lower Louisiana since the French “know Louisiana only through word of mouth—in other words not at all.” 
 
     65 Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 29 May 1804, Letter Books, II: 176;  Claiborne to Jefferson, 30 August 1804, 
Territorial Papers, IX: 284.  Here he described Poydras as being “among the most influential Men in the Province, he 
possesses a large Estate & is a man of good information.”   
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would assume for five consecutive terms.  Along with his director duties, Poydras also made efforts 
to establish a Chamber of Commerce in New Orleans, hoping to further reinforce the territory’s 
financial system.66  
    Claiborne also looked to Poydras to serve other important government positions.  Under the 
Spanish regime, government posts were headed by the offices of military and civil commandant 
that arbitrated over military, legal, and civil matters.  When the United States took control of Lower 
Louisiana, lawmakers temporarily maintained this system.  In such a chaotic time, lawmakers 
looked to competent and trusting men to keep order.  Claiborne wasted little time in appointing 
Poydras civil commandant over Point Coupee in August 1804.67    
    Moreover, President Jefferson rewarded Poydras’s initial support of the Claiborne administration 
by making the Creole planter a member of the territory’s Legislative Council.  While many ancients 
declined to serve in the new government, Poydras accepted, admitting that “I conceive it as my 
duty to accept ….  If those, who have great Interest in the Country, should decline serving it when 
called upon, their conduct would be unwarrantable.”68  Between 1805 and 1808, Poydras served as 
the president of the Legislative Council.69  In this capacity he worked vigorously to assist the 
Claiborne administration and Louisianans in the incorporation process.  When the Legislative 
                                                 
     66 Frances Pirotte Zink, Julien Poydras: Statesman, Philanthropist, Educator  (Lafayette: University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, 1968), 10. 
   
     67 Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 27; Claiborne to Julien Poydras, 30 August 1804, Letter 
Books, II: 313.  In the same month Poydras took over as civil commandant problems arose with the Spanish living in 
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use his new position to invoke “all the means in your power to prevent Citizens of your District from aiding the 
Insurgents.”    
 
     68 William C. C. Claiborne to James Madison, 5 November 1804, Ibid., II: 391.  In this letter Claiborne forwarded 
Poydras’s acceptance letter to the appointed Legislative Council.   
 
     69 Register of Civil Appointments in the Territory of Orleans, 13 February 1806, Territorial Papers, IX: 598.  Also see 
Claiborne to Julien Poydras, 13 June 1806, Letter Books, III: 326.  Here Claiborne informs Poydras that he has once 
again been chosen as a member of the Legislative Council.   
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Council convened in December 1804, Poydras used his first presidential address to encourage his 
fellow council members to cooperate with American lawmakers to alleviate the stress of the new 
regime change.70  As the Legislative Council’s president, Poydras guided Louisianans through the 
Burr Conspiracy and helped them fight for the continuation of civil law.  More importantly, Poydras 
took the lead in helping the Claiborne administration implement aspects of its Americanization 
program.  He continuously urged territorial leaders to pass legislation to establish public schools.  
He also corresponded with Congress in hopes of securing financial help for the new public school 
system.71  Much like his American counterparts, Poydras saw education as the key to Louisianans’ 
incorporation.   
    Beyond his assistance in the Legislative Council, Poydras also worked to ensure that 
Claiborne’s education system succeeded in his own community.  Through Poydras’s constant 
encouragement and generous support, members of the Pointe Coupee community met in 
September 1808 to begin preparations for the establishment of five parish schools.  At the 
gathering they crafted guidelines for paying instructors and the curriculum that consisted of 
reading, writing, composition, grammar, morals, the catechism, and arithmetic.  Furthermore, 
attendees decided to fund the schools by levying a fifty cent tax per slave on every planter in the 
parish.  Community members then selected a board of five directors to oversee the implementation 
of their plans.  These directors were to select instructors, establish examination methods, and 
                                                 
     70 Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 30.  He hoped that his fellow council members would put 
their ethnic differences aside to help Louisiana, arguing that “private interest cannot be isolated from the general good, 
without more or less hazarding the subversion of the social order, and without brutalizing, and dividing society into 
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     71 Claiborne to Poydras, 6 April 1804, Letter Books, II: 83.  Here Governor Claiborne wrote Poydras about his 
educational plans, espousing to the faithful Creole that he hoped that Louisianans would “guard with paternal care the 
Education of their children and spare neither expense nor attention to enrich their minds with correct morals and useful 
information.”  Also see Zink, Julien Poydras, 16.   
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handle disciplinary matters.  Julien Poydras gladly served on the board and took a formative role in 
advancing the school system.72  
    By the end of 1808, only four public schools existed in the Orleans Territory and all of them were 
located in Pointe Coupee.  Also through Poydras’s financial support, Pointe Coupee erected an 
academy for young women that remained open until the Civil War.73  By 1809, the Pointe Coupee 
system was fully functional and received accolades from Governor Claiborne.  “In the Parish of 
Point Coupee, it is understood, that provisions has been made for the support of two or more public 
schools,” Claiborne emphatically bragged.  He went on to encourage other lawmakers to emulate 
Poydras’s commitment to education, arguing that “Youths are reared into life, become the pride of 
their parents, the ornaments of society & the pillars of their country’s glory.  You cannot 
Gentlemen, but be sensible of the importance of this subject; it embraces the best interest of the 
community & mingles with the warmest affections of the heart.” 74 
    As Poydras made his way to Washington to serve as the territory’s delegate to Congress, 
Louisianans looked forward to having such a respected advocate in Congress.75  Claiborne too felt 
relieved to have a pro-American representative in Congress, but he also lamented Poydras’s 
departure.76  Since the Louisiana Purchase, Julien Poydras proved an indispensable ally to the 
                                                 
     72 Zink, Julien Poydras, 17.  They ultimately decided to pay instructors $300 a year.  The instructor would teach any 
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     73 Sam Mims, Trail of the Pack Peddler  (Homer Louisiana: The Guardian-Journal, 1887), 29-31.   
 
     74 Governor Claiborne’s Speech to the Two Houses of the Assembly, 18 January 1809, Letter Books, IV: 293.  He 
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     75 Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 33.   
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American government.  He not only worked alongside Claiborne and Washington lawmakers but 
also tried to help his fellow Louisianans to do the same.  In many respects he provided Louisianans 
an alternative to political resistance and encouraged them to use cooperation to influence the 
incorporation process.   
    Poydras proves a complementary figure next to Daniel Clark and Edward Livingston: Their careers 
and influence in the Orleans Territory exemplify two vital strategies Louisianans employed in the political 
arena.  Resistance allowed Louisianans to oppose unfavorable policies and ensure the maintenance of 
their French identity, while cooperation often demonstrated politicians’ commitment to assist their 
constituents in fulfilling the requirements for citizenship.  In turn, Creole leaders often used them 
interchangeably in their dealings with American lawmakers.  For instance, the Board of Regents of the 
University of Orleans for years attempted to make the institution of higher learning a reality.  By 1812, 
the university opened its doors largely because the acting regents secured money from both the 
Legislative Council and the City Council.  They also were successful in obtaining several city lots and 
buildings to house the inaugural class in November 1811.  The university, however, lacked many of the 
necessary provisions to accommodate more students and provide a thriving university community.  In 
hopes of keeping the university alive, the regents sent a petition to Congress begging for assistance.  
They requested money to procure more buildings and to make improvements to provide better facilities 
for current and future students.77  To reinforce their request, the memorial explained that Congress 
needed to share the burden of public education.  The regents, like so many American lawmakers, 
believed that education ensured that Louisianans would fulfill citizenship requirements.  They believed if 
lawmakers intended for these prerequisites to be met, they needed to do their part by “affording the 
                                                 
     77 Memorial to Congress from the Regents of the University of Orleans, 20 April 1812, Ibid., IX: 1015. 
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means (at least to the rising generation) of understanding the laws and maxims that govern the people 
of the United States, in the language in which they are written.”  The memorial allowed the regents to 
demand that Congress be more accountable for public education, while also showing their own 
commitment to the university’s success.78   
    Providing a cogent argument, the regents’ memorial illustrates that many Creole lawmakers hoped to 
see the success of some of Claiborne’s Americanization programs.  Even more interesting is the fact 
that many of these regents including Noel Destrehan, Pierre Derbigny, Evan Jones, and James Pitot 
were the same men that used resistance to combat unfavorable policies.  These men resigned their 
posts in the Legislative Council, wrote impassioned editorials against the Claiborne administration, 
carried the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana to Congress, and exploited the support of 
resistance leaders.  Yet these men were not always at odds with the American government.  At times 
they found causes that allowed them to cooperate with American lawmakers and to use their leadership 
skills and influence within the territory to promote a successful incorporation.  Public education became 
one such issue.  To them the diffusion of education was necessary for the next generation and an 
essential vehicle to help Louisianans learn English and the intricate workings of republican principles.79  
Although Poydras undoubtedly influenced the Board of Regents’ copious efforts, their memorial reveals 
that cooperation became an essential tool Creole politicians used to shape the incorporation process to 
offset their ardent resistant tactics.     
    The Burr Conspiracy also provides an excellent example of how Louisianans balanced 
resistance and cooperation.  The early years of the territorial period brought considerable protest 
from Louisianans who seemed dissatisfied with the 1804 Governance Act, the ban on the slave 
                                                 
     78 Ibid., IX: 1015-1016.   
 
     79 Ibid., IX: 1016.  
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trade, and the encroachment of English and common law in their lives.  Some ardent Creoles even 
expressed hope that the Spanish or French would reclaim Louisiana.  With such strong dissent it 
would appear that the Burr Conspiracy provided unhappy Louisianans the perfect chance to rid 
themselves of the American government.  Yet Louisianans failed to seize this opportunity.  While 
prominent political leaders such as General James Wilkinson, Daniel Clark, and Edward Livingston 
faced serious accusations of treason, not one ancient Louisianan was indicted or arrested in the 
malicious scheme.  When given the opportunity to rebel, Louisianans remained loyal, illustrating 
their reliance on attachment rather than defiance.   
    In the months following the Burr Conspiracy, Louisianans did not miss their chance to remind 
American lawmakers of their allegiance and attachment during such a chaotic time.  In February 
1807, members of the Legislative Assembly forwarded Congress a series of resolutions that 
professed their bonds of affection, saying that they were:  
Assured of the attachment and Devotion of the Citizens of this Territory to the 
Government of the United States, to Which under the Auspices of Providence they 
are so highly indebted for their present prosperity and Happiness and desiring to 
give a solemn testimonial to the World of our firm Determination under all 
Circumstances and at all hazards to maintain and support that political connextion 
which has united our Destinies to those of one of the freest and most enlightened 
people on earth.  
 
The resolutions went on to express Louisianans’ horror over an attempt to cast doubt on their 
loyalty and promised that territorial inhabitants would be ready to assist lawmakers in purging any 
traitors or those who sought to undermine the American government.80   
    Louisianans ignored Burr’s cunning plans in order to show their devotion and attachment to the 
United States.  Their actions proved useful.  According to George Dargo, since Louisianans turned 
                                                 
     80  Resolutions of the Legislative Assembly, 20 February 1807, Ibid., IX: 707-708.   
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against Burr, Governor Claiborne felt compelled to give special concessions to his loyal 
constituents.  He decided to approve the Digest of Civil Code, ending Louisianans’ long crusade to 
preserve civil law.81  This experience taught Louisianans the power of attachment and the benefits 
it yielded.   
    Although Louisianans’ professed bonds of affection proved useful during the Burr Conspiracy, 
they were far from a new concept.  Beginning with his first address to his constituents, Claiborne 
stressed the importance of attachment.  But what does attachment truly mean?  Why was it so 
important in the incorporation process?  Historian Peter Kastor argues that many historians see 
attachment and identity as one and the same.  He, however, prefers to use the word “attachment”, 
since identity had yet to enter into nineteenth-century Americans’ vocabulary.82  Yet by dissecting 
the word attachment one realizes it is infused with significant meaning for American lawmakers and 
Louisianans.  Identity refers to being similar or exactly alike.  More specifically, to identify with 
someone means to align one’s interests with his/hers.  Although identity describes the 
incorporation process, since Americans hoped that Louisianans would become identical to all 
Americans and share their values, mores, cultural mannerism, and institutions—attachment goes 
much deeper.  Attachment means the joining of a group through bonds of affection, loyalty, and 
devotion.  The incorporation process rested not only on making Louisianans an exact replica of 
Americans, but to make them willing Americans.  Attachment indicates a choice, a conscious 
assimilation not by force but through affection, devotion, and loyalty.  Americans, therefore, looked 
to bonds of attachment as the glue that bound willing and devoted Louisianans to the young 
republic.         
                                                 
     81 George Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana, 173.   
 
     82 Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible, 4-5.   
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    Long before the Louisiana Purchase, Americans spoke the language of attachment.  Since the 
colonial era, Americans used attachment as a litmus test for citizenship.  This, of course, 
manifested itself in different ways.  Open professions of affection or disavowing loyalty to another 
nation often furthered ones’ attachment.  At times it came with showing a love and knowledge of 
the federal Constitution and willingness to participate in the republican government.  More 
importantly, many immigrants found that gallant sacrifices on the battlefield transcended rhetoric to 
demonstrate their true love and devotion to the United States.  By the time the United States 
acquired French Louisiana, American lawmakers deemed attachment as essential for 
naturalization and assimilation as evidenced a by congressional committee’s conclusion that “only 
two modes present themselves whereby a dependent province may be held in obedience to its 
sovereign State—force and affection.”83  Americans lawmakers hoped attachment would be 
enough and relied on signs of affection as a prerequisite for Louisianans to receive statehood.   
    Governor Claiborne himself engaged in the conversation of attachment.  He filled his letters to 
American officials with references to his constituents’ affection and gradual warming to the United 
States.  Following the dismal failure of Louisianans’ Remonstrance, for instance, Claiborne assured 
James Madison that such minor setbacks did not shake Orleans inhabitants’ allegiance to the 
United States.84   While discussing tense negotiations between the United State and Spain in July 
1806, Claiborne hoped to ease James Madison’s mind by assuring him that “we [Orleans Territory] 
are by no means as divided as has been represented, and my firm opinion is, that in the event of 
war, many of the Louisianans will be found faithful to the American Standard.”85   Claiborne 
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obviously saw the importance of the conversation of attachment.  He knew many questioned his 
constituents’ loyalty as well as their desire to be affectionately tied to the United States.   At times 
he tried to convince lawmakers that Louisianans’ opposition was not a result of their lack of 
attachment for the Union, but the malice of designing men.  On one occasion, he described 
Louisianans as a “Mild pacific people,” with a strong attachment to the Union.  Yet he found they 
were “uncommonly credulous, and may easily be misled by designing Men, of which the Territory 
at present, has an abundant supply.”86   Years later, he continued to defend his constituents’ 
dissent, admitting to President Jefferson that “I attach no blame to the Louisianans; a few men 
whose native Language is English, have by their Intrigues, f’omented all the discontents, which 
have and do yet exist in this Territory.”87  Claiborne continued to use resistance leaders such as 
Clark and Livingston to explain Louisianans’ often less than affectionate attitude towards their new 
government.    
    Claiborne also used the conversation of attachment with his constituents.  From his first address 
to territorial inhabitants to his many speeches before the Legislative Assembly, Claiborne 
constantly urged Louisianans to demonstrate their loyalty and affection.  In July 1805, he 
expressed his confidence in Louisianans’ attachment, claiming that “My firm belief is, that the 
Mississippi will cease to flow, e’er she ceases to behold Louisiana attached to the Empire of 
American Freedom.”88  His later speeches aped such feelings.  In the opening session of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
     86 Governor Claiborne to the Secretary of State, 3 October 1804, Ibid., IX: 305.   
 
     87 Governor Claiborne to the President, 15 July 1806, Ibid., IX: 672-673.   
 
     88 Claiborne to Legislative Council, 3 July 1805, Letter Books, III: 112.     
 
 133 
Legislative Council in March 1806, Claiborne felt self-assured of Louisianans’ attachment, 
exclaiming that “in peace or in war—the good people of this territory will do their duty!”89 
    As Claiborne did his part to cultivate his constituents’ bonds of affection, Louisianans took it 
upon themselves to engage in the conversation of attachment.  The Remonstrance of the People 
of Louisiana provided Louisianans a chance to use such discourse to secure important goals.  The 
opening statement of the memorial expressed Louisianans’ anticipation and joy over becoming part 
of the United States, stating that “we passed under your jurisdiction with a joy bordering on 
enthusiasm, submitted to the inconveniences of an intermediate dominion without a murmur, and 
saw the last tie that attached us to our mother country severed with less regret.”  It further 
espoused Louisianans’ attachment and dedication to sacred American principles outlined in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.90  Moreover, the Remonstrance reveals that 
Louisianans clearly understood that attachment rested on reciprocal bonds of affection, warning 
that:  
It is the interest of the United States to cultivate a spirit of conciliation with the 
inhabitants of the territory they have acquired.  Annexed to your country by the 
course of political events, it depends upon you to determine whether we shall pay 
the cold homage of reluctant subjects, or render the free allegiance of citizens, 
attached to your fortunes by choice, bound to you by gratitude, for the best of 
blessings, contributing cheerfully to your advancement, to those high destinies to 
which honor, liberty, and justice, will conduct you, and defending, as we solemnly 
pledge ourselves to do at the risk of fortune and life, our common constitution, 
country, and laws.”91 
 
In this concluding remark, Louisianans made attachment a two-way street.  If lawmakers wanted 
their affection and loyalty, then they needed to give Louisianans reasons to be “bound to you by 
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gratitude.”  Although crafted as a protest by Edward Livingston, the Remonstrance articulates 
Louisianans’ acknowledgement and utilization of the conversation of attachment and its 
indispensable role in the incorporation process.     
    Louisianans’ espousals of affection and allegiance continued despite the many disappointments 
they faced in obtaining statehood.  Creole politicians in the Legislative Assembly did their part to 
advance the conversation of attachment with Washington lawmakers.  In April 1806, they sent a 
letter to Governor Claiborne assuring him that in times of crisis they would defend the country with 
the utmost energy and patriotism.92  The Legislative Council went on to send a similar declaration 
to President Jefferson, promising him that they would “cheerfully submit whatever sacrifice and 
privations may be necessary for vindicating the rights, the honor, the independence of our 
nation.”93  
    As politicians spoke the language of attachment, so too did the territory’s citizenry.  On the first 
anniversary of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, an anonymous author wrote a poem 
to commemorate the monumental day.  One stanza emphasized the attachment and union 
Louisianans sought to cultivate: “American and French unite, / Like Brothers, should, in love 
appear; / Let discord cease, with angry spite, / And hail the glories of the year!” 94  Beyond more 
poetic articulations, Louisianans provided assurances of their attachment when Americans needed 
it most.  In August 1807, New Orleans citizens gathered at the Coffee House to draft a memorial to 
the president expressing their thoughts regarding the Chesapeake-Leopard incident that resulted in 
the destruction of the American frigate Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia.  Appalled and horrified 
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by Britain’s blatant violation of American neutrality, Orleans citizens vowed to assist Jefferson in 
rectifying such a cruel act by “risking our lives and fortunes in support of the just cause of our 
country.”  These citizens went on to firmly articulate their loyalty and affection, asserting that “The 
inhabitants of the city of New Orleans pray you Sir, to receive the expression they now make of 
indignation and wounded pride … of zeal and eagerness to obtain atonement for the injury: of 
attachment to the United States, and confidence in the administration of its government.”  More 
notable than the overt discourse of attachment are the men that wrote such charged words.  Daniel 
Clark served as the meeting’s chairman, while Edward Livingston was in attendance.95  Although 
Clark and Livingston’s part in the memorial exposes their attempt at political damage control so 
quickly after the Burr Conspiracy, the other attendees at the meeting must have realized that in 
times of crisis their espousals of attachment were required and even more compelling.         
    Louisianans wasted little time in understanding and exploiting the conversation of attachment.  
Whether in angry protests or in the most common petitions to Congress, Louisianans never missed 
their chance to express their attachment and loyalty nor did American lawmakers fail to accept and 
revel in such language.96  Despite their neglect of key Americanization programs, Louisianans used 
this discourse to offset resistance efforts and signs of indifference.  Their espousals of affection 
and devotion often transcended their neglectful actions that served to frustrate American policies 
and interfere with lawmakers’ vision for the incorporation process.  Louisianans carved out a place 
whereby they could respond positively to certain aspects of Washington lawmakers’ proposals 
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while preserving a degree of autonomy in accepting what they deemed necessary for their 
assimilation.   
**** 
    Long before Clark and Livingston disappeared from the New Orleans political scene, 
Louisianans had already learned the intrinsic value of the conversation of attachment.  Territorial 
lawmakers, through the encouragement of Julien Poydras, used accommodation as a means to 
secure citizenship.  Their new strategy proved useful in preserving civil law.  More importantly, their 
cooperation with the Claiborne administration produced major pieces of legislation that promoted 
Americanization efforts.   
    Confident in the territory’s progress, in 1809 the Legislative Council drafted a petition for 
statehood.  This request proved premature as Governor Claiborne refused to forward their request 
on to Congress.  Still believing that Louisianans were ill-prepared for self-government, Claiborne 
expressed misgivings regarding their capabilities to run a state government.97  Undeterred, in 
March 1810 Louisianans submitted a second petition.  This time they invoked the conversation of 
attachment to prove their readiness, asserting that “The loyalty of the whole population of this 
Territory has since been put to trial in circumstances sufficiently critical for you to be Now 
convinced that the inhabitants of Lower Louisiana are not undeserving of the Confidence of the 
federal Government.”98  Louisiana lawmakers used their loyal actions in the Burr Conspiracy to 
convince American leaders of their attachment.  Based on the rules of the conversation of 
attachment, such affection and loyalty were supposed to show that Louisianans were ready and 
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worthy of statehood.  Moreover, Louisianans expected Congress to reward their bonds of 
attachment by allowing Louisiana to enter the Union.   
    During the territorial period, Louisianans utilized the conversation of attachment as a means of 
negotiation.  Soon, however, they would learn that statehood would only enhance their reliance on 
this discourse.  An impending war with Great Britain altered Louisianans’ relationship with 
American lawmakers and ultimately taught them that proving one’s attachment often transcended 
mere rhetoric.
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Chapter Four:  The “adopted child of a great family”:  Private Preservation and 
Public Negotiations Among Creole Families in Territorial Louisiana 
 
    After marching for over a year, Philogene Favrot felt relieved to see the fort at Mobile Point come 
into view.   Philogene, a first lieutenant in the 24th Infantry of the United States Army, left Natchez 
in September 1813 for what was supposed to be a four-month trip through Mississippi and 
Tennessee to gather recruits.  Yet the young soldier’s travels took him far off course.  His regiment 
detoured into Kentucky and then on to Ohio.  From there it headed north to reinforce soldiers in the 
Michigan Territory.  At this point, Philogene’s recruiting duties expanded to combat.  At Fort 
Michilimackinac, located 350 miles from Detroit, he faced a superior English foe strengthened by 
their Indian allies.  As his unit retreated he felt the pain of losing nearly sixty comrades.1  Although 
his travels introduced him to death and defeat, they also supplied the ambitious Louisianan with 
other, less fatal experiences.  “Treacherous Cupid seems to torment me everywhere I go,” he 
informed his sister, “I hardly arrived here [Fort Meigs Ohio] before he started to attack me.”  At 
every stop, the handsome Creole fell prey to beautiful ladies.  Philogene’s military expeditions also 
allowed him to meet Americans from all walks of life.  His unit alone exposed him to men from 
Pennsylvania to Georgia.  In sum, the War of 1812 took Philogene Favrot on a fantastic odyssey 
through a country he knew little about.2   
    Philogene’s travels finally took him to the Gulf South where he watched the sun set on Mobile 
Point the day after Christmas in 1814.  Although he had never been to the historic fort he knew the 
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Favrot, 15 July 1814, Ibid., V: 208; Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 6 October 1814, Ibid., V: 221-223.   
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significance it held for his family.  After his arrival he wrote his father, admitting to him that “You 
can imagine the thoughts that came to my mind when I saw Fort Mobile formerly commanded by 
you.”3  Nearly thirty years before, Pierre-Joseph Favrot, a captain in the Spanish Army, oversaw 
the daily operations at the colonial fort.  In many ways, the Favrot Family’s long military tradition 
had come full circle.  A young son encountered the vestiges of his father’s glorious career and 
followed in his footsteps as a soldier.  What was different, however, was that Philogene was an 
American soldier and the Favrots were now an American family.     
    The Favrots were one of Louisiana’s earliest families.  Philogene’s grandfather, Claude-Joseph 
Favrot, came to Louisiana in 1732 as a second lieutenant in the French Army.  Pierre-Joseph, 
Philogene’s father, continued the family’s military legacy as a captain in the 2nd Battalion of the 
Louisiana Infantry under the Spanish.  Pierre-Joseph’s duties took him all over Spain’s vast North 
American empire.  His travels also brought him into contact with Marie-Françoise Gerard, whom he 
married in 1783.  The Favrot home was one filled with love but also tragedy as the couple faced the pain 
of losing five of their eleven children.  In 1799, Pierre-Joseph accepted a position commanding troops in 
Baton Rouge and soon purchased a plantation near the fort.   
    In 1801, Pierre-Joseph’s career took an unexpected turn when Spain returned Louisiana to France.  
Having sunk his life’s savings into the new homestead, now located in French Louisiana, Pierre-Joseph 
ended his military career instead of relocating his family to a Spanish fort.  At the age of 57, Pierre-
Joseph Favrot retired to his West Baton Rouge plantation with his family that included his wife and six 
                                                 
     3 Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 16 January 1815, Ibid., V: 246.    
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children.  In 1803, as the United States took possession of Lower Louisiana, Pierre-Joseph began his 
life as a planter, full-time father, and new American.4  
    The Favrot’s experience was far from unique.  Some of Louisiana’s oldest families contributed 
immensely to both the French and Spanish imperial military.  Many witnessed Louisiana’s first regime 
change in 1763 that brought the Spanish to Louisiana.  Spanish imperial authorities hoped to integrate 
Louisianans into their burgeoning American empire by imposing their language, customs, institutions, 
and cultural mores.  Yet the predominance of French speakers in the colony made this virtually 
impossible.  By successfully preserving their heritage under the Spanish regime, Creole families learned 
how to maintain French cultural hegemony in Lower Louisiana.    
    The transfer of Louisiana to the United States, however, engendered new challenges for Louisiana’s 
oldest families.  American lawmakers and the Claiborne administration expected their newest 
inhabitants to politically and culturally integrate into the young republic.  Unlike the Spanish, American 
lawmakers implemented programs of Americanization hoping to assist Louisianans in making the 
desired transition from colonial Frenchmen to American citizens.  In many respects, American 
lawmakers deemed it necessary for Creoles to relinquish ties to their colonial past which ultimately 
challenged Louisianans’ language, culture, and identity. Creoles, however, entertained divergent ideas 
of their incorporation process.  While they looked forward to participating in Americans’ republican 
government and commercial enterprises, they attempted to preserve their French heritage, seeing it as 
by no means interfering with their ability to be good Americans.      
    These varying ideas of American citizenship often created a turbulent relationship between 
American lawmakers and Louisianans.  Both wanted to incorporate Louisiana into the Union, but 
                                                 
     
4
 Petition Made by Pierre-Joseph Favrot to King Charles IV of Spain, 15 January 1805, Ibid., IV: 169.  When Pierre-
Joseph retired he was a lieutenant colonel and captain of the grenadiers of the Louisiana infantry regiment.  See also 
Memoir of Pierre-Joseph Favrot’s Military Services, 5 April 1803, Ibid., IV: 26.  He was officially released from service 
in October 1805.   
 141 
they failed to agree on how.  Much like their Creole political counterparts, the Favrots tried to 
balance resistance to programs that infringed on their French identity, while using cooperation to 
accept aspects of Americanization programs to sufficiently earn the benefits of citizenship.  
Although not all Louisiana elites shared the Favrot experience or dealt with the Louisiana Purchase 
in the same way, the Favrot family’s extensive papers provide a useful case study of how Creole 
elites attempted to weave resistance, cooperation, and attachment together to shape the 
incorporation process.     
    One Louisiana politician once described the Orleans Territory as the “adopted child of a great 
family.”5  This reference, although about the entire territory, metaphorically illustrates the 
precarious situation the Favrots and many Louisiana elites families encountered.  When a child is 
adopted into a new family, undoubtedly it clings to the familiarity of its former traditions, 
mannerisms, and identity.  For this child to truly adjust to its new surroundings, however, it must 
abandon aspects of its past to embrace its new life.  The child, therefore, must find a balance 
between its preexisting ties and new family.  In many ways the Favrots were the adopted children 
of the great American family.  They failed to relinquish ties to their French heritage, while 
simultaneously Americanizing enough to amalgamate into the young republic.  Ultimately, the 
same tools of negotiation employed by Creole politicians allowed the Favrots to transition from 
adopted Frenchmen into true Americans.   
**** 
    The Favrots, like many Creole families, contributed to the growth and development of colonial 
Louisiana.  Their legacy began with the military career of Claude-Joseph Favrot.  Born in 
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Versailles, France in 1701, Claude-Joseph arrived in Louisiana as a second lieutenant in the 
French Army.  He quickly gained acclaim for his many battles against neighboring Indians.  In 
1736, he fought several campaigns against the Chickasaw Indians, earning a promotion to full 
lieutenant.  Three years later, his continuing conflict with the Chickasaws took him to the Illinois 
Territory in pursuit of the tribe.  In between his many Indian campaigns, Claude-Joseph met and 
married Louise-Elizabeth Brusle in 1735.6  The union proved most advantageous for the young 
soldier since his new father-in-law, Philippe-Antonie Brusle, was a member of the French Superior 
Council and also one of Louisiana’s wealthiest men.  Claude-Joseph and Louise Elizabeth soon 
expanded their family with the birth of daughter Louise (1737) and son Pierre-Joseph (1749).7 
    By 1750, Claude-Joseph had served throughout France’s vast territory from Illinois to Mobile and 
earned the rank of captain.  In 1753, he relocated his family to New Orleans to oversee the small 
garrison force in the port city.  As Louise-Elizabeth tried to make a suitable home for their small 
children, she also dealt with her husband’s long absences.  With the outbreak of the Seven Years’ 
War, Claude-Joseph left his family once again to reinforce troops in the Ohio Valley.  In 1754 and 
1757, he commanded troops at Fort Duquesne hoping to protect the French fort from an 
encroaching British presence.8    
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    Following the French defeat in 1763, Claude-Joseph, like many Creoles, faced a pivotal 
decision.  The loyal Frenchman found it difficult to imagine life under the Spanish regime.  
Furthermore, his wife’s onset cancer necessitated that he end his long military career and relocate 
his family to France to seek vital medical attention.  Upon his return to his homeland, Claude-
Joseph’s fortunes took a tragic turn: French doctors were unable to save Louise-Elizabeth and she 
died in Paris in April 1768.  Three years later, Claude-Joseph married Madam Goulet, a widow 
thirty years younger than him.  The marriage lasted only a brief stint before the couple separated.  
In 1777, Claude-Joseph Favrot, a decorated officer and esteemed Frenchman, died alone and 
impoverished at Senlis Charity Hospital.9   
    As his father perished in France, Pierre-Joseph Favrot continued the family’s military tradition in 
Louisiana.  From a tender age, the youngest of the Favrot children was groomed for life as a 
soldier.  When he was eighteen months old, Louisiana Governor Marquis de Vaudreuil made him a 
fusilier cadet in the French Army.  At twelve, he was commissioned as a second ensign in the 
Louisiana infantry.  As Claude-Joseph made preparations to relocate the family to France, Pierre-
Joseph, now eighteen, decided to stay behind.  In 1767, he was assigned to a post in Arkansas.  
There he undertook a special mission to follow Indian guides through the Illinois Territory in order 
to carry news of the arrival of the new Spanish governor Alejandro O’Reilly.  On his return trip 
                                                                                                                                                 
to me, I have thought that I could do nothing better for the service than to entrust him with the command of said 
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home, Pierre-Joseph was captured by Chickasaw Indians and held captive for an unknown period 
of time.10   
    Upon his release from captivity, Pierre-Joseph sailed to France to join his father.  There he 
secured a new military assignment working at a colonial recruiting station.  After his adventures in 
North America, Pierre-Joseph quickly found his new duties tedious and boring.  He began 
petitioning the French Crown for a promotion.  He seemed particularly determined to lead a 
regiment in either St. Domingue or Martinique.  His efforts bore little fruit.  Finally, Pierre-Joseph 
decided to go back to Louisiana and offer his services to the Spanish Crown in hopes of building a 
more lucrative career.11  By 1779, Pierre-Joseph, now Don Pedro Favrot, arrived in New Orleans 
as a captain in the 2nd Battalion of the Louisiana Infantry under the Spanish.   
    Pierre-Joseph wasted little time in becoming accustomed to his new role as a Spanish soldier.  
The moment he arrived in Louisiana he found himself thrust into war as the Spanish attempted to 
rid the Gulf Coast region of the British.12  In August of 1779, he assisted Spanish troops led by 
Governor Bernardo Galvez in securing forts at Manchac and Baton Rouge.  Soon after, Governor 
                                                 
     
10
 Military Commission Issued by Pierre-Francois de Rigaud Cavagnal, Marquis de Vaudreuil to Pierre-Joseph 
Favrot, 1 January 1751, Ibid., I: 55.  A fusilier cadet or musketeer refers to young soldiers that carry light muskets or 
fusil.  Military Commission Issue by Louis XV to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 1 October 1761, Ibid., I: 90; Charles-Philippe 
Aubry to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 30 December 1767, Ibid., I: 129; Letter to the Minister of the Navy Regarding Pierre-
Joseph Favrot, 14 January 1775, Ibid., I: 166-167.  In this letter the minister mentions that while in captivity Pierre-
Joseph’s life was “at stake several times, for everyone knows how cruel these savages are.”  Yet it fails to mention the 
length of his captivity.   
 
     11 Ibid., 166-167.  Through his letter, the minister hoped to assist Pierre-Joseph in securing a more exciting 
assignment in the Caribbean.    
 
     
12
 Pierre-Joseph to Bernardo Galvez, 15 July 1779, Ibid., I: 235-237.  At a council of war, Pierre-Joseph wasted 
little time in establishing himself as a trusted officer.  Here he presented a plan to help defend Louisiana against a 
British invasion, arguing that “I believe that, since their forces seem to be concentrated at Manchac, it would not be 
prudent to divide our forces, but to unite the regular troops with the militia of New Orleans, pending orders to march.”  
He went on to contend that “If the enemy should succeed in reaching the outskirts of the city, whether through the 
woods or by the roads, we could use the young Creoles, who are all hunters.  We should employ those who serve in 
the militia battalions as riflemen, as well as others who are not enlisted.  To these could be joined some of the most 
alert young soldiers to meet the enemy.”   
 
 145 
Galvez rewarded the ambitious Frenchman by appointing him the commandant of Baton Rouge.  
At his new post, Pierre-Joseph remained busy securing oaths of loyalty from former British subjects 
as well as managing relations with neighboring Indians.  His tireless efforts earned the approval of 
Galvez who commended his hard work, claiming that “Each day I am more pleased that I selected 
you to reestablish that fort.  I realize the difficulties you have overcome.  You can be sure of my 
esteem and trust.”13  While in Baton Rouge, the up and coming officer met Marie-Francoise 
Gerard, a nearby resident of Pointe Coupee.  The daughter of a prominent French surgeon, Marie-
Francoise shared a strong French heritage with her new beau which only strengthened their bonds 
of affection.  After a two-year courtship, the young couple wed in 1783.  In preparation for his life as 
a husband, Pierre-Joseph secured several properties in New Orleans as possible homes for his 
new bride.14       
    Pierre-Joseph’s intentions to settle in New Orleans were put on hold as the young newlyweds 
made their way to Mobile where Pierre-Joseph accepted an appointment as the acting 
commandant of the coastal fort.  There he maintained peaceful relations with neighboring Indians 
in addition to negotiating vital commercial agreements with English and American traders.15  Pierre-
Joseph’s copious efforts earned him the respect and support of the Mobile citizenry.  In 1786, when 
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he faced a possible transfer, citizens petitioned the governor requesting that he remain at his post.  
“We have enjoyed great satisfaction since we have been under M. Favrot’s command,” they 
strongly professed.  “We have proofs of his justice and fairness.  He has been able to keep the 
savages quiet and contented.”16  Their request had little influence as Pierre-Joseph was sent to 
New Orleans in June 1787 and then on to Fort St. Philip in 1795.   
    Pierre-Joseph’s new appointment at Plaquemines served as a testament of imperial authorities’ 
confidence in his job performance.  Located at the mouth of the Mississippi River, Fort St. Philip 
stood as the colony’s first line of defense.  In charge of nearly eighty regular troops, Pierre-Joseph 
worked tirelessly to maintain strong discipline while also combating occasional Indian attacks and 
rampant disease.  His assignment at Fort St. Phillip, moreover, put new demands on the seasoned 
soldier.  Although Spain enjoyed several years of relative peace in Europe, tense relations with 
Great Britain and France made foreign vessels more dangerous fixtures in the Gulf Coast region.  
The Mississippi River only added another troubling concern to colonial safety as incoming and 
outgoing traffic allowed foreign invaders easy access to New Orleans and adjoining areas.  These 
realities made Pierre-Joseph’s appointment at Fort St. Philip the most taxing one of his career.17   
    Monitoring traffic along the Mississippi River became one of Pierre-Joseph’s top priorities.  All 
incoming ships were required to have papers and passports of clearance.  Without such 
documentation, Pierre-Joseph was instructed to detain such vessels until further notice from the 
governor.  Furthermore, his surveillance required him to search for any free or enslaved blacks 
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arriving from Africa or other foreign destinations.18  Pierre-Joseph also undertook the task of 
revamping the fort’s defenses for a possible invasion.  The governor required regular drills and 
expected Pierre-Joseph to adhere to a strict training schedule.  Along with preparing his troops, 
Pierre-Joseph coordinated construction projects to fortify walls and protective batteries at both Fort 
St. Phillip and Fort Bourbon, located across the Mississippi River.  His renovation duties were 
further exacerbated when a hurricane destroyed parts of both forts in August of 1796.19  After 
playing a manic balancing act at Fort St. Philip for nearly four years, in March 1799 Pierre-Joseph 
was once again reassigned to Baton Rouge.  He left his post at Plaquemines with stellar reviews.  
Both Governor Carondelet and his successor commended Favrot for the “zeal and exactness” with 
which he ran his post.20   
    In September 1799, Pierre-Joseph arrived in Baton Rouge serving as the chief military officer.  
Soon he bought a plantation across the river from the fort with hopes of setting up a permanent 
residence for his bourgeoning family.  Governor Casa Calvo, however, had other plans.  In October 
1800, Casa Calvo transferred Pierre-Joseph back to Fort St. Philip.  The father of five protested, 
hoping to remain in Baton Rouge near his plantation, but the governor failed to relent.  In 1801, 
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Pierre-Joseph and his family once again relocated to Plaquemines with hopes of returning to their 
West Baton Rouge home shortly thereafter.   
    At the age of fifty, Pierre-Joseph had served all over the Spanish empire and received accolades 
for his performance.  His successful career, however, took a toll on his family.  Marie-Francoise 
and their children Josephine, Louis, Philogene, Octavine, and Henri often lived in rugged 
conditions far from the comforts of home.  While living at Fort St. Philip, young Josephine once 
recounted the trials of military life to her friend Helen de Grand-Pre, admitting that “It is common in 
this wretched post to contract intestinal trouble as soon as fever disappears, my spleen is as large 
as a three-pound biscuit.”  She went on to recall the troublesome mosquitoes, claiming that “there 
must be a thousand of them around me if there is one …. nothing frightens them.  They are 
fearless.”21  Illness remained a persistent problem for the Favrot children.  While at Plaquemines, 
Philogene spent months plagued by problems with urination and fever.  At times such sickness 
was only exacerbated without proper medical care at the post.22  Furthermore, military life often 
exposed the Favrot children to less than desirable characters.  Convicts sent by the governor to 
assist in the construction projects at Fort St. Phillip, along with foul-mouthed soldiers and 
intoxicated travelers, often introduced an unwanted influence in the Favrot children’s lives.   
    To alleviate such burdens, Pierre-Joseph and Marie-Francoise tried to provide stability for their 
nomadic family.  Their home was one filled with love and affection.  They maintained constant 
correspondence with extended family and friends, hoping to ease the burdens of the distance that 
separated them.  While at Fort St. Philip, Pierre-Joseph also composed his Education Manual for 
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his Sons to provide Louis and Philogene a proper education despite their constant mobility and 
rugged lifestyle.  His manual stressed the importance of subjects such as ethics, arithmetic, 
grammar, physical science, geography, and history.  He also sought to instill his sons with a moral 
education, beginning his work with a section entitled, “The Conduct of a Wise Man.”  Here he 
catalogued the virtues of selflessness, generosity, humility, propriety, and compassion.  Pierre-
Joseph also included a selection addressing the art of fencing in preparation for his sons’ future 
military careers.23  Pierre-Joseph’s manual provides an insightful glimpse into the mind of a father 
preparing his sons for adulthood.  From cultivating their morality to expanding their minds, Pierre-
Joseph hoped his sons would “follow the dictates set forth in this book.”  He also aimed to raise his 
sons to respect their French heritage by encouraging them to appreciate the French language 
while adhering to Catholic doctrine and civil law.24   
    Beyond education, Pierre-Joseph and his family remained tied to their French heritage.  They 
spoke French at home and even wore the latest French fashions.  At one point Josephine’s aunt 
sent her a Roman-style dress modeled after ones worn in Paris.  The young girl hoped to secure 
black pearls to accessorize her new outfit to truly emulate fashionable French ladies.25  The 
Favrots also kept up with the latest news from France.  Pierre-Joseph intently monitored the events 
of the French Revolution and the ongoing war between France and Spain.  As many Louisianans 
showed their support for the Revolution by singing French songs in the streets, Pierre-Joseph went 
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one step further.  Between 1793 and 1794, rumors circulated throughout Louisiana that Citizen 
Genet planned to retake Louisiana for France as he made his way down the Ohio River.  Unable to 
hide his elation at the idea, Pierre-Joseph wrote Genet an anonymous letter expressing his 
approval, stating that:     
You arrive in a colony inhabited by Frenchmen like yourself.  The same blood 
flows through their veins.  The same spirit moves them.  Long separated from their 
mother country, they lament their abandonment in secret.  Their eyes constantly 
fixed on her, although she seems to have forsaken them.  They follow her in her 
campaigns and, in silence, they rejoice in her victories.  Notwithstanding all 
indications to the contrary, they dare to hope that one day they shall return.  This 
longed-for day has a last arrived, and we have become again the children of 
France, our country.  Even if we have not shared her dangers, we shall enjoy her 
prosperity.  We shall be compensated for having been deprived of the honor of 
participating in her glory and for having been unable to be in a position to serve 
her ….  It is under such circumstances, Citizen General, that you are coming to 
organize this colony and to reunite the spirit of the people, which Spanish rule 
believed it must divide.  If, for one moment, one of our countrymen forgot that he 
was a Frenchman, remorse will punish him enough for his failing.  We shall be as 
we once were, before the coming of foreign domination, all relatives and friends.  
Those of Europe and those of America will glory equally in the name of 
Frenchmen and will acknowledge the obligations that so beautiful an epithet 
imposes.26   
 
Such commanding  language reveals the strong affection Pierre-Joseph felt for his mother country.  
Although a high-ranking Spanish military official, he never relinquished his ties to France.    
    The family’s strong ties to France were only further reinforced as the Spanish government 
negotiated the retrocession of Louisiana back to France.  By 1803, as both Spanish and French 
imperial authorities made the final preparations for the transfer, Pierre-Joseph, still serving at Fort 
St. Phillip, found himself taking on a whole new role.  He was the first Spanish official to meet 
Pierre Clément de Laussat, the new French Colonial Prefect of Louisiana.  Before Laussat’s 
voyage to Louisiana, Pierre-Joseph sent several letters to the prefect assuring him of the favorable 
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reception he and the new French government would receive in Lower Louisiana.  His letters also 
revealed his own jubilation over France’s homecoming.27   When Laussat and his family finally 
arrived in Plaquemines in March 1803, he found an anxious Pierre-Joseph waiting.  Later, in his 
memoirs, Laussat recounted his first meeting with Pierre-Joseph who could not hide his euphoria 
as “Joy beamed in this good man’s face upon seeing us.”  Pierre-Joseph took the prefect on a tour 
of Fort St. Philip and hosted a lovely dinner as “endless toasts were accompanied by artillery fire 
and French songs with choruses praising love and wine.”28   
    France’s return to North America fulfilled many of Pierre-Joseph’s longtime hopes; however, it 
also threw his military career into jeopardy.  Knowing that a high-ranking French commission was 
well out of his reach, Pierre-Joseph realized that staying in the Spanish Army meant that he would 
have to relocate his family once again and abandon his West Baton Rouge plantation, now located 
in French territory.29  In hopes of staying in the army, Pierre-Joseph began petitioning King Charles 
of Spain for an appointment close to home.  In December 1800, he asked the King to allow him to 
command the militia stationed in Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and New Feliciana.  Nearly a year 
later, he begged to be assigned to either Baton Rouge or the German Coast.30   
    As he counted on his loyal service to render him influence with King Charles, Pierre-Joseph also 
conferred with family and friends.  His brother-in-law Armand Allard Duplantier advised him to 
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continue his efforts to seek a commission in Baton Rouge.  Even Duplantier realized that Favrot 
was caught in quite a quandary, claiming that “there is no middle way.  You must accept your 
regiment’s fate, or quit.”  Heeding Duplanteir’s advice, Pierre-Joseph continued petitioning King 
Charles, yet bureaucratic channels stalled his efforts, hindering his chances of receiving a 
desirable assignment.  In desperation he even looked to Prefect Laussat for assistance, asking him 
if he could secure him a high-ranking French commission.  Laussat provided verbal 
encouragement, but promised nothing.31  The realities of the retrocession proved bittersweet for 
Pierre-Joseph.  He welcomed the return of France to Louisiana, but the reunion threatened his 
military career and his family’s financial security.   
    As he faced questions regarding his career, Pierre-Joseph continued his duties at Fort St. Phillip 
which included preparing the fort to be transferred to the French Republic.  Pierre-Joseph’s 
concerns, however, were further exacerbated as rumors circulated throughout Louisiana that 
France had sold French Louisiana to the United States.  Pierre-Joseph promptly wrote Laussat to 
gauge the validity of such talk.  Laussat initially eased Favrot’s fears, encouraging him to “not 
believe a word of them.”  Just weeks later, however, Laussat and Louisianans were shocked to 
learn about the Louisiana Purchase.  “I could not believe, Sir, in the cession of Louisiana up to the 
moment when doubt was no longer possible,” Laussat lamented to Pierre-Joseph.  He went on to 
express his deep regret over the purchase and thanked Pierre-Joseph for his friendship and 
support.32   
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    Still in disbelief over the Louisiana Purchase, Pierre-Joseph continued to fulfill his final duties at 
Fort St. Phillip.  He spent his last few weeks in Plaquemines collecting and compiling inventories of 
weapons, supplies, and troops in preparation to relinquish control of the fort to French Frigate 
Captain Gilberto Leonard.  Finally on December 7, 1803, Pierre-Joseph lowered the Spanish flag 
over Fort St. Philip as a twenty-one gun salute played behind him.  As he left his longtime post with 
the French flag flying high above, Pierre-Joseph deplored the fact that within weeks the American 
stars and stripes would replace his beloved tricolors.33    
    By April 1804, Pierre-Joseph received a leave of absence from the Spanish Crown and headed 
home to West Baton Rouge to contemplate his next career move.  By June, he received word that 
he was to rejoin Spanish forces in Pensacola.34   Immediately, Pierre-Joseph knew that it was time 
for his career to end.  In a letter to Charles de Grand-Pre, he admitted that he would be unable to 
continue his military career, contending that “I believe that Louisiana comprises the whole province, 
although the dividing line has separated the western bank of the river on which all of my property is 
located.  I could not abandon it under any circumstances, because this would mean the ruination of 
my entire family.”   In January 1805, Pierre-Joseph submitted his resignation to the Spanish Crown, 
claiming that his poor health and the loss of his property prevented him from continuing his service.  
At this time, he also requested that Louis and Philogene, both serving as cadets, be released from 
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service.  By October 1805, Pierre-Joseph and his sons retired from the Spanish Army although 
their quest to receive their military pensions would last for several more years.35 
    After thirty years of military service, Pierre-Joseph began life as a civilian and new American.  
For decades the Favrots were a French family living under the Spanish regime.  They benefited 
from appointments in the Spanish military, but in their daily lives they remained French from their 
language to their innermost feelings.  Very rarely did Louisianans, such as the Favrots, 
compromise their French identity to appease Spanish officials.  Yet they soon learned that the new 
American government expected them to not only compromise, but to abandon their former French 
ties.   
**** 
    With the Louisiana Purchase, the Favrot family again faced another regime and a new 
government.  As American lawmakers attempted to assimilate their newest inhabitants through 
vehicles of Americanization, they expected Louisianans to show signs of acceptance and 
attachment.  Whether Louisianans sent their children to public schools or verbally espoused their 
loyalty and affection, American lawmakers monitored them for any indication that they were 
becoming more “Americanized.”  Undoubtedly, such demands engendered many challenges for 
the Favrots.  From their language to their cherished traditions, the Favrot family attempted to 
safeguard their French heritage while integrating themselves into the young republic on their own 
terms.   
    A glimpse at the family’s extensive papers reveals that during the early years of the territorial 
period the Favrots remained more focused on their own domestic security than the external 
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presence of the new American government.  There is little mention of the actual transfer of Lower 
Louisiana to the United States or key territorial events such as the Burr Conspiracy.  Instead of 
being consumed with political and public issues, the Favrots focused more on matters that directly 
affected the family.  Pierre-Joseph spent much of his time securing his overdue pension from the 
Spanish Crown.  He also sold and accumulated property and slaves to enhance the family’s wealth 
and status.36  Pierre-Joseph did, however, monitor happenings in East Baton Rogue and Mobile for 
any information regarding longtime friends and comrades.37   
    Besides keeping up with the happenings in the Spanish empire, Pierre-Joseph focused his full 
attention on his family and home.  As he oversaw his plantation and slaves, life as a civilian 
provided him ample time with his family which now included his wife and six children Josephine 
(19), Louis (17), Philogene (14), Octavine (9), Henri (6), and Eulalie (1).38  In many ways, Pierre-
Joseph escaped the politically and ethnically charged atmosphere of New Orleans into the private 
enclaves of his family.  Having learned valuable lessons under the Spanish regime, the Favrots 
understood that, despite outside forces around them, the family served as their French sanctuary.   
    As their children matured, the Favrots’ bonds of affection continued to grow.  While on a trip to 
New Orleans, daughter Josephine received a heartfelt letter from her mother expressing her 
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despair over the distance between them and the “long time it has been since I have kissed you!”  
The Favrot children reciprocated such loving sentiments.  On one occasion, Louis wrote his 
mother, admitting that he could hardly stand being away from her.  His solemn letter also asked her 
to “give my respects to my dear Papa.  I embrace him and my brothers and sisters.”   Philogene 
articulated similar heartfelt tidings when he informed his mother that “You may be surprised my 
dear Mama, that I am not expressing any wishes to you.  Alas! The reason is simple …. I am 
unable to put all that I mean into words: I have to satisfy myself by embracing you a thousand 
times and letting you guess more of my feelings.”39   Letters from Louis and Philogene often were 
signed with expressions such as “respectful affection of your obedient son” or “the tenderest wish 
of your most obedient child.”40  Favrot family letters expose a deeply devoted and affectionate 
family.  Having long relied on the family to deal with the rigors of military life and a foreign 
government, the Favrots found comfort in their strong family bonds.   
    Moreover, the Favrots continued to use their home as a place to preserve their French heritage.  
They continued to speak French as well as remain in contact with extended family in Spanish 
Baton Rouge and France.  These ties allowed them to combat the encroachment of the new 
American government and reinforce their French identity.  Also Pierre-Joseph and Marie-Francoise 
continued to stress the importance of adhering to French traditions.  In February 1810, Pierre-
Joseph accompanied Josephine and Octavine to New Orleans to receive their first communion.  As 
his daughters engaged in one of Catholicism’s most important sacraments, they also experienced 
another one of France’s sacred traditions—Mardi Gras.  Arriving in New Orleans at the heart of 
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Carnival, Pierre-Joseph reveled in the fact that his daughters would have the opportunity to attend 
balls and partake in the French celebrations.41          
    As they schooled their children in all things French, Pierre-Joseph continued to implement his 
Education Manual.  Furthermore, he provided his children with more practical skills about running a 
plantation and the planting seasons.  Marie-Francoise focused more on her children’s decorum.  In 
her many letters, she provided snippets of advice regarding manners and proper public behavior.  
After she inquired about Philogene’s sleeping arrangements on one trip away from home, the loyal 
son quickly replied that “I have not been in any questionable homes.  I feel I would find myself out 
of place there.”  She even instructed her sons on matters of the heart.  At one point Philogene 
thanked his mother for her opinions regarding the opposite sex, admitting that “nothing is more true 
than your remark about the female enemies.  I fear them more than any others.”42  Pierre-Joseph 
and Marie-Francoise groomed their maturing children to become respectable adults and to be 
ready to deal with the challenges of living under a new government.   
    The Louisiana Purchase did little to change the Favrot’s private lives.  Pierre-Joseph and his 
wife ensured their home remained a French refuge that safeguarded their family’s colonial 
heritage.  At times, their efforts put them at odds with the American government.  They ignored 
Claiborne’s educational program, choosing to school their children at home using Pierre-Joseph’s 
faithful manual.  The fact that they failed to engage in many territorial debates or weigh in on 
important issues, to many lawmakers, served as an indication that the Favrots were indifferent to 
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the new American government.  However, one must not assume that just because the Favrots 
failed to mention or discuss such events that they were ambivalent.  At times historical participants 
reveal much more by what they fail to say.  Following the Louisiana Purchase, the Favrots 
continued their copious correspondence not only amongst each other but also with friends and 
family.  Their letters addressed important events from happenings in the Spanish Empire to 
mundane details from an occasional fever to the rising cost of sugar.  Therefore, it seems safe to 
assume that if the Favrots harbored strong opinions regarding the Louisiana Purchase or early 
territorial events they would have divulged them in their many letters.  The absence of such talk 
simply demonstrates that the Favrots’ primary concerns rested within the family.  For Pierre-Joseph 
and Marie-Francoise, obtaining financial security and raising their children were more important 
than the charged debates in New Orleans or the malicious schemes of men like Aaron Burr.  The 
fact that they did not seem consumed with the new American presence, furthermore, proves that 
they had long become accustomed to handling the realities of a regime change.  They looked to 
the things that had provided them solace in the past.  The family supplied the familiarity of their 
colonial heritage and ensured their survival in a new environment.    
    As the Favrots turned to their strong family bonds to ease the transition to life in the new 
American republic, they also employed other techniques to shape their incorporation.  Much like 
Creole politicians in New Orleans, the Favrots often resisted aspects of Americanization programs 
that challenged their French heritage.  However, they also utilized cooperation and attachment to 
demonstrate their willingness to assimilate.  After years of isolation, the Favrot family became more 
active in territorial issues.  This renewed interest might be attributed to Pierre-Joseph’s trip to New 
Orleans in February 1810.  Although there to chaperone his daughters, this trip was the first time 
the aging Frenchman visited the Crescent City since he was a commander in the Spanish military.  
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Pierre-Joseph was amazed by how much the thriving port city had changed, forcing him to admit to 
his son that it was virtually unrecognizable.43  Perhaps the realization that Louisiana was changing 
as he remained tucked away on his West Baton Rouge plantation prompted him to take a second 
look at his new surroundings.  Pierre-Joseph’s short time in New Orleans reminded him that he 
belonged in the United States and that he needed to prepare his family to be good citizens of their 
newest country.   
    Pierre-Joseph’s new interest was shared by other members of the Favrot family.  By the later 
part of the territorial period, Favrot correspondence reveals that publicly the family made conscious 
efforts to Americanize by showing their growing attachment to the United States.  Both Louis and 
Philogene joined the military, no doubt at the urging of their father.  In 1807, Louis received his first 
military commission as an ensign in the 7th regiment of the Militia of the Orleans Territory.  Within 
four years, he advanced to the rank of captain.  Despite his promotion, Louis hoped to advance 
even further within the ranks of the Louisiana militia.  In May 1813, Governor Claiborne attended a 
ball in East Baton Rouge where Pierre-Joseph used this opportunity to speak with the governor 
about his son.  Within a month, Claiborne made Louis a major in the 8th regiment of the Louisiana 
militia. 44   
    As Louis’s duties kept him near Baton Rouge and New Orleans, his younger brother Philogene 
enjoyed a much more eventful military career.  At the age of twenty, Philogene received a 
commission to serve as an ensign in the 24th Regiment of the Infantry of the Army of the United 
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States.  His duties included recruiting soldiers which became even more important as the War of 
1812 began.  His military responsibilities continued to keep him near New Orleans until his 
regiment was deployed to Tennessee in September 1813.45    
    Philogene stayed in Tennessee for only a short time before his regiment continued on to 
Kentucky.  There Philogene advanced to a second lieutenant and learned that his recruiting duties 
were over and that his unit was headed north to reinforce troops fighting near Canada.46  By April 
1814, his regiment arrived at Fort Sandusky, located about thirty-six miles from Lake Erie.  He 
practiced field medicine for nearly a month until his unit crossed over into Malden, Canada, arriving 
in Detroit on May 26, 1814.  In July, portions of his unit were dispatched to Fort Michilimackinac 
located at the junction of Lake Huron and Michigan.  On August 4, Philogene faced his first combat 
experience as he and 700 men engaged in open battle with the British and their Indian allies.  
Although American forces defeated the enemy, sixty-six of Philogene’s comrades died.  Following 
the battle, Philogene headed back to Detroit where he remained for several days before he 
received orders to resume his recruiting duties in Mobile.47  In December 1814, Philogene, now a 
first lieutenant, arrived in Mobile where the fighting had largely subsided.   
    Military service provided Philogene with a chance of a lifetime to see his new country.  He 
served with men from all over the United States and ventured far from his Baton Rouge home.  In 
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his unit alone, Philogene served alongside an Irishman from Pennsylvania and several Americans 
from different states.  He also encountered a variety of unfamiliar Americans customs.  In Nashville 
he noticed that “duels are such rare events that fathers describe them to their children, who do not 
forget them for as long as they live.”  He found that people in Tennessee and Kentucky tended to 
be more pious, contending that “Papa would spend a great deal of money if he were here because 
some judges fine a man fifty cents every time he swears.”  He even found that such strong piety 
kept women from dancing even on weekdays, something quite strange to a Frenchman long 
versed in the art of dancing.48    
    Philogene’s service in the 24th Infantry also strengthened Favrot family bonds.  Upon leaving his 
Baton Rouge home to report for duty in New Orleans, Philogene lamented leaving his family.  “I 
think each minute is bringing me further from the only people who bring life to me; that I am going 
to be separated from them for a considerable length of time of unknown duration,” he sadly wrote 
in his journal.  “Such thoughts throw me into a profound sadness.”  His letters continued to become 
more affectionate as he spent time away from home.  To his brother Louis he signed one letter 
“Farewell dear brother.  I embrace you with my soul but with my eyes closed.”49    
     Philogene’s separation was often eased by letters from his family.  He and Louis often spoke 
about their military service, local gossip, and their future wives.  Philogene once wrote his brother 
wishing for him a “young wife who is gentle, witty, virtuous, sensitive, and belongs to a good family.  
I would not want her to be wealthy, because money does not bring happiness, but I do hope she 
would be rich enough to supply the needs of an easily satisfied man like you.”  His sister Josephine 
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often disparaged him for allowing his flippant romances to prevent him from writing her more often.  
“Really, I cannot understand how three little crickets of Faubourg St. Mary can make you forget 
your family,” she scolded, “Confound this vain little girl who is making you lose your head!  We 
have to believe that when love fires certain hearts it cools off filial love, brotherly tenderness, and 
friendship.”50     
    As the Favrot children stayed well connected with their traveling brother, Pierre-Joseph and 
Marie-Francoise continued to guide their son from afar.  Pierre-Joseph often instructed his son on 
how to deal with Americans, recommending that “if people take you for a physician, it might be very 
profitable.  If you are mistaken for a lawyer, do like Niveson and make them pay ahead for your 
advice.”  Marie-Francoise monitored her son’s propriety by always inquiring about his sleeping 
arrangements and the company he kept.  At one point she must have disapproved of his behavior 
as Philogene informed her that “On reaching the part of your letter where you said vous [to show 
disapproval] to me, I started to take off my hat, expecting a big scolding.”51  
    Philogene’s time in the United States Army, although often lonely, served as an Americanizing 
experience.  In August of 1812, he was passed over for a promotion to serve as General James 
Wilkinson’s aide-de-camp.  He remained convinced that he failed to advance because he did not 
speak English.  To avoid missing another such opportunity, Philogene used his military 
assignments to learn English.  In a letter to his mother, he admitted that “I remain in this service 
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only to learn English.”  In later letters, he informed his mother that he often experienced humiliation 
“by not being able to speak English.52  As he perfected English, Philogene also became enthralled 
with territorial politics.  While serving in New Orleans, Philogene observed the hotly contested 
gubernatorial race between William C.C. Claiborne and Jacques Villeré.  “The Governor’s election 
and other elections have greatly agitated the two opposing parties [Creoles and Americans],” he 
reported to his brother.  He went on to inquire about his brother’s political selections, stating that “I 
hope, my dear friend, that being a Creole, you voted for one of your fellow citizens.”53  His short 
time in New Orleans exposed Philogene to ongoing ethnic and cultural disputes between ancient 
Creoles and American lawmakers.  It did not take long for Philogene to feel sympathy for his 
Creole counterparts and empathize with their cause.     
    Philogene’s growing familiarity with the English language and American politics undoubtedly 
allowed him to become more acquainted with American life.  His military service also allowed him 
to cultivate a greater attachment to his country.  At one point during his time up North, the Favrot 
family received a letter informing them that Philogene was caught in a skirmish where his horse 
was killed out from under him as bullets whistled by his head.  Upon hearing this news, Pierre-
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Poydras and others to draft Louisiana’s state constitution in 1812.  That same year he ran for governor against 
Claiborne, but lost because the Creole votes were split between him and longtime resister Noel Destrehan.   Following 
his defeat for governor, Villeré went on to command the First Division of the Louisiana Militia in the Battle of New 
Orleans.  In 1815, his political hopes came to fruition when he was finally elected governor of Louisiana.  He retried 
from politics in 1824 and died in March 1830.      
 
 164 
Joseph immediately wrote to his son begging him “to resign your commission and come back to 
live in the midst of our family, where you will be able to find a good position and live honorably.”  
When Philogene received this letter he responded by asking his father, “you don’t mean this do 
you?  At the moment when my regiment (most of which is here) receives the order to reinforce the 
garrison at Mobile; at the moment when my fellow countrymen are called upon to defend their 
homes; at the moment when rest would be a torment for me; you want me to renounce my seniority 
and rank.”54  Philogene’s letter illustrates a monumental transition.  For years, his family served as 
an asylum from the changing landscape of Lower Louisiana; however, his military service exposed 
him to his new surroundings and aided him in fostering attachment to the United States.  When 
New Orleans faced an invasion and the United States was in danger, Philogene felt compelled to 
do his civic duty.  It appears that military service Americanized Philogene Favrot.  In turn, his 
service allowed him to fulfill one of the most important requirements for American citizenship.       
    Louis and Philogene’s military service provides an excellent example of how the Favrots 
employed cooperation as a means to assimilate into the American Union.  At a young age, both 
sons joined the Spanish Army as cadets.  Thus it is conceivable that they could have easily 
rejoined the Spanish Army.  With Baton Rouge still under Spanish control and plenty of family 
friends in high-ranking positions, the young men could have easily secured decent commissions 
within the Spanish ranks.  Yet they chose to enlist in the American military.   Although both sons 
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 Philogene Favrot to Pierre-Joseph Favrot, 6 October 1814, Ibid., V: 221-222.  Philogene went on to plead with 
his father, “you want me to resign in order to return home (however appealing home is to me) that I may be compelled 
to leave before long to serve as a simple militiaman?”  He also dispelled the rumors forwarded by Fergus, claiming that 
“It is true that I heard several bullets whistling by and that a few men were killed near me.” Philogene Favrot to Louis 
Favrot, 11 October 1814, Ibid., V: 227.   
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wrote little about their motivation to serve alongside Americans, their hopes of fulfilling their family’s 
civic duty must have been a strong motivating factor. 55    
    The Favrot sons were not the only members of the family to display their growing affection.  
Pierre-Joseph, like so many of his Creole counterparts, looked to political participation to 
demonstrate his family’s loyalty to the United States.  In the summer of 1814, Pierre-Joseph was 
elected to the Louisiana state legislature.  By December, he arrived in New Orleans to begin his 
new appointment.  His new political duties soon threw him into the government’s feverish 
preparations for the Battle of New Orleans.56  Although many Creoles used political activism to 
resist the American government, Pierre-Joseph’s role as a legislator not only sealed his family’s 
bond to American republican principles, but also allowed him to help defend his new country in a 
moment of peril.     
**** 
    Despite their affinity for all things French, the Favrot family invoked several strategies to shape 
their incorporation process.  At times the private enclaves of the family allowed them to preserve 
crucial aspects of their French heritage and their existing colonial ties.  This often put them at odds 
with Claiborne’s education programs and major territorial debates.  The Favrots, however, made 
attempts to show their growing assimilation publicly.  The Favrot sons’ military service 
demonstrated that they were willing to do their duty to their new country, while Pierre-Joseph’s 
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 Philogene Favrot to Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot, 8 June 1813, Ibid., V: 163-164.  In several letters to his 
mother, Philogene attempted to explain why he chose to join the United States Army rather than serving with his 
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 Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Philogene Favrot, 16 September 1814, Ibid., V: 219; Neuville DeClouet to Pierre-Joseph 
Favrot, 5 January 1815, Ibid., V: 134-135.   
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election to the state legislature revealed that even the most ardent Creole could gradually learn 
and accept the principles of the American government.   
     Outside of the public political arena, Louisiana elites like the Favrots found ways to dictate the 
incorporation process.  Their home remained a French sanctuary that safeguarded their colonial 
heritage and family values.  Yet publicly, the Favrots demonstrated their attachment by choosing to 
participate in the republican government as well as the defense of Lower Louisiana.  Their efforts 
often brought them closer together and brought them even closer to their adopted American family.  
Where American lawmakers often saw Louisianans failing to assimilate, Louisianans often saw 
themselves striking the essential balance between their private preservation and public 
negotiations in the Orleans Territory.   
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Chapter Five:  “The Chosen Men of Color”:  Free People of Color in a New Racial Hierarchy 
 
    Feeling the effects of the unusually hot weather in his full military gear, Noel Carrier stood in 
formation next to longtime friends and comrades waiting in anticipation for the day’s festivities.  As 
the ceremony began on the afternoon of December 20, 1803, Carrier reflected back on his long 
military career in the service of the Spanish Crown.  He remembered being promoted to captain of 
the morenos in the milicia de color, the many battles with neighboring Indians, and chasing 
runaway slaves through the swampy bayous.  As he watched the French flag come into view, the 
tricolors caused him to pause as he remembered that it was under the French regime that he was 
emancipated from slavery and allowed to live as a free man.  Finally, as he caught a glimpse of the 
ascending American stars and stripes, Carrier remembered leaving his young bride Marianne to 
assist Anglo-Americans in the American Revolution.  Although many spectators that day celebrated 
the transfer of French Louisiana to the United States, Noel Carrier quietly commemorated an 
extraordinary life and the accomplishments of Lower Louisiana’s free people of color.1     
    Lower Louisiana’s racial composition has long been the subject of history and fiction.  From the 
secret world of the quadroon balls to Congo Dances, many find that Lower Louisiana represents a 
racial anomaly.  At the time of the Louisiana Purchase, even American lawmakers recognized the 
unique racial landscape of their newest land acquisition.  As Americans spent nearly two centuries 
codifying racial contempt and white supremacy, Lower Louisiana’s colonial history engendered a 
special class of free people of color that possessed freedoms unparalleled in nineteenth-century 
America.   
                                                 
     1 Pierre Clément de Laussat, Memoirs of My Life, 90.   
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    The first African slaves arrived in Louisiana in 1719 along with French settlers in John Law’s 
Mississippi Company.  For the next several decades the slave population grew through natural 
increase and direct importation from Africa.  Very quickly, slaves in colonial Louisiana assumed a 
quite different role than their counterparts in British North America.  Louisiana’s first white settlers 
were ill-equipped to handle the rigors of the wilderness, forcing them to rely on their slaves for food 
and other vital resources.2  The colony’s inadequate numbers also compelled white settlers to use 
their slaves to defend against neighboring Indians.  By 1739, French authorities created a 
permanent company of black militiamen to fight Indians and help build fortifications and levees.  
French settlers’ heavy reliance on their chattel provided slaves with privileges that often 
undermined regulations established in the Code Noir and ultimately promoted slaves as an 
essential group.3   
    Within a decade of settlement, free blacks appeared in colonial Louisiana.  In 1731, Governor 
Perier reported that several Indians and “free blacks” had been massacred in a raid.  His dispatch 
clearly distinguished these victims as free people of color or gens de couleur libre rather than gens 
de couleur which designated African slaves.  Although little is known about the origins of free 
blacks in colonial Louisiana, historians believe that a growing number of manumissions contributed 
to their existence.  Over time, this group of free blacks took on a dynamic role in colonial 
Louisiana.4     
                                                 
     2 Jerah Johnson, “Colonial New Orleans: A Fragment of he Eighteenth Century French Ethos,” Creole New Orleans, 
32-33.  Johnson estimates that over two-thirds of Louisiana’s first settlers were craftsmen with little agricultural 
knowledge or skills. See also Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, “The Formation of Afro-Creole Culture,” Creole New Orleans, 61. 
 
     3 Alice Moore Dunbar-Nelson, “People of Color in Louisiana,” 10; Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 40-42.   
 
     4 Ibid., 11-12.  In 1735, Governor Bienville reported that his military rolls contained bands of Negro slaves 
commanded by free blacks.   
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    Under the Spanish regime, however, libres thrived.  It is estimated that by 1805, 1556 free 
blacks lived in New Orleans.  Immigration from Haiti and other Caribbean islands as well as natural 
increase explain such growth.5  Spanish officials also helped to enhance these numbers by 
allowing more slaves to enter the free black population.  In addition, Spanish policies promoted 
libre rights by allowing them to arrange contracts, own and transfer property, and bring suit in civil 
litigation.  These new laws allowed many free blacks to accumulate enough wealth to own thriving 
businesses and slaves.  Besides participating in the commercial activities of colonial Louisiana, 
libres served in the Spanish military.6  Spanish policies gradually placed libres like Noel Carrier in a 
middle stratum that allowed them to freely interact with white society while having a separate 
identity from slaves.  By the time the United States took possession of French Louisiana, libres 
helped create Lower Louisiana’s unique three-tiered racial hierarchy. 
    Although the day’s events made Carrier quite nostalgic, they also filled him with apprehension 
over an uncertain future.  He wondered if the new American presence signaled an end of an era for 
free people of color in Lower Louisiana.  He worried that Americans’ white supremacist ideology 
might undermine the rights and privileges libres enjoyed.  Carrier also recognized the irony of the 
day’s events.  Less than thirty years before he and other free black soldiers fought against the 
British in the Gulf Coast, which in turn helped Anglo-Americans secure their independence under 
the banner “all men are created equal.”  Carrier could not help but wonder if Americans included 
Lower Louisiana’s free black population under this Enlightenment idea.  Would Americans 
                                                 
 
     5 Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 1-2, 12.  See also New Orleans in 1805: A Directory and A Census 
Together with Resolutions Authorizing Same Now Printed for the First Time From the Original Manuscript  (New 
Orleans: The Pelican Gallery Inc.,1936).   
 
     6 Ibid., 111-113. 
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acknowledge that every aspect of Louisiana’s founding, growth, and survival depended on free 
people of color?  Would Americans extend libres the same rights they helped them secure so many 
years before?   
    Carrier’s anxiety was certainly not unwarranted. Governor Claiborne and other American officials 
saw Lower Louisiana’s unique racial composition as one of the most pressing issues facing 
lawmakers.  Over the course of several years, American officials sought to redefine the status of 
libres hoping to emulate the strict racial hierarchy found in the United States.  Hoping to solidify 
white supremacy in the Orleans Territory, the territorial legislature passed a new Black Code.  The 
1806 act forced free blacks to more subordinate roles, creating a rigid society of whites and non-
whites.7  As the new code attempted to circumscribe the status of free blacks, territorial officials 
also sought to diminish libres’ role in the military.  Although the militia de color remained in 
existence following the Louisiana Purchase, territorial lawmakers systematically neglected the 
black corps.  By the end of the territorial period, white Creoles and American lawmakers managed 
to impede libres’ typical avenues of autonomy and citizenship.  Free people of color, like white 
Creoles, were forced to adapt to a new American presence and find strategies of negotiation.  Yet 
they would face a different set of challenges than their white counterparts.  Besides maintaining 
their colonial heritage and gaining American acceptance, free blacks had to combat a strong white 
supremacist ideology that demoted them to second-class citizens.      
    Dying just one year after the transfer ceremony, Noel Carrier would not live to see many of his 
concerns vindicated.8  Rather his son, Noel Carrier Jr., would carry the burden of Americans’ strict 
                                                 
     7 Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible, 82.  
  
     8 Noel Carrier Sr. died on December 5, 1804.  Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic Church of the 
Archdiocese of New Orleans, ed. Charles E. Nolan (New Orleans: Archdiocese of New Orleans, 1993-1999), Volume 
8.     
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racial hierarchy and confront the challenge of securing a place for himself and all free people of 
color in the young republic.  His life illustrates that libres made substantial efforts to maintain their 
colonial rights despite American policies that sought to marginalize them.  Through kinship 
networks, property ownership, and military service, libres continued to utilize their colonial heritage 
and their parents’ legacy as bargaining chips with lawmakers and white Louisianans.  Ultimately, 
free blacks employed innovative techniques in order to secure citizenship in an increasingly hostile 
racial environment.       
    The men who participated in the milicia de color were often referred to as the “chosen men of 
color.”  Their status gave them a prominent role in the libre community and colonial Louisiana.  
Noel Carrier Jr. and the sons of these chosen men of color would have a much different battle than 
their fathers.  They did not fight a strong military foe but a government that sought to expunge their 
special racial status and destroy Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy.  Equipped with the lessons 
imparted by their fathers and a strong colonial heritage, Carrier and other libres fought to live as 
free men in the United States.   
**** 
    It is impossible to comprehend the experience of Noel Carrier Jr. and other libres in territorial 
Louisiana without first understanding the role free people of color played in colonial Louisiana.  Like 
other European colonists, the early founders of France’s southern colony had to contend with many 
of the rigors of the North American wilderness.  Precarious relationships with neighboring Indians 
coupled with environmental challenges made the initial settling of Lower Louisiana an arduous 
task.  Historians have also found that the composition of the colony only exacerbated these 
demands.  The first settlers to Louisiana consisted of many gentlemen accompanied by debtors, 
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prisoners, and other undesirables from Canada.  Lacking any real knowledge of farming, these 
settlers established vital relationships with the colony’s Indians.  Furthermore, slaves supplied 
needed labor to keep the early settlement afloat.9  Besides relying on slaves for food and shelter, 
French settlers soon began using them to defend the colony from foreign and Indian threats.  As 
early as 1729, Governor Perier armed a band of slaves to defend New Orleans against the 
Choctaws.10  Throughout the French period, imperial officials counted on slave soldiers in 
desperate times.  The realities of the wilderness and colonial demands allowed slaves to assume a 
special role in colonial Louisiana.   
    Despite the services slaves provided, white Louisianans sought to create a society that 
promoted white supremacy and the institution of slavery.  In hopes of solidifying their control over 
their chattel, colonial officials drafted and implemented the Code Noir in 1724.  Borrowed from the 
Caribbean model, the Code Noir restricted slave’s mobility, regulated relationships between slaves 
and Indians, and prohibited slaves from carrying weapons or assembling without white supervision.  
Although the Code placed many restrictions on slaves and crafted a clear racial barrier, it also 
revealed slaves’ unique role in colonial Louisiana.  Historian Jerah Johnson finds that the Code 
Noir attempted to integrate slaves into the larger community with common social rights.  It 
stipulated, for instance, that slaves were to be instructed in the Christian faith and receive Catholic 
sacraments.  Colonial officials encouraged slave marriages and baptisms overseen by masters and 
clergymen.  Moreover, the Code defined a master’s responsibilities that included taking care of sick 
and disabled slaves as well as providing proper food, shelter, and clothing.  Although some of the 
Code’s provisions seem contrary to the racial contempt that officials intended to engender, early 
                                                 
     9 Johnson, “Colonial New Orleans,” 32-33; Hall, “The Formation of Afro-Creole Culture,” 61.    
     10 Dunbar-Nelson, “People of Color in Louisiana,” 10.  
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Louisianans used the Code Noir to control slaves while also acknowledging the valuable role they 
played in Lower Louisiana’s survival.11   
    The Code Noir also helped promote a new class of blacks in colonial Louisiana, the free person 
of color.  In 1731, Governor Perier mentioned that gens de couleur libre were killed in an Indian 
raid.  His used of the word libre indicated that these men were not slaves but free black men.  
There must have been a small group of libres in Louisiana before this date since the Code Noir 
dedicated several provisions to the status of “freed or free-born negroes.”  It stated, for instance, 
that if a child was born to a slave father and a free woman of color, that the child would “share the 
condition” of its mother.  This language acknowledges two important realities.  First, under the 
French a substantial number of slaves were freed from bondage and entered into the libre class.  
This can be explained through the Code Noir’s liberal manumission policy that allowed masters to 
free slaves for various reasons from loyal service to old age.  Colonial officials also contributed to 
the growing libre population by granting freedom to slaves who showed valor on the battlefield.  On 
one occasion, nearly fifty slaves gained their freedom by assisting colonial forces in suppressing 
the Natchez Revolt.12     
    More importantly, the Code Noir illustrates that libres were present in colonial Louisiana as early 
as 1724.  As more slaves received freedom, they contributed to the strength and numbers of the 
gens de couleur libre.  Thus by the time the Code was drafted there were enough libres to merit its 
                                                 
     11 Johnson, “Colonial New Orleans,” 42.   
     12 Roland C. McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana: A History of The Battalion of Free Men of Color  
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968.) 14; H.E. Sterkx, The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana  
(Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickson University Press, 1972), 26-27.     
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final provision which stated that free people of color were to receive the same “rights, privileges, 
and immunities which are enjoyed by free born persons.”13   
    As the Code Noir served to control Louisiana’s slave population, it remained flexible as the 
demands of the colony required.  One particular deviation came in arming slaves.  Although slaves 
were prohibited from having their own weapons, French officials armed them when necessary.  
When Indians invaded the Natchez settlement in 1729, Louisianans turned to every able-bodied 
man in the colony.  The initial attack claimed the lives of nearly 200 settlers and caused the 
destruction of farms and crops.  Governor Perier had only 400 men available to fight as more 
Indians joined the massacre and made their way through the colony.  Fearing an invasion of New 
Orleans, Perier looked to slaves and free people of color to provide much needed manpower.  
Along with white soldiers, slaves and free blacks met Natchez warriors near Point Coupee where 
they demonstrated “surprising valor”14  As the conflict continued, Jacques De La Chaise, the 
president of the Superior Council of Louisiana, drafted a memorial advocating the formation of a 
permanent company of black soldiers to be ready at all times to defend Louisiana.  Chaise’s 
proposal failed to immediately materialize, but French officials continued to use black volunteers in 
their ongoing struggle against the Natchez Indians and their Choctaw allies.  In April 1736, 
Governor Jean Baptiste le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville, assembled nearly 140 slaves and free black 
troops to take on the Natchez in Mobile.  He placed forty-five of these troops under the command 
of free black officers.  As expeditions against the Indians continued, black recruits increased, 
forcing French officials to form a separate negres’ libres company.15 
                                                 
     13 Code Noir.   
     14 McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 7.   
     15 Ibid., 12-13.   
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    When French campaigns against the Natchez ended in 1740, black soldiers, both slave and 
free, had not only found a new avenue of freedom, but a vital means of establishing a special 
status in the community.  Many slaves received their freedom as reward for their service, while free 
blacks gained valuable experience that would make them even more viable and needed members 
of the colony.  Although the French never used black troops in any other major engagements, they 
had created a distinct black fighting force that would continue long after the French left Louisiana.     
    When the French ceded Lower Louisiana to the Spanish in the wake of the Seven Years’ War, 
Louisianans confronted their first regime change.  Libres became willing beneficiaries of new 
Spanish policies that enhanced their numbers and group identity.  Under the Spanish, the 
population of libres continued to grow.  One historian estimates that at the time the Spanish 
obtained Lower Louisiana free people of color made up about 7.1% of Louisiana’s population.  By 
1805, just two years after the Louisiana Purchase, this number increased to nearly 33.5%.16  
Immigration from the Caribbean and natural increase undoubtedly contributed to such growth.  
Spanish policies, however, also promoted growth.  Where the French relied on slaves and free 
people of color for survival, the Spanish found them useful in combating hostile Frenchmen 
resentful of the new imperial regime.  Replacing the Code Noir, the Spanish implemented a new 
set of provisions known as O’Reilly’s Laws.  It is clear that these policies upheld white supremacy 
and a slave society, but also served to forge unity between the Spanish government and 
Louisiana’s burgeoning free black population.  O’Reilly’s Laws codified the practice of coartacion 
which allowed slaves to “purchase their freedom for a stipulated sum of money agreed upon by 
their master or the Spanish courts.”  What made this law so unique is that a slave did not need 
                                                 
     16 Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 12.   
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his/her master’s permission to initiate the court proceedings.  Furthermore, O’Reilly’s Laws allowed 
masters to free slaves without receiving permission from the Superior Court as the French 
required.  From self-purchase to a third party securing the freedom of a slave, Spanish policies 
made freedom the gift of the Crown rather than a benevolent master.  In essence, the Spanish tried 
to make loyal free blacks, grateful for their new-found freedom, important allies against foreign 
invaders and disgruntled white Creoles.17   
    Spanish policies, moreover, gave free blacks many new privileges that provided them the means 
to start thriving businesses and acquire property.  O’Reilly’s Laws allowed slaves and free blacks to 
receive donations and gifts from former masters and white kin.  Don Marcos de Olivares 
bequeathed to his slave daughter Maria Josepha not only her freedom but also two thousand 
pesos, several pieces of furniture, and silver.  Such gifts allowed free blacks to purchase and 
possess luxury items and accumulate real estate and slaves.  Although libres owned fewer slaves 
than their white counterparts, slave ownership became an important means for free blacks to 
associate themselves with white society and distinguish themselves from black chattel. Many libres 
also used such gifts and donations to help other slaves secure their freedom and join the free black 
community. 18   
    Besides using monetary gifts to acquire real estate and other property, free blacks utilized 
favorable Spanish policies to start businesses.  In a society of masters and slaves, free blacks 
assumed a middle stratum in the commercial hierarchy.  Excluded from professional and 
                                                 
     17 Ibid,. 25.  Sterkx, The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana, 37-39.  According to Sterkx, Spanish laws allowed 
slaves to become free even if their master opposed the emancipation.   
 
     18 Code Noir.  The Code prohibited whites from bestowing any monetary or propertied gifts and donations to their 
slaves or free blacks. See also Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 70-73.  Sterkx, The Free Negro in Ante-
Bellum Louisiana, 55-57.   
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government positions, free blacks supplied the bulk of Louisiana’s skilled labor as carpenters, 
shoemakers, and blacksmiths.  Many of these skills free blacks learned while slaves.  In turn, 
second-generation libres typically worked in the same profession as their fathers and other male 
relatives.  Libre women also worked in the service sector as seamstresses, laundresses, and even 
tavern keepers.19  Spanish imperial officials also provided libres with many employment 
opportunities.  They hired libres to fix and build levees, bridges, and roads.  Juan Bougin, a free 
black carpenter, received a handsome salary from the Cabildo for work he did on a bridge in the 
Carondelet Canal cemetery.  Working for the crown often allowed free blacks to accumulate 
property to invest in other businesses or join partnerships.  For example, Marie Louise, a free black 
woman, had enough money to financially support the business endeavors of a white blacksmith, 
Nicholas Duquenay.20  Ultimately, the Spanish provided new channels of autonomy for free blacks, 
encouraging them to accumulate property, build important economic partnerships, and create 
thriving businesses.   
    As Spanish officials promoted libre involvement in the commercial sector, they also encouraged 
their participation in the military.  In 1762, Spanish authorities sought to reorganize their imperial 
forces throughout their vast empire.  During the Cuba restructuring, officials reorganized the 
historic milicia de color by creating two separate companies.  The first company consisted of free 
pardos or light skinned libres who had traces of white ancestry.  The second company, the 
morenos (dark-skinned), consisted of black troops more recently freed from bondage.21  In 1769, 
                                                 
     19 Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 58-59.  A 1795 Census reveals that outside of agricultural jobs, free 
blacks worked in artisan occupations.   
 
     20 Sterkx, The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana, 58-60.   
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newly-appointed Spanish governor Alesandro O’Reilly arrived in New Orleans to implement the 
militia reorganization.  Upon taking a census of Louisiana, O’Reilly created four white military units 
and a company of libres.  Just one year later, he appointed a free black man, Pedro Simon, as the 
captain and commander of the free pardo and moreno militia.  Along with Simon, several other 
prominent free blacks were commissioned as officers in the Spanish Army.  O’Reilly also extended 
libres the right of fuero militiar which was a set of special military privileges that included retirement 
and death benefits, the right to bear arms, as well as equal pay.  More importantly, fuero provided 
libres privileges that even members of the white community did not possess. As one historian 
argues, fuero “placed the holder [libre] above and apart from the rest of society and in effect 
constituted the militia as a social elite.” 22  O’Reilly included free blacks in this social elite, elevating 
their status in the Louisiana social structure.   
    In 1779, Louisiana’s reorganized milicia de color received its first orders as Spain declared war 
on Great Britain.  Louisiana Governor Bernardo de Galvez quickly assembled his forces to expel 
the British from the Gulf of Mexico and Mississippi River.  Among his new recruits were eighty free 
blacks, many with previous military experience under the French.23  These black troops, arranged 
into pardo and moreno units led by black officers, marched with Galvez and his forces towards 
Baton Rouge where they forced a British surrender at Fort Bute de Manchac.  Galvez and his 
forces soon turned their attention to Mobile, hoping to secure the Gulf of Mexico.  In January 1780, 
Galvez strengthened his forces, adding an additional thirty black troops.  By March, these brave 
soldiers secured Mobile and began heading towards Pensacola.  Needing more manpower, Galvez 
enlisted slaves to serve alongside the milicia de color.  A month later, British forces surrendered at 
                                                 
     22 Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 111-112, 118.   
     23 McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 17.   
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Fort George, thus completing the Spanish conquest of the Gulf South.24  Following these 
successful expeditions, free black troops received praise through monetary rewards and medals 
from the Spanish Crown.        
    After the American Revolution ended, black troops in the milicia de color continued to provide 
valuable services.  Their predominant peacetime role consisted of chasing and capturing runaway 
slaves called Cimarrons.  These particular runaways flocked to the swampy bayous where they 
created slave armies that raided Louisiana farms and plantations.  Libre troops also undertook 
public works projects along the Mississippi River and throughout New Orleans.  By the end of the 
Spanish period, free black soldiers grew nearly five-fold as the Spanish took measures to provide 
organization and structure to a legitimate milicia de color.25 
**** 
     Looking at the lives of Noel Carrier Sr. and other chosen men of color it is apparent that free 
blacks utilized the advantages that Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy offered.  Noel, born a slave, 
entered the libre population during the French regime.  Although the exact circumstance of his 
manumission is unknown, it is possible he received his freedom through some noble military act.  
Soon Carrier became a master cooper in New Orleans and married Marianne Thomas in 
November 1778.  As he built a thriving business, Carrier became a second lieutenant in the 
moreno unit in the newly revived milicia de color.  In 1779, Carrier put his leadership skills to the 
test as he joined Governor Galvez and other Spanish troops to purge the Gulf Coast of the British.  
Leaving Marianne behind, Carrier and his troops followed Galvez where they forced a British 
surrender in Baton Rouge and Natchez, securing key posts along the banks of the Mississippi 
                                                 
     24 Ibid., 17-21.   
     25 Ibid., 22-23.  See also Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 113.     
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River.  Along with his comrades Bautista Hugon and Francisco Dorville (lieutenant of the pardo 
unit), he received special honors for the Baton Rouge expedition.  Carrier and Dorville would go on 
to earn more accolades including a bonus of 300 pesos for their efforts in both Mobile and 
Pensacola.26   
    Following the Spanish conquest of the Gulf Coast region, Carrier reunited with his wife and 
welcomed his first son Noel.  Although he never left home again in the service of the Spanish 
Army, his role as an officer in the milicia de color required his constant attention.  In 1784, Carrier 
and his moreno unit maneuvered through the Louisiana bayous in pursuit of Cimarron rebels.  
Moreover, the harsh realities of the mighty Mississippi also consumed Carrier’s role as a military 
leader.  In 1790, now a captain of the morenos, he oversaw the rebuilding and repairing of a levee 
near the city.  Working alternately with Bautista Hugon’s pardo unit, Carrier ensured the city’s vital 
levee system remained intact.27   
    Carrier’s career exemplifies how the military served as a tool for libres, giving them the 
opportunity to fight for the defense of their homes, but also to demonstrate their worth to society.  
The military fulfilled other purposes as well.  At times it proved economically advantageous.  It is 
not inconceivable that Carrier used his bonus from the British campaign to invest in his expanding 
business, family, and even property.  Some libres even received military pensions that allowed 
them to take care of their families into their old age.  Beyond monetary gain, the military also gave 
libres the opportunity to further separate themselves from slaves.  By fighting against Cimarrons, 
libres joined with white Louisianans rather than runaway slaves, demonstrating that the safety of 
                                                 
     26 Ibid., 120-121.  McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 18-19.   
     27 Ibid., 23.   
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the colony transcended the empathy they felt for black chattel.28  Furthermore, the leadership roles 
libres assumed in the military spilled over into society, allowing black leaders the bargaining power 
to request privileges for the entire free black community.       
    Libres like Carrier took advantage of favorable Spanish policies that provided them avenues of 
freedom and a means to forge a separate group identity.  Free blacks also employed other 
strategies that continued to strengthen their cohesion and position in colonial Louisiana.  One 
important factor in libre methods was their ancestral connection to white society.  French and 
Spanish authorities referred to libres as mulattoes (or more specifically pardos and morenos), yet 
free blacks themselves created much more complex racial classifications based on one’s degree of 
separation from the Caucasian race.  It is important to note that not every free person of color had 
white blood since so many came directly from Africa as slaves and later earned their freedom.  
Many libres did have claims to white ancestry which only enhanced their status.  Ultimately, libres 
created important racial classifications that emphasized one’s lineage and connection to white 
society.  These distinctions fell into three phenotypes.  The most common in slave societies, the 
mulatto designated the offspring of a white and black parent.  Generations of racial mixing, 
however, engendered even more specific categories.  Quadroon, for example, refers to the 
combination of whites and mulattoes, while a griffe was a child with a black and mulatto parent.29   
    These particular racial phenotypes became important in the libre community serving as either 
badges of honor, distinction, or denigration.  Many libres exploited such ancestry to create 
advantageous business partnerships and strong bonds with white kin.  Within their own community, 
                                                 
     28 Ibid., 23.   
     29 W. A. Vaughan, “The Black Militia in the Battle of New Orleans”  (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern Mississippi, 
1993), 3.  
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free blacks adhered to their distinct racial classifications.  Colonial marriage records indicate that 
many free blacks married within their own phenotype illustrating that one’s link to white society was 
worth preserving.30  Such a concern for one’s racial composition and white ancestry illustrates that 
many libres hoped that their connection to white society, no matter how distant, enhanced their 
position among other free blacks and encouraged favorable relations with white kin.   
    Beyond the intricate web of racial phenotypes, libres also relied on a variety of kinship networks, 
both real and fictive, to protect their status and corporate identity.  In Bounded Lives, Bounded 
Places, Kimberly Hanger argues that godparenthood joined free blacks together, but also linked 
them to white society.  The goal in choosing a godparent centered on finding someone of equal or 
preferably higher status that would gain one’s children privileges.  This included selecting white 
godparents, but also libres of status, usually black militia officers.31  Libres used complex kinship 
bonds to promote their well being and that of succeeding generations.  
    Many free blacks looked to white Louisianans to serve as godparents to their children.  Colonial 
records indicate that between January 1787 and December 1797, nearly 56% of free black children 
had at least one white godparent. 32  Such records also reveal that more white males were used as 
godparents than white females, indicating that libres hoped to benefit from the influence of white 
men.  In 1796, Carlos Brule, a lieutenant in the milicia de color, asked Ygnacio Fernandes to 
sponsor his daughter Maria.  As a second lieutenant in the white Louisiana Infantry, Fernandes’ 
role as godfather provided Brule with a vital link to the white military and white society.  Pierre 
Bailly, another lieutenant in the milicia de color, also used white men as godfathers to all of his 
                                                 
     30 Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 95-96.   
     31 Ibid., 89, 108.       
     32 Ibid., 105.   
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children.  For his son Joseph Pedro’s godfather, Bailly chose Joseph De La Pena, a captain in the 
white infantry.  Later he asked Andres Armesto to sponsor his son Andres.  As the secretary to the 
governor of Louisiana, Armesto proved an important ally and through godparenthood Bailly forged 
a relationship that could later benefit him and his children.33   
    Libres who did not have connections with white society often turned to prominent free black 
leaders to help secure favors and privileges.  Many free blacks used officers in the milicia de color 
as godfathers.  At times this strengthened the camaraderie between fellow soldiers as in the case 
of Noel Carrier and Pedro Claver.  In 1796, Noel Carrier Sr. witnessed the baptism of Claver’s son 
Manuel.  Two years later, Claver returned the favor serving as godfather to Carrier’s son Balthazar.  
For both men the role of godparent was one that kept fellow soldiers united.  Moreover, for Claver, 
a lower ranking officer, having Captain Carrier as a godparent strengthened his connection with 
other black officers.  Claver continued to utilize his relationship with Carrier, asking him and his 
wife Marianne to sponsor his son Pedro several years later.34   
    Besides strengthening external links, godparenthood also solidified the nuclear family.  Carlos 
Brule often asked female family members to serve as godmothers.  He asked his sister Charlotte 
Brule to sponsor his son Carlos Savidor.  Later he asked his wife’s sister to be godmother to 
daughter Margarita.  Noel Carrier often used more immediate family members as well.  When his 
daughter Ana was born in 1796, he asked his wife’s brother and sister-in-law to serve as sponsors.  
Carrier also used godparenthood to maintain attachments to more distant, but important relatives.  
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 Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Volume 4, 5, 6. 
  
     34 Ibid., Volume 6, 7.     
 
 184 
Linked to the Montreuil family through Fanchon Carrier, Noel asked cousins Bartalome, Descanda, 
and Francisco Montreuil to serve as godparents to three of his children.35   
    Much like the sacrament of baptism, strategic marriages also provided free blacks the 
opportunity to make vital connections.  Statistics reveal that free blacks preferred to marry within 
their ranks rather than having less sanctioned unions with whites and slaves.  Marriage allowed 
free blacks to dissociate from slaves and enhance a growing libre community.  Weddings also 
allowed free blacks to solidify special bonds.  Libre military leaders often arranged marriages 
among their children.  Pedro Claver, the son of Augustin Claver, a corporal in the milicia de color, 
married Celeste Hugon, the daughter of Bautista Hugon, captain of the pardo unit.  Such a union 
allowed the libre elite to maintain their status for generations.  Many couples also asked military 
officers to witness their nuptials.  Noel Carrier Sr. and several other officers witnessed the above 
union between Claver and Hugon.  Carrier witnessed three other marriages between 1784 and 
1796.  Francisco Dorville’s role as a captain of the pardos also made him a popular witness to 
many libres unions.36 
    Through strategic marriages and godparenthood, libres created an intricate network of real and 
fictive kinship bonds that sought to enhance their status among whites, camaraderie in the military, 
and cohesion among the libre community.  Free blacks, however, went outside the private enclave 
of the family to secure their rights and identity.  During the colonial era, free blacks maintained an 
open dialogue with Spanish authorities through the military.  During the Revolutionary War, 
Francisco Dorville requested that black troops receive a portion of the wartime spoils.  Other 
                                                 
     35 Ibid., Volume 5, 6, 7, 8. 
   
     36 Ibid., Volume 4, 5.  
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officers petitioned imperial authorities to receive pensions as reward for wartime sacrifices.37  Using 
the milicia de color, free blacks collectively received benefits, but more importantly created a 
dialogue with colonial officials that allowed libres to demand and obtain certain privileges.38      
    Libres also used the public sphere of New Orleans as a means to interact with white society and 
assert their status.  In the city streets, free blacks marched in celebratory holidays and military 
musters as well as paraded in costumes during Mardi Gras festivities.  Alongside whites, libres 
partook in some of Louisianans’ most sacred holidays and cherished pastimes.  White and black 
men mingled in the many taverns and dance halls throughout the city.  Together they bet on 
cockfights, horse races, and games of chance.  Whites and libres lived in the same neighborhoods 
and even worshipped and received the sacraments together at the St. Louis Cathedral.39  Free 
blacks attempted to make the streets and facilities of New Orleans a common space for all 
Louisianans—a public realm that downplayed racial distinctions and promoted unity among 
partygoers, parishioners, gambling men, and citizens.   
    By the time the United States took possession of French Louisiana, free people of color had 
already helped to settle, secure, and sustain Louisiana.  Throughout the colonial period, free blacks 
employed many strategies that allowed them to strengthen their own community, but more 
importantly to downplay race and emphasize their status as citizens.  Ultimately, libres contributed 
to the unique three-tiered racial hierarchy that would prove problematic for Americans.   
                                                 
     37 McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 21.  
 
     38 Ibid., 28; Hanger, Bounded Lives, Bounded Places, 136, 152-153.  Some libres displayed more radical activism.  
During the French Revolution, many Louisianans not only empathized with their former countrymen but were lured by 
the promises of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.”  Pierre Bailly became one such patriot and used a public ball to solicit 
libre assistance in overthrowing the Spanish regime.  Hoping to pave the way for a new revolutionary French regime, 
Bailly believed that fellow libres would help him with his radical plot in exchange for equality.  For his efforts Bailly 
landed in a Havana prison for several years.  
 
     39 Ibid., 138, 143.   
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**** 
    Noel Carrier Jr. perhaps felt similar apprehensions as his father when the United States took 
possession of Lower Louisiana.  He worried about the fate of his property, his business, and even 
his status as a solider in the milicia de color.  Yet he faced different challenges than his father, not 
only having to combat a new American government but preserve the legacy and rights of the 
chosen men of color.  Throughout the territorial period, Noel and his fellow libres continued to use 
the same strategies employed by their fathers in the face of obstacles that threatened their colonial 
heritage.   
    As American lawmakers made preparations for the transfer of Lower Louisiana, they quickly 
began to realize they had much more to deal with than border disputes and unhappy Creoles.  
They also were confronted with a free black population much more numerous and autonomous 
then those found in the United States.  Initial reports estimated that nearly one-fourth of Louisiana’s 
population consisted of free people of color.40  Just days after the official transfer of French 
Louisiana, Governor Claiborne expressed concern regarding the existing companies of the milicia 
de color, contending that “to re-commission them might be considered as an outrage on the 
feelings of a part of the Nation, and opposed to that Policy which the Safety of the Southern States 
has necessarily established.”  Here Claiborne illustrates the main dilemma facing American 
lawmakers.  Maintaining the historic milicia de color violated the rigid racial hierarchy well 
established in the United States.  Nowhere in the Union did Americans accept or even consider 
arming slaves or free blacks, let alone allowing them to form a military battalion.  Over time, 
Claiborne’s anxiety gave way to practicality as he acknowledged libres’ importance to domestic 
                                                 
     40 Territorial Papers IX: 18, 32-33.  Clark and Claiborne initially believed Lower Louisiana had nearly 50,000 to 
60,000 people, of which one-third to one-forth were libres.  Both mentioned the existence of the milicia de color.  Their 
estimates have been backed by others in the territory such as Benjamin Morgan.       
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security.  He feared that alienating free blacks “would disgust them, and might be productive of 
future mischief.  To disband them would be to raise an armed enemy in the very heart of the 
Country.”41  Claiborne faced a precarious situation.  Should he protect white Americans’ cherished 
racial hierarchy at the expense of libres, thereby risking a possible black revolution?  Or should he 
protect the rights of the milicia de color at the risk of alienating many of his white constituents?     
    As Claiborne begged for instructions regarding libres, other Americans reflected on the racial 
predicament.  Benjamin Morgan, a longtime resident of New Orleans, pondered the race issue with 
his good friend Chandler Price.  Commending libres’ colonial contributions, Morgan believed that 
free people of color could also be useful to Americans especially in dealing with slaves, contending 
that “it is worth the consideration of government they [libres] may be made good citizens or 
formidable abettors of the black people [slaves] … if they should ever be troublesome.”42  He 
concluded that Americans should make free blacks friends rather than enemies.  General James 
Wilkinson shared many of Morgan’s postulations.  He urged American authorities to cultivate good 
relations with free blacks, warning that “the People of Colour are all armed.”  He believed that by 
treating libres with respect and delicacy, Americans averted feelings of resentment that could 
“produce those Horrible Scenes of Bloodshed & rapine, which have been so frequently noticed in 
St. Domingo”43  Like Claiborne, Wilkinson clearly understood that free people of color were vital to 
Louisiana’s racial harmony.     
                                                 
     41 Claiborne to Madison, 27 December 1803, Letter Books, I: 314.    
 
     42 Benjamin Morgan to Chandler Price, 7 August 1803, Territorial Papers, IX: 7.   
     43 James Wilkinson to the Secretary of State, 11 January 1803, Ibid., IX: 160.  Wilkinson also commended free 
people of color who had “universally mounted the Eagle in their hats & avowed attachment to the United States” as 
white Creoles continued to profess loyalty to France.    
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    Contemplating their own precarious situation, free blacks initiated negotiations with territorial and 
Washington lawmakers.  In January 1804, fifty-four free men of color sent the “Address from the 
Free People of Color” to Governor Claiborne.  The libre petitioners referred to themselves as “free 
Citizens of Louisiana” who possessed a “sincere attachment to the Government of the United 
States.”  The address went on to explicitly articulate libre views regarding their status in the United 
States, stating that:  
We are Natives of this Province and our dearest Interests are connected with its 
welfare.  We therefore feel a lively Joy that the Sovereignty of the Country is at 
length united with that of the American Republic.  We are duly sensible that our 
personal and political freedom is thereby assured to us for ever, and we are               
also impressed with the fullest confidence in the Justice and Liberality of the 
Government towards every Class of Citizens which they have taken under their 
Protection.44   
 
The opening paragraph of the address quickly set the tone for libre interactions with American 
lawmakers.  First, they invoked the rhetoric of attachment that had become essential in territorial 
negotiations.  By providing assurances of their affection to the United States, libres hoped to depict 
themselves as loyal countrymen.  More importantly, the potent language of the address left little 
doubt that libres considered themselves legitimate citizens of the United States.  Their bold 
assertion came in large part from Article III of the treaty between the United States and France that 
stated that Louisiana inhabitants would be admitted to the United States “as soon as possible” to 
enjoy “all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens.”45  For free people of color this 
included them.   
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 Address from the Free People of Color, January 1804, Ibid., IX: 174.   
 
     45 Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Article III.  See also Dunbar-Nelson, 
“People of Color in Louisiana,” 8n.  According to Dunbar-Nelson, the cession treaty included free people of color and 
all mixed bloods in their definition of inhabitants thus granting libres full citizenship.  Although there is a lack of 
evidence behind this assertion it is obvious that free people of color did believe that Article III granted them the same 
rights as every other white citizen.   
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   To buttress claims of citizenship, the address reminded Americans of libres’ military 
contributions, recounting that:   
  We were employed in the military service of the late Government, and we hope we 
may be permitted to say, that our Conduct in that Service has ever been 
distinguished by a ready attention to the duties required of us.  Should we be in 
like manner honored by the American Government, to which every principle of 
Interest as well as affection attaches us, permit us to assure your Excellency that 
we shall serve with fidelity and Zeal.  We therefore respectfully offer our Services 
to the Government as a Corps of Volunteers agreeable to any arrangement which 
may be thought expedient. 46   
 
This reference to the colonial milicia de color illustrates that libres were willing to use the legacy of 
their ancestors to protect their colonial rights and citizenship.  Ultimately, this address served as a 
preemptive strike that unveiled libres’ approach in dealing with American lawmakers.   
    Governor Claiborne’s response to the address proves just as insightful in understanding the 
strategy he adopted in negotiating with libres.  In a letter to the free black petitioners, Claiborne 
promised them protection of their “Liberty, Property, and Religion.”  However, when it came to the 
issue of military service, he failed to provide any assurances, but rather simply stated that the fate 
of the milicia de color depended on Washington lawmakers.47  Claiborne’s letter was even more 
ambiguous regarding their status as citizens, failing to address Article III of the cession treaty.  
Claiborne treated the “Address from the Free People of Color” with delicacy, instituting an 
approach he would use in his many encounters with free people of color.     
    These early negotiations between libres and territorial lawmakers bore fruit.  After waiting 
months for a response from Washington, Claiborne finally received instructions regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
     46 Address from the Free People of Color, Territorial Papers, Ibid., IX: 174-175.   
     47 Claiborne to Madison, 17 January 1804, Letter Books, I: 339-340.   
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milicia de color.  Secretary of War Henry Dearborn encouraged Claiborne to renew the black militia 
under the strict orders not “to increase the Corps, but diminish it, if can be done without giving 
offense.”  Also he instructed Claiborne to replace colonial black leaders with white officers of good 
character.  As a token of the government’s confidence and acknowledgement of the new free black 
battalion, Dearborn wanted Claiborne to present them with a flag.48  Claiborne immediately 
implemented Dearborn’s orders.  In June, he selected Major Michael Fortier and Lewis Kerr as 
commanding officers for the new free black battalion.  Just days later, Claiborne presented the 
Free Color Battalion with an official flag that was “made of white silk, Ornamented with fifteen 
Stripes (alternately red and white).” 49    
    By the Spring of 1804, libres felt confident in their new relationship with the territorial 
government.  They earned the right to continue their time-honored military tradition and received a 
standard of recognition similar to other white units.  Soon, black troops patrolled New Orleans 
streets and other public facilities on night watches, a job designated to the territorial militia.  Libres 
also found that the early airing of their grievances proved a useful tactic in engendering an open 
dialogue with lawmakers and a vehicle for negotiation.  Claiborne abated the “color problem,” 
                                                 
     48 Henry Dearborn to William C. C. Claiborne, 20 February 1804, Ibid.,II: 54-55.  
     49 Claiborne to Fortier, 22 June 1804, Ibid., II: 215-216.  Fortier was a native of New Orleans and had become a 
prominent merchant and plantation owner.  Kerr, a relative of Claiborne, had previously lived in the Mississippi Territory 
and accompanied Claiborne to New Orleans when he was appointed territorial governor of Lower Louisiana.  Claiborne 
described both men as having good character and respectability.  See also Claiborne to Dearborn, 9 June 1804, Ibid., 
II: 200.  In July 1804, General James Wilkinson sent President Jefferson a correspondence in which he characterized 
prominent citizens in New Orleans.  He described Fortier as a merchant who was “Rich, ignorant, Creole, rather hasty 
presumptuous, obstinate & intemperate, warm Friend of the Prefect Laussat, but without influence—no morals.”  
Territorial Papers, IX: 252.    
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temporarily appeasing libres without toppling the American racial hierarchy.  He happily reported to 
Washington lawmakers that the renewal of the milicia de color proved sound policy. 50   
    Having initial success with lawmakers, free blacks hoped another address could secure them 
more privileges.  This time they set their sights on political rights.  In 1804, as white Louisianans 
drafted the Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana, they failed to represent the interest of all 
Louisianans since free blacks were excluded from the proceedings.  A prominent black leader, 
therefore, began preparations for a separate meeting for libres to draft their own memorial to 
Congress.  As a portent for looming racial animosities, city printers refused to print or circulate the 
meeting announcement.  Hearing of the proposed libre meeting, Claiborne lashed out at the free 
black community, calling their actions “reprehensible and of a nature to create anxiety.”51  Several 
days later, he met with ten prominent libre leaders hoping to discourage an assembly or petition.  
Despite these efforts, however, white Louisianans confronted the prospect of a free black memorial 
with scorn.  Claiborne reported to Secretary of State Madison that the proposed meeting “excited 
some alarm among the white citizens,” and that many white Louisianans wanted him to apprehend 
and punish the free man of color who orchestrated the meeting.  Ultimately, no one went to jail over 
the incident and free blacks abandoned plans for a memorial to Congress. 52   
    The outcry over a possible libre memorial demonstrates an important undercurrent that often 
dictated negotiations between lawmakers and free blacks—white Louisianans. The presence of 
                                                 
     50 Claiborne to Dearborn, 22 June 22, 1804, Letter Books, II: 218.  Free black militiamen served for a time as 
watchmen as evidenced by an incident when a black solider on watch struck a white man.   
 
     51 Claiborne to James Pitot, 1 July 1804, Ibid., II: 232.   
     52 Claiborne to Madison, 3, 5, 7, July 1804, Ibid., II: 234-235, 237, 239, 244-245. Claiborne reported to Madison that 
the free black leaders left their meeting “convinced of their error, declared their intention to abandon the suggested 
project, gave the most unqualified assurances, of their friendly pacific disposition, and devoted attachment to the 
present Government and to good order.” 
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free people of color undoubtedly engendered a volatile situation for all Louisiana inhabitants.  
Historically free blacks were important members of society and assisted whites in upholding the 
institution of slavery.  These contributions, however, did not often merit respect.  Rather, for white 
Louisianans, free blacks were a serious threat.  Despite black claims of citizenship, their skin color 
made them more like slaves than whites.  Many white Louisianans feared that free blacks would 
one day join their enslaved counterparts and incite a racial revolution.  Such feelings were only 
exacerbated in the context of international affairs.  As Americans watched in horror as slaves in St. 
Domingue overthrew their white masters, many worried about a similar insurrection in the United 
States.  Louisiana seemed even more vulnerable to such a revolt due to its close proximity to the 
Caribbean.  As a large influx of island refugees flooded into New Orleans, white concerns 
intensified, fearing that armed free blacks with military experience would be enticed by ideas of 
freedom and equality.  The Haitian Revolution, therefore, generated scorn and fear and further 
strained free blacks’ relationship with Creole and Americans living in the Orleans territory.  
    There existed an equally, if not more, significant dimension to white Louisianans’ growing 
disdain for free blacks.  At first glance it would seem that white and black Louisianans faced the 
same struggle.  Both had to negotiate with American lawmakers to maintain their colonial heritage 
and receive the benefits of American citizenship.  In actuality, whites attempted to secure American 
acceptance by reinforcing white supremacy and Americans’ racial hierarchy.  Thus to make their 
claims of citizenship more legitimate, white Creoles disassociated themselves from free people of 
color.  As they fought for a new territorial government, white Louisianans feared that libres would 
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only hinder their efforts since most Americans refused to accept the special status of Louisiana’s 
free people of color.53   
    As libres attempted to negotiate with territorial and Washington lawmakers, they also had to 
combat white Louisianans who sought to alienate them.  At every turn, libres faced suspicions and 
scrutiny.  In the Louisiana Gazette, one angry citizen called the “Louisianan” criticized Claiborne for 
his haste in organizing the Free Color Battalion and for presenting it with a standard similar to that 
of white units.  Although this disgruntled citizen was disturbed that Claiborne would put black 
troops on equal footing with whites, he seemed even more upset at the prospect of armed free 
blacks parading in the streets. 54  Slave insurrections also provided white Louisianans opportunities 
to depict libres as a dangerous lot.  In September 1805, a slave named Celestin exposed a plot 
orchestrated by a recent white immigrant from St. Domingue named Le Grand.  Celestin produced 
Le Grand’s writings outlining his malicious scheme to use blacks to overtake New Orleans.  What 
was particularly damaging about this rumored insurrection is that Celestin implicated several 
prominent free people of color who served as Le Grand’s agents.  This incident only further 
supported white fears.  New Orleans mayor John Watkins, for instance, believed Le Grand’s plot 
proved that all free blacks were “political enemies.”55  Creoles failed to see free blacks as fellow 
countrymen in a common struggle against the new American government, but rather as foes and 
potential threats.   
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     55 John Watkins to Secretary Graham, 6 September 1805, Territorial Papers, IX: 500-504.  Louisianans seemed to 
been constantly concerned with free black and slave activity.  In September 1804, concerned citizens sent a letter to 
Governor Claiborne regarding a slave insurrection uncovered on the plantation of Michael Fortier.  They used this 
failed revolt to urge Claiborne to set up a new special court to prosecute slaves and to increase security throughout 
New Orleans and adjoining areas. See also Petition of the Inhabitants & colonists of Louisiana, 17 September 1804, 
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    White Louisianans’ paranoia soon spilled over into the policies of the territorial legislature.  As 
early as October 1804, the Free Color Battalion was in danger as officials failed to mention it in the 
new militia law.  This neglect continued when the Legislative Council reorganized the territorial 
militia in 1805.  As council members created twenty-four new militia districts, they failed to include 
the free black corps.56  In this same year, Claiborne surveyed the new territorial militia, giving it 
positive marks.57  However, neither the Legislative Council nor Claiborne made any mention of the 
Free Color Battalion in this evaluation.  In 1806, festivities celebrating the anniversary of the 
Louisiana Purchase and the Fourth of July featured territorial militia units.  They paraded in the 
Place d’ Armes in front of government officials and New Orleans residents.  Ignored again, the 
Free Colored Battalion was not even invited to participate.58  For nearly two years the Free Color 
Battalion only existed in name, as territorial officials deactivated it by omission.   
    Besides neglecting the Free Color Battalion, territorial officials also sought to circumscribe the 
place of free blacks in territorial New Orleans with a new black code.  The Black Code of 1806 in 
many respects resembled the Code Noir, outlining certain white responsibilities and restricting the 
activities of slaves.  Concomitantly, the new code redefined the racial landscape of territorial 
Louisiana by specifically addressing the status of free people of color.  It required any libre carrying 
a weapon to produce papers proving his freedom.  This particular stipulation certainly demeaned 
black militiamen accustomed to having their own guns.  The last section of the Black Code, 
however, struck the hardest blow to the libre community, stating that “free people of color ought 
never to insult or strike white people, nor presume, to conceive themselves equal to whites; but on 
                                                 
     56 Louisiana Gazette 7, 11, 14 June 1805. 
     57 William C.C Claiborne to James Madison, 11 November 1805, Territorial Papers, IX: 592. 
     58 Louisiana Gazette, 2 May 1806 and 17 June 1806.   
 195 
the contrary that they ought to yield to them in every occasion, and never speak or answer to them 
but with respect, under penalty of imprisonment according to the nature of the offense.”59   This 
particular statement is what made the new 1806 Black Code quite different than its colonial 
counterpart.  The Code Noir clearly limited slaves and solidified white supremacy, yet it always 
remained flexible as colonial realities necessitated.  The Black Code of 1806 was quite clear—no 
longer did the demands of the wilderness or population concerns make slaves and free people of 
color valuable members of the community.  Rather the Code stressed the absolute subordination of 
slaves and free blacks that engendered a clear racial barrier between black and white.  More 
importantly, the new Code lacked a blanket statement promising free people of color the enjoyment 
of all rights and privileges as citizens.  Ultimately, the new Black Code urged free blacks to accept 
that their status mirrored that of a slave rather than a white citizen. 60   
    Despite mounting pressure from the legislature and white Louisianans, Claiborne failed to 
permanently abandon the Free Color Battalion.  Like so many Louisianans, Claiborne feared free 
people of color and their possible interaction with slaves.  As early as 1804, he admitted to James 
Madison that “at some future period, this quarter of the Union must (I fear) experience in some 
degree, the Misfortunes of St. Domingo, and that period will be hastened if the people should be 
indulged by congress with a continuance of the African Trade.”  Claiborne clung to the belief that 
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have free black immigrants diverted to other places.   
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free people of color could be even more dangerous if ostracized by territorial officials and white 
Louisianans.  “I remembered that the events which have Spread blood and desolation in St. 
Domingo,” Claiborne warned, “originated in a dispute between the white and Mulatto inhabitants, 
and that the too rigid treatment of the former, induced the Latter to seek support and assistance of 
the Negroes.” 61  As white Louisianans and legislators ignored free blacks’ demands, Claiborne 
continued to invoke a delicate approach.  He hoped to give libres some concessions to keep them 
happy, yet always mindful of white concerns and resentment.  One dispensation he hoped to make 
to free blacks was the continuation of the free black battalion.   
    By 1807, Claiborne made efforts to reorganize the black militia and gave orders for military 
officials to ascertain the number of free men of color in the territory.62  This particular request fits 
into Claiborne’s larger concerns regarding the general state of the territorial militia.   Following the 
militia reorganization act in August of 1805, Claiborne still believed the territorial militia remained 
“greatly defective.”  He seemed particularly concerned about the scarcity of arms and the lack of 
discipline among militiamen.  Inadequate numbers and poor organization contributed to Claiborne’s 
concerns that the militia had “hardly sufficient strength to ensure internal tranquility should foreign 
intrigue give motion to the disaffected.” 63  External threats proved just as troublesome as American 
relations with France and Great Britain deteriorated.  Although President Jefferson initially abated 
conflict with the unpopular Embargo Act, many believed that war was imminent and Americans 
                                                 
     61 Claiborne to Madison, 12 July 1804, Letter Books, II: 244-245.   
     62 Claiborne to Madison, 8 January 1804, Territorial Papers, IX: 561.   
     63 Claiborne to the Two Houses of the Assembly, 13 January 1807, Letter Books, IV: 92-93.  See also Carter, 
Territorial Papers, IX: 558, 717.   
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needed to be ready.64  Nowhere was this readiness more vital than in Louisiana.  Fearing that a 
war would open the door to foreign intrigue from the British or even the Spanish, many believed 
that Louisiana’s security affected the nation’s safety.   
   Exploiting this precarious situation, Claiborne hoped to kill two birds with one stone by using free 
black troops to strengthen the territory’s deficient military.  He urged lawmakers to consider 
recognizing and using the free black battalion with the regular militia.65  The territorial House of 
Representatives agreed to “give to the Battalion of free men of Color the activity which their zeal 
solicits.”66  National security brought renewed interest in the free black corps and temporarily 
circumvented white fears of libre troops.  Yet despite the international situation and assurances of 
activating the black militia, the Legislative Council failed to recognize the free black battalion in any 
militia laws passed during the territorial period.   
**** 
    Despite Claiborne’s efforts and a few empty promises, the milicia de color existed only in name 
and in the memories of free people of color.  Year after year, the black corps remained absent from 
territorial laws and debates.  Concomitantly, free blacks dealt with a changing racial environment 
as the new Black Code and white hostility marginalized them.  The territorial period posed an 
important crossroads for free blacks.  Severely handicapped by American policies and racism, free 
blacks were forced to find ways to combat such obstacles to preserve their colonial heritage and 
                                                 
     64 As early as January 12, 1807, the Louisiana Gazette speculated that war with Great Britain was imminent.  
Throughout 1807 and 1808, the Gazette was filled with articles discussing the possibility of war with Great Britain.  See 
Louisiana Gazette, 27 November 1807, 20 May 1808.  Many disparaged the Embargo and advocated war as a way to 
alleviate the Embargo’s financial burden.  See Louisiana Gazette, 30 August 1808, 20 September 1808, 1 November 
1808.  
 
     65 Louisiana Gazette, 12 January 1807. Claiborne also read and circulated a message sent to him by a prominent 
free person of color who offered libre military assistance. 
 
     66 From House of Representatives, 26 Jan. 26 1807, Letter Books, IV: 113.   
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rights.  Noel Carrier Jr. and many other libres continued to use the strategies invoked by their 
parents to secure citizenship.   
    In the colonial era, libres fostered an open dialogue with Spanish authorities to secure military 
privileges, pensions, and concessions for the libre community at large.  Hoping to achieve similar 
success, territorial libres attempted to maintain communication with government officials as 
illustrated by the “Address from the Free People of Color.”  Besides asserting their citizenship, this 
address also revealed the leaders of the territorial libre community.  Among the fifty-four petitioners 
were officers in the Spanish milicia de color including Captain Charles Simon and Lieutenant Pierre 
Bailly.  In addition to this older breed of libre leaders, a new generation of free black crusaders 
emerged.  Many of them were the sons and relatives of former colonial soldiers.  Luis Simon, who 
signed his name first to the “Address from the Free People of Color,” was related to not only 
Charles Simon but also Pedro Simon, the first black commanding officer of the milicia de color.  
Pierre Bailly Jr. joined his father in submitting the address, undoubtedly inheriting his father’s 
fighting spirit.  As the Simon and Bailly names invoked the legacy of the chosen men of color, new 
names such as Populus, Fortier, Hardy, and Poree all appeared on the address and introduced the 
next generation of libre leaders.  These men joined with old breed libres and their relatives to 
preserve free blacks’ rights.  Over the course of the territorial period, these young men formed 
important business partnerships, initiated further political protest, demanded militia service, and 
later fought in the Battle of New Orleans.67   
    As many libre leaders resorted to political activism, some took more extreme measures.  In 
1806, Stephen, a free black man, informed Governor Claiborne of a possible black revolt.  He 
                                                 
     
67
 Address From the Free People of Color, January 1804, Territorial Papers, IX: 174-175, Hanger, Bounded Lives, 
Bounded Places, 130-131, McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 35. 
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claimed that libres harbored “hostile intentions” and met nightly making preparations to assist the 
Spanish in overtaking Louisiana.  Stephen explained that former Spanish governor Marquis Casa 
Calvo planned to return with three or four thousand troops to join free blacks in implementing the 
massacre.  Stephen implicated several prominent free men of color including Francisco Dorville 
and Carlos Brule, both officers in the Spanish milicia de color.  The validity of Stephen’s sworn 
statement is uncertain, however, Governor Claiborne took precautionary measures ordering militia 
companies on guard every night for several months.  Although a libre/Spanish revolt failed to 
materialize, it appears that many free blacks resented new territorial policies.  Dorville, for example, 
wore a Spanish cockade at all times and continued to sign his name followed by the title 
“Commander of the mulattoes during the time of Spanish domination.”68  Dorville’s frustration with 
the American government could certainly explain his public display of loyalty to Spain and perhaps 
drove him and other chosen men of color to contemplate a possible revolt.   
    While libres attempted to negotiate with American lawmakers, they also relied on kinship 
networks to strengthen their community cohesion.  Utilizing tactics employed by their parents, 
libres continued to look to godparenthood and marriage to foster vital links amongst each other and 
to white society.  Free blacks still relied on former military leaders to witnesses their marriages and 
baptisms.  Francisco Dorville spent much of his time in St. Louis Cathedral.  Between 1803 and 
1810 (the year of his death), he witnessed seven libre unions.  In March 1804, both he and Noel 
Carrier Sr. witnessed the marriage of Captain Carlos Brule’s daughter.  Dorville and other former 
free black officers such as Pedro Claver and Brule continued to serve as godfathers for libre 
                                                 
     68 McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 42.  See also Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic 
Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Volume 8.  When Noel Carrier Jr. died his death record from St. Louis 
Cathedral listed him as the “commandant of the Negro militia of this city in the time of Spanish rule.”  In many records 
former members of the milicia de color continued to showcase their military service.   
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children, illustrating that within the libre community old military officers, although ignored by 
American officials, remained prominent men.69     
    The selection of witnesses and godparents also reveals that many libres began turning to the 
younger generation of black leaders.  In 1808, Vincent Populus asked not only his three brothers, 
but also Luis Simon to witness his daughter’s wedding.  Simon also was godfather to one of Pierre 
Bailly’s sons.  Several years later, Simon returned the favor by asking Bailly to sponsor his 
daughter Melania.  Through religious sacraments, the emerging leaders of the black community 
forged fictive kinship bonds that spilled over into their public and military activities.70   
   Libres also continued to use godparenthood to strengthen real family ties.  Brothers Francisco 
and Juan Bautista Dauphin chose immediate family members to sponsor all of their children.  In 
1811 alone, they served as godfathers to each other’s children.  Free blacks also tried to maintain 
preexisting family bonds.  Basilo Montreuil, for instance, asked Marianne Carrier to witness his 
nuptials, sealing the connection between the two families that had existed for nearly three 
generations.  In a hostile racial environment the family served as a safe haven from the harsher 
realties of the new American regime.71             
    Although territorial libres often relied on black godparents more than their colonial counterparts, 
many did not abandon hope that white godparents were still advantageous.  A glance at territorial 
marriage and birth records indicates that Antonio Xerez witnessed many free black marriages and 
baptisms.  Xerez’s family came to New Orleans from the Canary Islands years before he was born.  
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 Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Volume 7, 8, 9, 10.  
Francisco Dorville died in November 1810 at the age of 66.  
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 Sacramental Records of the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Volume 9, 10.   
 
     71 Ibid., Volume 8.    
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Although his occupation and status are unknown, it is certain that Antonio was a white man.  
Between 1812 and 1814, Xerez witnessed four libre baptisms.  He also witnessed several 
marriages including the union of Carlos Brule’s daughter to emerging black leader Nobert Fortier.  
Brule, a former Spanish officer and prominent libre, could have asked many other people, yet 
Xerez was in attendance.  Many libres must have seen him as an important link to white society 
through either his occupation, status, or just the color of his skin.  Other white Louisianans agreed 
to witness libre sacraments.  Noel Dupuy, a white officer in the United States military, served as 
godfather to Antonio Foucher’s son Noel.  Foucher also made Elisabeth Cap-Grand the young 
boy’s godmother.  A landowner in St. Domingue, Cap-Grand possibly was a white relative of 
Foucher’s wife, also from Port-au-Prince.  This choice reveals that Foucher hoped the good 
fortunes of his wife’s white kin could bestow rewards to his son and other children.72  Perhaps the 
most interesting godparent selection came from Jose Terencio LeBlanc for his son Henrique.  
Although he came from a large libre family, Jose chose Henrique St. Geme to be his son’s 
godfather.  St. Geme was the brother of Louis XVI and made his way to New Orleans when the 
French were expelled from Haiti.  Upon his arrival he bought a sugar plantation and served in the 
Louisiana militia commanding the elite fighting force known as the Dragons of Pied.73  Terencio 
chose a white man of great prominence as his son’s godfather in hopes of having a white ally 
against the American government.   
                                                 
     72 Ibid., Volume 10, 11.  Although many white clergymen were present for libre sacraments, it is clear that Xerez 
was not a member of the clergy.   
 
     73  Henri de Ste-Geme Papers, MSS 100, Historic New Orleans Collection.  As a soldier in the French Republican 
army, St. Geme made his way to St. Domingue.  When the French were expelled from Haiti he came to New Orleans.  
Later, he fought in the Battle of New Orleans and earned the name “salty little French rooster” from Andrew Jackson.  
He later returned to France but kept ties in Louisiana, leaving his plantation to his son.   
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    As free blacks cultivated real and fictive kinship networks, they also utilized the territorial legal 
apparatus to maintain their diminishing rights.  Although the Black Code sought to marginalize 
libres in New Orleans society, these laws failed to change the civil code of law which protected free 
blacks.  Libres, therefore, exploited territorial courts to protect their property and fight against other 
offenses.  Alexis Andry, a free man of color, went before the City Court to secure property he 
purchased on St. Anne Street from a free woman of color named Babel Bienvenu.  Babel sold 
Andry a home on the lot under the stipulation that she be allowed to have one chamber of the 
home for herself.  Eight months later when Andry rented out the apartment to Lewis Pareset, she 
refused to allow him to live in the home, claiming it was hers.  Andry demanded Babel pay 
damages and abide by their original agreement.74   
    Although many such cases involved disputes amongst fellow libres, the courts also helped free 
blacks fight against white Louisianans.  Alexis Andry appeared before the First Judicial Court filing 
suit against J. B. Brampin, a white man he hired to do upkeep on a house located in the Faubourg 
Marginary.  Andry believed that Brampin failed to meet the stipulations of their agreement and 
sought monetary damages.75  These court cases reveal that many libres continued to uphold their 
legal rights despite their military and political alienation.  Furthermore, free blacks’ legal activities 
illustrate that, much like their colonial counterparts, they owned and accumulated property and 
established thriving businesses.   
    Libres continued to support the New Orleans commercial sector as artisans.   In many cases 
they carried on the family business.  Noel Carrier Jr. worked as a cooper just like his father.  Also 
many libre relatives worked together in profitable partnerships.  Maurice, Juan Baptiste, and 
                                                 
     74 New Orleans City Court Case 1594, 27 April 27 1809, City Archives Collection, New Orleans Public Library.     
     75 First Judicial Court of Orleans Parish, Case 951 and 419, March 1814, 1816, City Archives Collection.        
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Vincent Populus were all shoemakers, while their brother Bathelemy worked as a tailor.  When 
they were not signing addresses to the governor, the Hardy brothers Jacque and Joachim worked 
as a shoemaker and a butcher.  Many of the emerging free black leaders supplied New Orleans 
with skilled labor as carpenters, blacksmiths, and woodcarvers.76   
    Along with setting up businesses throughout the city, many libres continued to accumulate 
considerable property and slaves.  At the time of his death, Noel Carrier Jr. owned five different city 
lots and nine slaves with an estimated worth of $17,000.  His younger brother Balthazar also 
owned several adjacent properties, demonstrating that families often pooled their resources to yield 
maximum profits. 77  Pedro Claver possessed property throughout the city, including a lot located 
between Burgundy and St. Louis Street valued at $1800.  He also owned at least one slave which 
he bequeathed to his daughter upon his death.  Francisco Poree’s inventory demonstrates that 
wealth went beyond slaves and land.  Among his possessions, Poree had tables, chairs, a liquor 
stand, armoire, candlesticks, and a looking glass.  Poree also owned tools valued at $290.97.  Free 
blacks used their skills as master craftsmen to accumulate property throughout New Orleans.  
Such properties provided them a higher standard of living, but also allowed them to mingle with 
whites in city streets and neighborhoods.78   
    In many ways free black strategies had one underlying purpose: to bolster claims of black 
citizenship.  The lynchpin to their methods rested on proving that they had more in common with 
whites than slaves.  Choosing black colonial officers to witness their sacraments, for instance, 
                                                 
     76 Albert J. Robichaux Jr., Civil Registration of Orleans Parish Births, Marriages, and Deaths: 1790-1833  (Rayne 
Louisiana: Herbert Publications, 2000), 406, 669-671.  This collection of records provides ample evidence that libres 
continued to make up a large portion of New Orleans’ artisans.  See also Probate Records, City Archives Collection.      
 
     77 Probate Records Orleans Parish, City Archives Collection.   
     78 Robichaux., Civil Registration of Orleans Parish Births, Marriages, and Deaths; See also New Orleans in 1805.   
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showcased that many libres had military distinctions that even white citizens did not possess.  
Their ownership of businesses and real estate allowed libres to accumulate wealth promoting 
lifestyles similar to their white counterparts.  Their role as slaveholders made them facilitators of 
the institution of slavery and white solidarity.  Throughout the territorial period, free blacks 
employed any means necessary to differentiate themselves from slaves and to prove that their 
activities, wealth, and loyalty mattered more than their skin color.   
    Perhaps no event reinforced free black claims of citizenship more than Louisiana’s most 
widespread and destructive slave insurrection.  In January 1811, slaves on the plantation of 
Colonel Manuel Andry revolted, wounding the colonel and killing his son.  Several hundred slaves 
left the Andry plantation and headed towards New Orleans about forty miles away.  As they made 
their trek to the city they recruited other slaves and destroyed everything in their path.  When news 
of the insurrection made its way to Governor Claiborne he detached two New Orleans volunteer 
units led by General Wade Hampton.  Fearful that the insurrection would reach New Orleans, 
Claiborne put all militia units under arms including the Free Color Battalion.  Hampton met the 
slave army at Fortier’s sugar works eighteen miles outside New Orleans.  There his forces, along 
with reinforcements sent from Baton Rouge, subdued the slaves, killing their leaders and detaining 
the rebels for trial. 79  As New Orleanians rejoiced at the successful suppression of the slave revolt, 
many praised the efforts of black militiamen who, despite being neglected for nearly seven years, 
showed great military prowess in the face of danger.  Claiborne applauded libres for their “zeal for 
public safety” and their “great exactitude and propriety.”  Almost a month later, Claiborne presented 
the Legislative Assembly with a message signed by prominent white Louisianans “bearing 
                                                 
     79 Claiborne to Secretary of State, 14, January 1811, Letter Books, V: 100. See also McConnell, Negro Troops of 
Antebellum Louisiana, 49-50.     
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testimony to the good conduct of certain free men of color during the late Insurrection, and 
recommending them to the favorable attention of the Legislature.”80   
    Free people of color gained attention for their bravery and their willingness to protect New 
Orleans.  More importantly, free blacks hoped that loyal conduct would trump the race card.  By 
siding with white Louisianans against slaves hoping to secure freedom, free blacks validated the 
institution of slavery while disassociating themselves from slaves.  Libres owned property, received 
sacraments, worked hard, and fought gallantly just like white Louisianans.  Their strategies of 
negotiation sought to transcend race and expose libres as viable and necessary citizens of the 
United States.  
**** 
    In 1811, Noel Carrier Jr. could be assured that his father would have been proud of him.  He 
established a successful business, owned real estate and slaves, took care of his family, and 
volunteered for military service.  In many ways he followed in his father’s footsteps.  Yet much had 
changed in New Orleans that dictated many of the contours of the younger Carrier’s life.  Where 
his father received military accolades from a grateful Spanish Crown, Noel Jr. belonged to a black 
militia that existed only in name.  Where his father voiced his concerns and opinions to an open 
government, Noel’s political expressions were often described as “reprehensible.”  Where his 
father lived in a unique racial society where libres assumed a vital role, Noel faced disdain and 
resentment from white Creoles and Americans who deemed him more like a slave than a citizen.   
    Despite such obstacles, Noel Jr. and other libres continued to fight and negotiate with American 
lawmakers, unwilling to relinquish the rights and privileges their ancestors enjoyed.  With every 
                                                 
     80 Message to Gentlemen of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives, 25 February 1811, Letter Books 
V: 163.   
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policy, decree, and territorial law, libres hoped to combat marginalization by employing strategies 
once used by their parents.  These efforts allowed territorial libres to build even stronger kinship 
bonds as well as a community centered on survival.  Also by invoking the legacy of their fathers, 
free blacks hoped to legitimize their claims for citizenship as Americans fumbled to define a class 
of people that had little place in their rigid racial hierarchy.  
    At times, free blacks had little control over their precarious fate.  American lawmakers viewed 
and treated libres much differently than their colonial counterparts.  Although French and Spanish 
authorities sought to establish a clear racial divide through policies such as the Code Noir, 
necessity often bent the confines of such racial restrictions.  Under the American regime, however, 
this necessity had largely diminished, making free blacks seem less important for the territory’s 
survival.  Americans delicately negotiated with free blacks hoping to make them loyal subjects 
especially in the face of foreign invasion and possible slave insurrections.  As lawmakers remained 
careful not to upset the racial balance in favor of free blacks, most territorial policies failed to 
protect libres’ colonial rights.  In many ways, free blacks maintained aspects of their colonial status 
because Americans feared them rather than accepted them.   
    As a war with Great Britain approached, necessity once again required libres to stand up and 
fight just like their fathers.  Libre strategies of negotiation sustained free blacks during the territorial 
period, but ultimately it would be their efforts on the field of battle that would provide them the 
opportunity to secure more of the benefits of American citizenship.  Wartime necessity would allow 
Noel Carrier Jr. and many libres to become themselves “chosen men of color” and to temporarily 
challenge Louisiana’s unique racial hierarchy.   
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Chapter Six:  “Applause of an admiring nation”:  Louisianans’ Battle for Acceptance and 
Citizenship 
 
    On January 23, 1815, Pierre-Joseph Favrot arrived at the Place d’ Armes to find a triumphal 
arch placed in front of St. Louis Cathedral.  Lining the path from the arch to the cathedral stood 
young girls each representing an American state or territory.  General Andrew Jackson and several 
of his men walked under the arch as two children representing Louisiana placed a laurel crown on 
his head.  As jubilant music played in the distance, children threw flowers at the general’s feet.1  
After weeks of uneasiness and constant preparation, Louisianans finally felt safe enough to 
celebrate their stellar victory at the Battle of New Orleans.  For Pierre-Joseph, it was a pleasant 
relief from the rigors of his new political position.  From the moment he arrived in New Orleans in 
December 1814 to take his legislative seat, the Creole father and one-time Spanish solider worked 
feverishly to procure weapons and fortify city defenses against a British invasion.  He also 
maintained constant contact with his wife and children in West Baton Rouge in addition to 
monitoring the whereabouts of his sons Louis and Philogene fighting under the American flag.  Yet 
on this morning he simply enjoyed the festivities and took time to reflect upon the importance of the 
ceremony and what the recent Battle of New Orleans meant to him.  For Pierre-Joseph and so 
many Louisianans, this event at the Place d’ Armes marked the end of a battle that took much 
longer then the engagement at Chalmette.  For on this day, the state of Louisiana, much like the 
girls lining the triumphal arch, stood alongside other American states as a received member of the 
Union. 
                                                 
     1 Major A. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815  (1816; reprint, 
Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1964), 199; Pierre-Joseph Favrot to Marie-Francoise Gerard Favrot, 21, 
January 1815, The Favrot Family Paper, V: 261;  Robert V. Remini, The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew Jackson and 
American’s First Military Victory (New York: Viking, 1999), 187-188.   
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    The Battle of New Orleans still holds a secure place in America’s historical memory.  Historians 
continue to examine aspects of the battle ranging from military strategy to the social implications of 
the American victory.  The Battle of New Orleans, however, has also been the subject of folklore, 
where actual facts often become blurred with myth.  According to historian Carol Reardon, memory 
often determines what one considers truth or history.  Reardon contends that commonly held 
values, traditions, hopes, and fears are all embedded in how and what people remember.2  What 
one considers truth is influenced by societal mores and individual ideology.  Americans filtered the 
Battle of New Orleans through their own personal and national aspirations.  In the context of the 
War of 1812, the victory at Chalmette became synonymous with the success of the citizen-soldier.  
Americans had long wrestled over the appropriate form of national defense that could provide vital 
protection without threatening civil liberties.  Throughout the Revolutionary War and the early 
national period, however, militiamen proved an unreliable and inconsistent form of national 
defense.  In Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812, C. Edward Skeen finds the same militia inactivity 
during the War of 1812.  States initially failed to meet national quotas, while many militia units were 
poorly organized and unfit for war.3  These shortcomings were easily forgotten after the Battle of 
New Orleans.  Soon victorious militiamen were revered in songs and poems.  The “Hunters of 
Kentucky,” a song by Samuel Woodward M. Ludlow, exemplifies the postwar image of the militia.  
As the lyrics praised the noble efforts of Kentucky riflemen who defeated British professionals, it 
also celebrated the virtues of the American citizen-soldier.  For many Americans, the service of 
farmers who left their homes to defend New Orleans reaffirmed their faith in republicanism.4  
                                                 
     2 Carol Reardon, Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 3. 
 
     3 C. Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812  (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999).  
Skeen mentions militia insubordination throughout the book.    
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“Hunters of Kentucky” also downplayed the dismal militia defeats that were commonplace during 
the War of 1812.  This symbolism attached to the Battle of New Orleans reflected early Americans’ 
faith in the militia over a standing army and the merits of republican virtue.   
    Another byproduct of the Battle of New Orleans, according to the work of John William Ward, 
was the formation of a national exceptionalism.  Borrowing ideas from colonial Puritanism, 
Americans believed that they were God’s chosen people.  Many looked at the victory at Chalmette 
as divine intervention.5  According to congressman George McIntosh Troup, “The God of Battles 
and of Righteousness took part with the defenders of their country, and the foes were scattered 
bare before us as chaff before the wind.”6  Americans saw British defeat as an indication that God 
ordained them with His protection and blessing.  An integral element to this spiritual myth was 
General Andrew Jackson, who many believed served as God’s earthly agent.  Ward contends that 
Jackson’s heroism in the War of 1812 caused Americans to equate him with God himself and 
declare him the savior of Louisiana.7  This exalted image of Jackson largely conditioned his public 
image and has often colored historical interpretations of him since.  Indeed, historians continue to 
cite Jackson’s transcendent character as the major reason behind the victory at Chalmette and the 
main reason why Louisianans fought with him.   
    In 1816, Major A. Lacarriere Latour, a French engineer who accompanied Jackson on his Mobile 
and New Orleans campaigns, published his memoir providing one of the first accounts of the 
historic battle.  Although his work is a valuable source in understanding the day to day operations 
                                                                                                                                                 
    4 John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 9, 20. 
 
    5 Ibid, 108. 
 
    6 Annals of Congress, 13th Congress, 3rd sess., 1156.   
 
    7 Louisiana Gazette, 6 July 1815.   
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within Jackson’s ranks, it at times inaccurately characterizes Louisianans’ wartime mobilization and 
motivation.  Latour insists that Jackson’s mere presence was the main reason Louisiana’s diverse 
population fought, arguing that “love of country, the hatred of England … fire every heart; -but all 
this would have availed nothing without the energy of the commander-in-chief:”  Furthermore, he 
argued that Jackson’s charisma and military expertise inspired confidence among Louisianans.8   
    Many historians continue to ape Latour’s conclusions.  In The British at the Gates, Robin Reilly 
contends that the prewar, chaotic state of New Orleans could only be remedied by Jackson’s 
presence, claiming his “boundless energy, apparent confidence, and his ruthless removal of 
obstacles” demanded respect and subordination of the disunited Louisiana populace.9  According 
to Samuel Carter in Blaze of Glory, Jackson’s “authoritative presence, his bold assurance infected 
the people with a spirit of self-confidence that they badly needed.”  Carter goes on to argue that 
Jackson seemed to have a mystical power to unite Louisianans, asserting that “the jealousies and 
suspicions, the cantankerous disputes, began to wain before a common leader and a common 
purpose.”10  These few examples of the historical literature demonstrate that Latour’s interpretation 
left a lasting imprint on historical memory.  Unfortunately, this memory and interpretation are highly 
selective and leave many pieces of the story untold.     
    Jackson’s arrival in New Orleans on December 1, 1814 certainly catalyzed the mobilization 
efforts already prompted by Louisiana Governor William C.C. Claiborne.  Historians, however, have 
treated this too simplistically.  They depict Jackson riding into New Orleans and soothing the ethnic 
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tensions and political disputes that had plagued Louisiana for years.  This popular image overlooks 
what really motivated Louisianans to fight and follow Jackson.  To ignore this crucial aspect of 
wartime mobilization is to neglect the history of the Orleans Territory marked by Louisianans’ 
ongoing struggle for incorporation and American acceptance.   
    The diverse ethnic composition of the territory rendered it foreign to many Americans outside of 
Louisiana and engendered questions about its loyalty and attachment to the Union.  Statehood in 
1812 failed to dispel such doubts.  As an invasion of New Orleans seemed imminent, Americans 
continued to cast dubious glances at their newest countrymen.  For Louisiana militiamen, their 
obligation as citizen-soldiers went much further than the expectations placed on their neighbors in 
Tennessee or New York: They became emblematic of the state as a whole.  Their actions or 
inactions appeared as indicators of the extent of all Louisianans’ allegiance.  American 
apprehensions regarding Louisianans’ loyalty made wartime mobilization and the Battle of New 
Orleans a crucial event representing Louisianans’ final strategy of negotiation and a true 
demonstration of their attachment.   
    As Pierre-Joseph and other Louisianans celebrated victory at the Place d’ Armes, Louisiana 
representative Thomas B. Robertson stood before Congress to convey the impact the war’s final 
engagement had on his constituents.  He proudly professed that in the Battle of New Orleans 
Louisianans displayed “a zeal, a patriotism … which command the applause of an admiring nation.”  
In addition, he argued that Louisiana militiamen’s gallant efforts not only defeated British forces, 
but dispelled suspicions “derogatory to the history of Louisiana.”11  After years of professing their 
affection, resisting unfavorable policies, and cooperating with lawmakers, it was Louisianans’ 
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sacrifice on the battlefield that showed they were true Americans.  From New Orleans to the floor 
of Congress, Louisianans celebrated their victory at Chalmette and the end of their long-fought 
battle for acceptance.   
**** 
    In February 1809, Julien Poydras rode on horseback from his home in Pointe Coupee, Louisiana 
to Washington D.C. to take his seat in Congress.  The long journey provided him ample time to 
think about affairs at home, but more importantly his new government position.  Poydras looked 
forward to the opportunity to serve his fellow Louisianans and hoped that he could enhance his 
constituents’ relationship with Washington lawmakers.  He also made it his top priority to convince 
fellow congressional members to approve Louisiana’s admission into the Union.12  Despite their 
failed attempt in 1809, Louisianans reapplied for statehood in March 1810.  Although the territory’s 
population failed to meet the required 60,000 inhabitants needed for statehood, Louisianans 
begged Congress to grant them special concessions as it did when it “erected in 1802, the territory 
of Ohio into a State, long before it possessed the number of inhabitants required by the [1787 
Northwest] Ordinance.”13  Due to a congressional recess, Poydras did not introduce Louisianans’ 
petition to the House until December 17, 1810.  At this time he happily reported that since the 
petition was submitted in March, the Orleans Territory had reached the 60,000 residents needed 
for statehood.14  To Poydras, nothing ought to prevent Congress from admitting Louisiana into the 
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Union.  He soon found, however, that residency requirements were the last concern on lawmakers’ 
minds and many of them had yet to shake their initial perceptions of Louisianans.  Representatives 
continued to question if Louisianans had learned republican principles or fostered the needed 
bonds of attachment to the United States.   
    These debates also revived many constitutional questions regarding statehood and the durability 
of the infant nation.  Massachusetts Representative Laban Wheaton strongly opposed granting 
Louisianans statehood, believing that the Constitution prohibited the admission of a territory not 
included “within the limits of the United States when the Constitution was established.”15  John 
Quincy Adams continued to express fears regarding the detrimental effect Louisiana statehood 
would have on the political and economic power of the old Northeastern states.  As he did in the 
Eighth Congress, Adams attempted to use the Constitution as a tool to block Louisiana’s 
admission, claiming that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to admit new states into the 
Union.  Failure of congressional leaders to adhere to the confines of the country’s most sacred 
document, Adams predicted, would be “a death-blow to the constitution.”16  Federalists continued 
their crusade against Louisiana which they still viewed as the agent of their demise.  In refutation, 
Maryland Republican Robert Wright believed that Louisiana statehood did nothing to undermine 
the Federal Constitution, arguing that Article IV, Section III allowed Congress to not only admit new 
states, but also to make needed regulations for American territories.  Wright considered statehood 
as one such regulation.  He also countered earlier arguments against extending the original 
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borders of the United States, contending that the United States already exceeded its original 
boundaries when it admitted Vermont into the Union.17   
    Beyond constitutional matters, congressional leaders seemed concerned whether Louisiana’s 
diverse population had cultivated the political expertise needed to run a state government.  Virginia 
Representative Daniel Sheffey argued that Louisianans needed more time to ensure that they truly 
understood the republican system, urging congressional members to “let them become 
accustomed to our Government, before permitting those to govern themselves who had lately 
emerged from despotism.”18  Others expressed apprehensions over whether Louisianans were 
loyal and had formed the necessary bonds of attachment.  To Tennessee Representative Pleasant 
Miller, it seemed doubtful that Louisiana’s foreign population would ever sever ties to France.  “I 
was born in Virginia, sir, and I have not yet lost some of my Virginia feelings,” Miller admitted, “and 
I cannot see why we should expect the people of Orleans to act and feel differently from other 
people… they [inhabitants] will have some attachments.”19  Washington representatives such as 
Miller continued to view Louisianans as adopted Frenchmen who had yet to undergo the proper 
Americanization process.  Yet several lawmakers came to Louisianans’ defense, arguing that the 
conversation of attachment proved their readiness for statehood.  North Carolinian Nathaniel 
Macon scolded his fellow lawmakers for depriving Louisianans statehood, claiming that they had 
“already served a sufficient apprenticeship to the United States.”  Macon also contended that 
Louisianans had shown their attachment in repelling a Spanish invasion in 1806, as well as by 
remaining loyal during the Burr Conspiracy.  These acts of affection, to Macon, proved that 
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Louisianans “possessed certainly as strong an attachment to the nation as could be expected for 
the time they had belonged to it.”20  
    The Louisiana statehood bill underwent several revisions in both the Senate and the House 
before receiving final approval in February 1811.  At this time, Congress passed the Enabling Act 
which authorized Louisianans to select delegates to prepare a state constitution.  In addition, the 
act required Louisianans to include certain provisions in their new constitution such as making 
English the official language in government and legal proceedings.21   
    The debates in the Eleventh Congress demonstrate that many congressional members felt that 
Louisianans still needed more time to fulfill their apprenticeship to liberty.  Yet Washington 
lawmakers admitted Louisiana to the Union anyway.  Why?  What prompted these men to give 
statehood to a population that many still deemed politically ignorant and culturally unattached?  
Further examination reveals that American lawmakers granted Louisiana statehood not out of 
willingness, but rather out of necessity.   
    The port of New Orleans had become one of the most prominent in North America.  To secure 
its advantages, American lawmakers needed to align Louisianans’ economic interests with those of 
the United States.  The territory’s close proximity to Spanish Texas and Florida also made it quite 
vulnerable to foreign invasion.  Concomitantly, the territory’s diverse population theoretically made 
intrigues by European powers more likely.  In the event of a war, the British could use Louisiana’s 
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population to strike a destructive blow to the United States.  Congressional leaders recognized 
these important realities.  Mississippi delegate George Poindexter saw Louisiana’s economic and 
geographic position as vital to the well-being of the republic since New Orleans commanded “the 
mouth of the Mississippi and Mobile River” and controlled the outlets of western commerce.  Also 
Poindexter looked to Louisiana as a needed buffer between the Spanish and the western states of 
the Union such as Kentucky and Tennessee.  To ensure that Louisianans protected both the 
economic and domestic safety of the country, he believed that Orleans inhabitants needed 
incentives and reciprocal bonds of attachment between them and their American brethren.  These 
bonds, he argued, would encourage “the deep interest of the people … and stimulate them to repel 
at every hazard an attempt to disturb that intercourse.”  In essence, Poindexter contended that 
statehood would seal Louisianans’ loyalty and affection to the United States.22  Representative 
John Rhea reiterated Poindexter’s assertions.  He argued that the Orleans Territory’s proximity to 
foreign territory, as well as the danger of a possible war with England, made it extremely 
susceptible to invasion.  To strengthen its ties and loyalty to the United States, Congress needed to 
provide Louisianans with “all the rights of freemen and citizens, to the full extent of the term to 
uphold and defend.”  According to Rhea, these privileges were the only sure way to secure 
Louisianans’ loyalty against foreign invasion.  He avowed, “you will make them warriors indeed, 
they will fight for themselves and for the United States if invaded, because they will then have 
everything worth contending for, their grateful hearts with irresistible vigor will strengthen their arms 
to wield the sword against the enemies of the United States.”23  
                                                 
    22 Annals of Congress, 11th Congress, 3rd sess., 507.  Poindexter was a Virginian who moved to the Mississippi 
Territory in 1802.  He was elected the congressional delegate for the Mississippi Territory in the Tenth, Eleventh, and 
Twelfth Congress.  Later he served as a representative for the state of Mississippi and governor from 1819-1821.  
Later in his career he would become a strong opponent of Andrew Jackson.  
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    The Eleventh Congress seemed troubled over Louisiana statehood.  Many harbored the same 
apprehensions once expressed by their predecessors in the Eighth Congress, while others 
believed statehood provided one more means to secure Louisianans’ loyalty and attachment.  
Louisianans, therefore, received statehood not because lawmakers deemed them ready to be full 
members of the Union or accepted them as countrymen, but out of necessity to keep them loyal 
and ensure they remained attached to the United States.   
    Despite congressional reservations, Louisianans welcomed statehood.  On November 4, 1811, 
forty-five delegates met at Tremolet’s Coffee House in New Orleans to draft Louisiana’s state 
constitution.  Having returned from Washington, Poydras assumed the role as president of the 
convention that included many ancient Creoles such as Noel Destrehan and Colonel Joseph 
Bellechasse.24  Creole delegates wasted little time in speaking out against the Enabling Act.  
Destrehan bewailed the provision that made English the official language of the Louisiana 
government.  He also deplored other aspects of the bill that he believed undermined Louisianans’ 
French identity.  Despites his objections, in January 1812, the convention unanimously voted to 
accept the new state constitution.25  To mark this occasion, Poydras spoke to the convention about 
their landmark work.  He compared Louisianans to a ship navigator who weathered adverse winds 
and fatigue only to enter “the port which is the object of his wishes and the hope of his fortune.”26    
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     On March 3, 1812, Louisiana’s completed constitution made its way to Congress.  Following a 
close examination of the laws and provisions of the document, it was approved and President 
James Madison signed the “Act for the admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union, and to 
extend the laws of the United States to the said state” on April 8, 1812.27  After years of pledging 
their attachment, cooperating with lawmakers, and employing political resistance, Louisianans’ 
strategies of negotiations earned them statehood.  Louisianans had faced the adverse winds of the 
territorial period; now they had safely arrived in port as American citizens.  Yet underneath the 
merriment and celebration, Louisianans realized that Americans still questioned their loyalty and 
affection to the United States.  They monitored the congressional debates regarding statehood and 
understood that many still looked askance at Louisiana’s diverse population.  Little did Louisianans 
know that they would have another opportunity to show their attachment and once and for all dispel 
such doubts.     
**** 
    Louisianans’ statehood fanfare came to a quick end on June 18, 1812, when Congress declared 
war on Great Britain.  As the Eleventh Congress prepared for war, it soon became evident that its 
predecessors failed to provide an effective militia organization or the appropriations needed to fund 
major military expeditions.  In New York, 1,600 militiamen gathered to fight, but lacked any arms or 
supplies for battle.  Governors all over the country failed to meet militia quotas issued by Adjutant 
General Thomas H. Cushing.  Militiamen complained about serving under officers from other states 
while other soldiers deserted before their term expired.28  Partisan affiliations also hindered militia 
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participation.  The Federalist governor of Massachusetts refused to muster his forces, 
demonstrating his opposition to the Madison administration and the War of 1812.29   
    Governor Claiborne faced similar problems as Louisiana’s militia was ill-prepared to engage in a 
full-scale war.  He found not only a lack of military supplies, but also insubordination among many 
of his constituents.  In an address to the Louisiana state legislature, Claiborne reiterated Henry 
Hopkins’ 1809 critique of the state militia, asserting that the “contrariety of language spoken by the 
Citizens of Louisiana; the dispersed situation of settlements” both hindered wartime mobilization.30  
These persistent problems created strong waves of resistance towards militia service.  To 
President Madison, Claiborne admitted that Louisiana’s heterogeneous population rendered the 
city militia inefficient, as French descendants refused to fight for the United States.  In June 1813, 
the worried governor lamented the disorganized state of the city militia, which he described as in 
“Great Derangement.”31   
    Governor Claiborne confronted the same challenges facing other state governors.  For many 
American lawmakers, however, these common problems carried a different connotation when 
occurring in Louisiana.  Louisianans’ failure to answer militia calls prompted many to question if 
these new Americans were truly attached to the United States.  These questions became even 
more potent as many turned their attention to a possible invasion of New Orleans.  As early as July 
1813, Claiborne acknowledged that “Louisiana I fear is in greater danger than the Secretary of War 
apprehends.”32  By the next year, Claiborne’s fears were vindicated as an invasion of New Orleans 
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seemed imminent.  As the southeastern Indian campaign came to a close, both American and 
British officers turned their attention to New Orleans.  General Andrew Jackson, on March 16, 
1814, accepted his new appointment as Major General of the United States Army and immediately 
set his sights on Louisiana.  Claiborne had little good news to provide the general, admitting that 
“there are many faithful Citizens, but I repeat there are others, on whose Attachment to the United 
States I cannot confide.”  Claiborne cited ethnic tensions and militia insubordination as the major 
obstacles obstructing a strong Louisiana front. 33  Months later, James Monroe received intelligence 
that revealed that “a British force consisting of twelve or fifteen thousand men would sail from 
Ireland early in September for New Orleans and Mobile with the intention to take possession of the 
city.”34  General Jackson soon reaffirmed Monroe’s warning, informing Governor Claiborne that a 
detachment of a thousand Irishmen were heading for Louisiana in hopes of overthrowing the 
American regime.35  Louisianans themselves also entertained notions of a possible invasion.  
Pierre-Joseph Favrot cautioned his family that “News from Pensacola states that the English are 
making big preparations to capture New Orleans ….   It is said that the English want to take back 
Louisiana and give it back to Spain, who intends to reoccupy her former possessions.”36  Such 
reports and Claiborne’s inability to mobilize military forces made many Americans wonder if 
Louisianans would defend their newest country or welcome a foreign invader.   
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    Questions of Louisianans’ loyalty not only lingered within the United States, but also among the 
international community.  European powers assumed that Louisianans’ attachment to the United 
States rested on a precarious foundation.  The Secretary of the Navy intercepted a detailed letter 
outlining plans for the Spanish conquest of Louisiana.  The letter from Colonel Louis DeClouet to 
Spanish officials in Cuba stated that over two-thirds of the state’s population remained loyal to 
Spain.37  The British also hoped to use unattached Louisianans to defeat American forces.  British 
Captain James Stirling saw New Orleans as the key to British domination of the Gulf Coast region, 
but more importantly as the ideal place for an invasion because of its vulnerability.  Stirling believed 
that Louisiana’s distance from the rest of the United States and weak military forces provided the 
British easy access to the port city.  Moreover, he hoped Louisiana’s population would be a useful 
asset since it was “made up chiefly of emigrants from all Nations unconnected by blood or long 
fellowship with the other states of America.”  He also believed that the precarious political situation 
in Louisiana might induce Creoles to support any plan to separate Louisiana from the Union.38  
Heeding Stirling's advice and hoping to exploit Louisianans’ perceived disloyalty, in August 1814, 
English Col. Edward Nicholls issued a proclamation urging them to join him: 
Natives of Louisiana! On you the first call is made to assist in liberation from a faithless, 
imbecile government, on your paternal soil.  Spaniards, Frenchmen, Italians, and Britons, 
whether settled or residing for a time in Louisiana, on you also I call to aid me in this just cause.  
The American usurpation in this country must be abolished, and the lawful owners of the soil 
put in possession… You will have no fear of litigious taxes imposed upon you for the purpose of 
                                                 
 
    37 Powell A. Casey, Louisiana in the War of 1812  (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1963), 2. 
 
    38 James Stirling Memorandum, 17 March 1813, MSS 94, Historic New Orleans Collection.  He believed that 
Louisianans would be forced to join the British once a naval blockade diminished their commerce.  He also laid out a 
plan for the invasion of New Orleans that included exploiting General James Wilkinson who “is reported to be a man of 
much excess and considerably in debt --- His principles are not considered very firm and he has been treated very 
harshly by the American government.”     
 222 
carrying on an unnatural and unjust war; your property, your laws, the peace and tranquility of 
your country will be guaranteed to you by men who will suffer no infringement on theirs.39  
 
Nicholls encouraged Louisiana’s ethnic population to retaliate against the United States in order to 
return their native soil to its original inhabitants.  He also went so far as to attempt to enlist the support 
of pirate Jean Lafitte.  Nicholls hoped that Lafitte would help him convince Louisianans to join the British 
cause in exchange for the rank of captain and land from the spoils of victory.40   
   Aware that there existed an international consensus questioning their loyalty, Louisianans themselves 
took active measures to dispel such doubts and transcended mere rhetoric to show their attachment to 
the United States.  By the summer of 1814, a new spirit seemed to infect New Orleans and adjoining 
parishes.  Some historians argue that this was sparked by Jackson’s arrival in New Orleans in 
December; however, as early as September Louisianans took a renewed interest in strengthening the 
city’s defense and volunteering for military service.  One group of concerned Louisianans assembled at 
Tremoulet’s Coffee House on September 15, 1814, to form a committee to assist civil and military forces 
throughout New Orleans.  Edward Livingston was elected the chair of this newly-formed Committee of 
Defense while Julien Poydras participated in the proceedings.  After years of clashing over Louisianans’ 
incorporation process, these political adversaries put aside preexisting feuds to help Louisianans 
safeguard New Orleans from danger.  In a speech opening the meeting, Livingston argued that a 
Committee of Defense was essential to ensure protection, but more importantly to show the English that 
their assumptions about Louisianans’ disloyalty were grossly erroneous.  Furthermore, Livingston 
contended that Louisianans owed it “to ourselves to disavow such unfounded and calumnious 
                                                 
 
    39 Latour, Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana, 185-186.   
 
    
40
 Edward Nicholls to Messier Jean Lafitte, 31 August 1814, Edward Nicholls and William H. Percy Letter, MSS 196, 
Historic New Orleans Collection.      
 223 
insinuations, and by a prompt and cheerful offer of support, to show the rest of the United States that we 
are not unworthy of a place among them.”   
    Livingston realized that this Committee of Defense provided an opportunity for Louisianans to show 
their attachment through their diligent actions.  In turn, committee members adopted several resolutions 
that revealed that they felt the same.  For instance, one resolution stated that “the good people of this 
State are attached to the Government of the United States, and they will repel with indignation every 
attempt to create disaffection.”  The committee also agreed to build up city defenses and rally support 
amongst the citizenry.41  Fulfilling its promise, the committee recruited wealthy citizens to donate money 
to assist government efforts.  Livingston himself gave $400, while many Creoles made generous 
contributions to the fund.42  Just days later, the Committee of Defense circulated a public proclamation 
to Louisianans that encouraged them to cooperate with government officials and to answer the call to 
arms.  Moreover, it urged Louisianans to remain steadfast in their affection to the United States, arguing 
that “A just idea of the geographical situation of your country will convince you that your safety, and in a 
greater degree your prosperity, depends on your being irrevocably and faithfully attached to an union 
with the other states.”43  The nine-person Committee of Defense included many of Livingston’s former 
Creole cohorts such as Noel Destrehan. In the face of danger and constant suspicion, even the most 
fervent ancient stood up to help Louisianans show their attachment.  
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    Following the lead of the Committee of Defense, the New Orleans City Council also did its part to 
prepare the city.  On September 20, 1814, Mayor Nicholas Girod and members of the council sought to 
set up a government defense committee for the express purpose of uniting civil and military leaders.44  
Members of the Louisiana state legislature, including Pierre-Joseph Favrot, also contributed to wartime 
mobilization by appropriating $17,000 to repair fortifications and provide needed ammunition.  Besides 
providing political support, Pierre-Joseph also felt compelled to use his military expertise to enhance 
mobilization efforts.  In a published memorandum, he suggested how Louisiana leaders could improve 
Fort St. Phillip.  He recommended that batteries with numerous militiamen and infantry be placed in front 
of the fort as well as at the English Turn to prevent British access from the mouth of the Mississippi 
River.  He also suggested that Fort Bourbon receive six new 18-caliber cannons.  By Pierre-Joseph’s 
estimates these improvements would take under a week to implement and would ensure Louisianans’ 
safety.45  Louisianans’ copious mobilization efforts helped ease American apprehensions and prompted 
Governor Claiborne to happily report that “a great change has taken place in the Public mind in this 
Quarter, and a very Patriotic Spirit pervades the State.”46     
    As New Orleans’ citizens spurred mobilization efforts, the state’s military forces converged in New 
Orleans.  The Louisiana Drafted Militia under Alexander DeClouet was the first to assemble in 
September 1814.  The regiment consisted of men from various units from throughout the state.  These 
regiments were later dispersed throughout Jackson’s forces.  The 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th regiments of the 
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Louisiana Drafted Militia also assembled and were stationed at Magazine Barracks.47  Louis Favrot, now 
a major in the 8th regiment, was among these troops.  Statewide cavalry units also reported for duty 
between September and November 1814.  On September 29, Captain Jedediah Smith’s Feliciana Troop 
of Horse began patrolling the riverbanks near St. Francisville preparing for a possible slave insurrection 
or a surprise British attack.  In October, Captain Joseph Dubuclet’s Volunteer Troops of Hussars of the 
Teche-Attakapas joined forces with Captain Thomas Beale’s Company of New Orleans Riflemen which 
consisted of sixty-eight men of prominent families.  As these militia and cavalry units gathered in New 
Orleans, specialized volunteer companies united with their statesmen to help defend New Orleans.   
   By November 1814, the Uniformed Battalion of Orleans Volunteers assembled in New Orleans.  This 
unit included five companies that existed under the French and Spanish colonial regimes.  Serving as 
the senior company, the Carabiniers consisted of 114 French businessmen from New Orleans.  The 
Francs, led by Captain Jean Hundry, consisted of artillerymen whose ancestors fought in the French 
colonial militia.  Captain Henri St. Geme’s company of “Dragons D’Orleans” numbered ninety-nine 
Frenchmen, while the company of Chasseurs totaled to eighty-two.  The final company of this elite 
fighting force was the Louisiana Blues, a unit made up of Irishmen from the city.48  The Uniformed 
Battalion of Orleans Volunteers represented the rich ethnic composition of Louisiana’s population and 
the long ties they had with their colonial past.  Yet these ancient Creoles joined New Orleans’ militiamen 
to repel a British invasion and gain national acceptance.       
    Like their white counterparts, libres also mobilized their own battalions.  For years the Free Color 
Battalion existed only in name, as black militiamen were ignored by Louisiana legislators.  Despite this 
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neglect, Governor Claiborne continued his efforts to make a free black battalion a recognized militia unit.      
Using libres’ participation in the 1811 slave rebellion as well as the impending war with Great Britain, 
Claiborne pleaded with state legislators to activate the Free Color Battalion as a vital military necessity.  
In January 1812, state legislators began deliberations on a comprehensive militia bill.  In August, House 
members debated the section of the bill regarding the free black militia and within a day approved the 
measure to allow the governor to enlist certain libres.  Louisiana lawmakers included several stipulations 
including one limiting the battalion to only four companies.  Those libres eligible for service were 
required to meet the same property requirements as their white counterparts.49  “An Act to Authorize the 
Governor to Enroll Certain Free People of Color” passed through both the House and Senate.  On 
September 7, 1812, Governor Claiborne signed the bill into law creating the Battalion of the Free Men of 
Color.  For over nine years free blacks fought for the same military privileges enjoyed by their fathers.  
Four companies of the “chosen men of color” carried on their colonial legacy to fight for their country 
when it needed them most.   
    Since 1804, Michel Fortier had commanded the free black battalion.  In 1812, he resumed these 
duties, heading the 1st Battalion of the Free Men of Color.  Major Pierre Lacoste was given command of 
several companies under Fortier.50  As libres mobilized for service, General Andrew Jackson sent a 
public proclamation to New Orleans addressed to Louisiana’s free people of color.  Jackson’s speech 
referred to these chosen men as Americans and told them that “your country looks with confidence to 
her adopted children for a valorous support, as a faithful return for the advantages enjoyed under her 
mild and equitable government.”  He went on to promise libres the same benefits given to white soldiers 
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in the service of the United States Army, which included equal pay as well as 160 acres of land.51  
Jackson’s proclamation was largely a response to Claiborne’s fear that free blacks might be enticed by 
the enemy.  His concerns were not unwarranted since British Captain James Sterling advocated arming 
Louisiana’s free black and slave populations to assist British forces. 52  Free black Louisianans faced 
many suspicions regarding their attachment as many feared foreign intrigues might sway their loyalty.  
Like their white counterparts, Louisiana’s free people of color looked to the War of 1812 as an 
opportunity to bolster their claims for citizenship and gain acceptance in the United States.   
    With the immense outpouring of libre enlistments, legislators were forced to create a second free 
black battalion under the command of Major Louis D’Aqurin in October 1814.53  Prominent 
members of Louisiana’s free black community exploited their new opportunity for service.  Luis 
Simon, Pierre Bailly and his son, Vincent and Maurice Populus, and Charles Poree all enlisted in 
Fortier’s battalion.  These same men, nearly eight years before, crafted and signed the “Address 
from the Free People of Color” begging Claiborne for military service.  Pillars of the libre 
community, these free black crusaders took their leadership skills to the battlefield.  Luis Simon 
and Vincent Populus both served as captains in Fortier’s battalion, while Noel Carrier Jr. and 
Maurice Populus were commissioned as first lieutenants.54  For years, the old and new generation 
of chosen men of color combated Americans’ racist ideology to preserve the rights enjoyed by their 
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colonial predecessors.  The War of 1812 supplied them another vital means to show their merit as 
American citizens.   
    As Claiborne watched Creole, American, and libre soldiers mobilize for service he felt assured that 
state forces were becoming stronger and better prepared.55  In a few short months, civic and military 
organizations ensured that New Orleans was prepared for a British attack.  Certainly this rapid 
mobilization came out of fear of British occupation of the city.  Constant questions regarding their 
loyalty, however, also motivated Louisianans.  For nearly twelve years, Louisianans engaged in a 
constant struggle to prove their attachment to the United States.  Even statehood failed to secure the 
trust and acceptance of fellow Americans.  A possible invasion of New Orleans, therefore, provided yet 
another opportunity for Louisianans to show their allegiance.  Clearly, the members of the Committee of 
Defense realized this, justifying their very existence under the banner of attachment and affection for the 
United States.  More importantly, troops from various backgrounds consolidated their forces in New 
Orleans weeks prior to Jackson’s descent on New Orleans.   
    Upon his arrival in December 1814, General Jackson himself acknowledged and applauded 
Louisianans’ profuse efforts.  In a series of public proclamations, Jackson assured militiamen and 
Louisianans that their enthusiasm and affection would continue to alleviate any doubts of their loyalty.  
Moreover, he encouraged Louisiana soldiers to “continue with the energy you have begun,” thus 
promising “victory over the insolent enemy who insulted you by an affected doubt of your attachment to 
the Constitution of your country.”56  Jackson’s praise of Louisianans countered affirmations made by 
Latour and historians such as Reiley and Carter who believed that Louisianans united to fight only after 
Jackson had infused the city with his spirit, expertise, and charisma.   
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    By December 1814, other state units began to arrive daily to help defend the crucial port city.  The 
Mississippi Territory’s Troop of Horse, General John Coffee’s Tennessee Brigade, and William Carroll’s 
division from Nashville joined Jackson on December 22.57  Later that evening a British detachment 
reached the mouth of Bayou Bienvenue and by 1:30 the next afternoon advanced closer to the city.  A 
small skirmish occurred later that evening as Beale’s New Orleans Riflemen penetrated the center of 
the British line.  Displaying their bravery and skills, Louisiana riflemen killed several British troops and 
took several others prisoner.  The next two weeks saw only minor exchanges of fire, as both British and 
American officers aligned their forces for one last major engagement.  On January 4, the Kentucky 
militia arrived with 2,230 men ready for what would be the last battle in the New Orleans campaign and 
the War of 1812.     
    A few days prior to the famous Battle of New Orleans, Jackson selected his main line of defense 
(Line Jackson) just five miles below New Orleans located between the Rodriguez and Chalmette 
plantations.58   On Line Jackson, Louisiana militia and volunteer units were combined with units from 
both Tennessee and Kentucky.  On the extreme right of Line Jackson stood Captain Beale’s Riflemen 
right next to Major Plauche’s Uniformed Battalion of Orleans Volunteers.  Located further left was Major 
Lacoste’s Battalion of Free Men of Color. 59  Along the main line, artillery was distributed throughout 
eight individual batteries.  Major D’Aquin’s Battalion of Free Men of Color stood between batteries four 
and five.  According to Latour’s memoir, the rest of Line Jackson (nearly two-thirds) consisted of 
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Tennessee militiamen under the command of Generals Carroll and Coffee.60  Located about 4000 yards 
behind Line Jackson were several other Louisiana units including Colonel Robert Young’s Tenth 
Regiment, Captain Griffith’s Feliciana Mounted Riflemen, and Smith’s Troop of Horse.  These men 
stood as a protective wall defending Line Jackson from behind.61   
    The morning of January 8, 1815, began with a rocket flare signaling the start of British advancement 
towards Line Jackson.  The bulwark of British troops advanced in columns of sixty men towards Battery 
seven.  Eyewitness accounts recall the relentless fire coming from Line Jackson.62  As the columns of 
British soldiers faltered and were replenished by new troops, the American bombardment of artillery fire 
continued.  Louisiana units did their part to repel the British advancement.  Beale’s Orleans Riflemen 
fought off British penetration on the right flank ensuring the durability of Line Jackson.63   When firing 
ceased at Chalmette, initial counts estimated 3,000 British killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, while 
American casualties numbered no more than thirteen.64    
    As American soldiers on the left bank of the Mississippi River reveled in their stunning victory, 
General David Morgan and his forces suffered America’s one defeat of the New Orleans campaign.  
Situated on the opposite side of the Mississippi River, General Morgan’s forces included portions of the 
1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th Louisiana regiments, 500 Kentucky militiamen, and troops from the Louisiana 
conscripted militia.  Morgan’s main line of defense was located about 1,300 hundred yards downstream 
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from Line Jackson.65  Here advancing British forces received the same bombardment as their 
countrymen on the left bank.  Enemy troops, however, successfully broke American defenses through 
an unguarded gap between Kentucky and Louisiana militiamen.  Kentucky troops withdrew with no way 
to regain their position.  The retreat rendered Morgan’s other forces ineffective.66  Despite this loss, 
British officers sent General Jackson a flag of truce—ending the fight for the Crescent City.   
**** 
    As the smoke cleared at Chalmette, Americans rushed to assess the importance and magnitude of 
the Battle of New Orleans.  Major John Reid, an aide-de-camp to General Andrew Jackson, provided a 
friend with the intricate details of the engagement.  He explained that British forces drastically 
outnumbered American troops.  Besides being outnumbered, he argued, that American troops were 
inferior in discipline, supplies, and experience.  Through a combination of gallant vigor and Jackson’s 
military genius, Reid believed that American forces overcame their many inadequacies.  What he 
witnessed at the Battle of New Orleans made him believe that “this army will have accomplished more 
than any other army ever did in the same time, under the same circumstance.”67  Louisiana planter 
Duke Summer also expressed amazement over the events of January 8, 1815.  He shared many of 
Reid’s assumptions regarding the inferior state of Jackson’s forces, arguing that “we have no instance 
since the invention of gunpowder of so great a disproportion as that which took place on the 8th.”68  
Outnumbered, undersupplied, and inexperienced, American citizen-soldiers defeated British 
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professionals as a nation watched with pride and astonishment.  For Louisianans, however, the Battle of 
New Orleans meant much more.         
    Louisianans’ participation in the Battle of New Orleans earned them the title of American heroes 
along with a new acceptance in the United States.  In the months following this historic battle, 
Louisiana itself was equated with the efforts of its militiamen.  Just days after the battle, Governor 
Claiborne wrote to President Madison emphatically expressing that “I glory in the opportunity which 
has afforded the people of Louisiana to prove that altho’ the Youngest of the great American 
Family, they are not the least in valour and Patriotism.”69  He, more than anyone, understood the 
battle’s significance for his constituents.  Several weeks later he printed a broadside thanking 
Louisianans for their gallantry and loyalty.  He also indicated that their efforts earned the gratitude 
and acceptance of their countrymen who long doubted them.  He hoped that the Battle of New 
Orleans would show the rest of the country that “Louisiana has been faithful to the union and 
faithful to itself.”70   
    Andrew Jackson himself expressed praise and admiration for Louisianans.  In a letter to Mayor Girod, 
Jackson thanked Louisianans for their “unanimity and patriotic zeal” as well as their “love of order, and 
attachment to the principles of our excellent constitution. “  He went on to applaud the efforts of the City 
Council and the Committee of Defense, as well as New Orleans’ “softer sex” who encouraged husbands 
to fight and took care of the city in their absence.  Jackson’s comments display the appreciation of a 
general who saw Louisianans’ efforts as more than an attempt to defeat a stronger foe, but a means for 
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them to strengthen their bonds of affection.  He concluded his letter professing that “Seldom in any 
community, has so much cause been given to deserve praise.”71   
   Free black soldiers also received accolades.  The Baltimore Niles’ Weekly Register highlighted the 
sacrifice of black militiamen, claiming that those “killed and wounded on our part were chiefly of the New 
Orleans colored regiment who were so anxious for glory that they could not be prevented from 
advancing our breastworks and exposing themselves.”72  Although overlooked by Washington and 
Louisiana lawmakers for so long, the Battle of New Orleans gave libres the military recognition they long 
desired.  Furthermore, it placed them, if only for a moment, on the same footing as other Americans who 
fought for their country.   
    In February 1815, Congress also took time to acknowledge Louisianans’ courage and patriotism with 
a series of resolutions commending their brave efforts which “deserve well of the whole people of the 
United States.”73   No other state received such attention in Congress, reflecting lawmakers’ surprise 
and admiration for Louisianans’ display of honor.  To Louisiana Senator James Brown, the Battle of New 
Orleans alleviated any doubts concerning Louisianans’, arguing that:    
Their conduct on the late trying emergency has been such, as not only to fulfill the predictions 
of their friends, and efface the unfavorable prejudices of those who until now were strangers to 
their true character… The ties of interest and of affection, which have long attached the 
Western States to Louisiana, have now become indissoluble. The purple stream of their best 
blood has united and mingled in the same channel, and has at once cemented their union and 
that of their country.”74   
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Kentucky Representative Solomon Sharp embraced Louisiana as the newest and most patriotic 
member of the Union, asking whether “there be an American, whose bosom does not beat high with joy 
to call Louisiana a legitimate daughter of the Union, and hail her citizens as brothers?”75    
    In his memoirs, published in 1816, Latour also realized the great accolades the battle secured for 
Louisianans.  He lamented the days of the Orleans Territory when “they [Louisianans] were considered, 
for a long time, suspicious members of the American family, and as persons who could not be relied 
upon.”  He contended that “it was not by words that those meritorious citizens vindicated their character; 
but by the best proofs of devotion to their country, by defending it faithfully, and by valiantly repelling the 
invading enemy.”76  Despite turbulent years with America lawmakers, the Battle of New Orleans 
solidified Louisiana’s place as an American state.   
    As Americans celebrated British defeat, Louisianans quickly began constructing their own 
interpretation of the battle’s profound impact.  Events in the Place d’ Armes on January 23, 1815 were 
filled with symbolism as Louisianans looked forward to being accepted members of the Union.  Even the 
most resolute Creoles felt the elation that came with victory and acceptance.  Just a week after the 
Battle of New Orleans, Josephine Favrot sat down to compose a tribute to the soldiers who fought at 
Chalmette.  She thanked the “invincible Tennesseans” as well as the “illustrious and magnanimous 
Jackson.”  She boasted that Louisianans’ courage, American patriotism, and French intrepidity proved 
the winning combination over the British.  Furthermore, Josephine’s tribute demonstrated her own 
acceptance of the United States.  “Intrepid warriors!  In order to defend our country, you sacrificed 
without hesitation … how flattering it is for us to call you our countrymen,” she proudly wrote.77  Her 
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references to “our country” and “our countrymen” illustrate that she no longer felt like a Frenchwoman in 
a strange country, but rather an American enjoying her country’s victory and success.  She accepted 
her place in the republic and celebrated her new American family.  Her mother displayed a similar 
transformation, telling her son Louis “May God protect our cause.”  Even she saw the American cause 
as her cause.78   
    Year after year, Louisianans continued to celebrate the historic battle.  On December 23, 1816, the 
Louisiana Gazette reminded its readers of the 1814 night battle, claiming that “It was on this day that the 
people of Louisiana first showed their northern and western brethren that they were willing to seal their 
blood and the compact that had already indissolubly bound them to the great American republic.”79  On 
January 10, 1817, a similar announcement reminded readers of the two-year anniversary of the “Eighth 
of January”.80   In 1848, one of Louisiana’s leading citizens, Bernard Marigny, published his Reflections 
of the Campaign of General Andrew Jackson, in Louisiana in 1814 and ’15.  His Reflections sought to 
defend Louisianans who had long been subject to questions regarding their loyalty.  He argued that “it 
would be impossible for our detractors to cite a single Louisianan, a single Creole, a single naturalized 
Frenchmen, who in the moment of danger, abandoned the country or refused to fight.”  He went on to 
discuss the Committee of Defense that helped to secure money and supplies for the war effort. 81   At 
the heart of his pamphlet, Marigny redressed three accusations mounted against Louisianans prior to 
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the war by the American press.  One American newspaper had reported that the Louisiana legislature 
wished to give up the country to the English by capitulation.  To this, Marigny replied that its efforts to 
fortify the city, procure weapons, recruit soldiers, and assist General Jackson illustrated the blatant 
falsehood of such a statement.  He also bewailed Americans who had once looked suspiciously at 
Louisiana’s diverse population.  He simply asked his fellow Americans why all efforts to locate and 
implicate Louisiana traitors rendered nothing.  Finally, Marigny addressed the long-held assumption that 
Frenchmen refused to fight in the Battle of New Orleans.  To refute such claims he calculated the 
location and participation of several Creole units and found that five were led by French captains.  He 
also estimated that at least ten or twelve French and Creole soldiers served as cannon operators while 
the majority of Line Jackson consisted of ancient Creoles. Ultimately, he concluded that Creoles 
“covered themselves with glory and deserve American reverence.”82   
    Marigny’s Reflections demonstrate how even decades after the Battle of New Orleans, Louisianans 
continued to assess the importance of their sacrifices and how the battle allowed them to finally show 
their loyalty and attachment.  Even today the Battle of New Orleans still holds great significance for 
Louisianans.  On a tour of Chalmette, young guides inform their audiences that the historic site is much 
more than a battlefield:  It is the place where Louisianans became Americans. 
**** 
    Heading to Café Du Monde to enjoy the splendors of powdered beignets and chicory coffee, tourists 
today pass by Jackson Square, discernible by the towering statue of General Andrew Jackson.  Most 
people walk by only giving a brief glance to the effigy of the American icon who made his career just five 
miles below New Orleans.  Just as his monument hovers above the Crescent City, so does the memory 
of his victory at the Battle of New Orleans.  In both myth and history Jackson has been heralded as the 
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“savior of Louisiana.”  Following the battle Americans referred to him as “God’s earthly agent,” while 
historians further reinforce this image in their works on the famous battle.   
    Although this image of Jackson the hero makes for great stories and biographies, it overlooks 
what motivated Louisianans to fight.  It fails to address why Edward Livingston, after years of 
resisting and stalling Americanization efforts, put aside his hatred for the Claiborne administration 
to help his arch rival prepare New Orleans for a British invasion.  Or why Livingston joined forces 
with Poydras after years of taking such divergent paths.  It fails to explain why Pierre-Joseph 
Favrot worked alongside other members of the Legislative Council to procure money and supplies 
for Louisiana’s military.  It fails to clarify why Louis Favrot fought against British forces at Magazine 
Battery, while his brother Philogene reinforced troops in Mobile.  It fails to elucidate why Noel 
Carrier Jr. and other chosen men of color, despite being overlooked and demoted to second-class 
citizens, risked their lives to defend Louisianans who often looked at them with disdain and 
contempt.  
    As historians continue to examine aspects of the Battle of New Orleans from the activities of 
militiamen to the rise of Andrew Jackson, they must not neglect the history of the Orleans Territory 
and Louisianans’ battle for acceptance.  The Battle of New Orleans served as a culmination of 
Louisianans’ negotiations with American lawmakers.  For years they employed strategies such as 
resistance, cooperation, and the conversation of attachment to earn a place in the Union on their 
own terms.  Despite all their tactics, Louisianans’ sacrifice on the field of battle allowed them to 
transcend mere rhetoric and actively demonstrate their attachment to the United States.  From that 
day forward it mattered little if Louisianans spoke French, practiced civil law, or even celebrated 
Mardi Gras, because they were American enough when it truly mattered.  They fought for their 
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country when it needed them most.  The Battle of New Orleans gained Louisianans the admiration 
of a nation that applauded and honored them as brother and Americans.   
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Epilogue: “America’s most European City”:  Louisiana’s Franco-American Culture  
    In March 2007, I packed my bags for a big research trip.  Having only a vague idea about my 
dissertation topic, I looked forward to finding some lead or inspiration in the New Orleans archives.   
As I arrived at my gate at the Atlanta airport to catch my connection to the Crescent City, I learned 
that I had been bumped from my flight.  Frustrated, I sat at the gate along with seven other 
stranded passengers.  As we waited for Delta to book new flights, I began making small talk with 
my fellow travelers.  I soon learned that my new companions were a group of school teachers from 
Lafourche Parish, Louisiana, headed home from a conference in Atlanta.  One of them asked me 
why I was going to New Orleans.  After explaining that I was headed there for research, her 
husband quickly interrupted, asking me, “What are you studying?”  Perplexed, I tried to explain that 
I had always been interested in exploring Louisianans’ experiences following the Louisiana 
Purchase.  I also divulged that I was interested in discovering if and how the existence of a Franco-
American culture influenced the Orleans Territory.  As I tried to clarify what I meant by a Franco-
American culture, one of the teachers stopped me mid-sentence and said “my grandmother 
refuses to speak English.”  From there she explained that she was a first-generation English 
speaker in her family.  Much to her grandmother’s dismay, she was not bilingual in both French 
and English.  One of the other teachers also admitted that her parents and grandparents belonged 
to several organizations fighting to keep street signs and government ordinances in French.  As I 
listened, it hit me—there was a Franco-American culture in the Orleans Territory and it still existed 
in the state of Louisiana.  When I was bumped from my flight in Atlanta that day, I was angry to 
have lost a valuable day of research.  What I failed to realize, however, was that by sitting in that 
airport with seven Louisiana school teachers I had found the lead and inspiration I was looking for.  
I had found my topic!     
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**** 
    In writing a project about the incorporation of Lower Louisiana, one must first understand what it 
meant to be incorporated.  American lawmakers hoped to integrate Louisianans into the social, 
political, and cultural infrastructure of the Union.  To achieve this goal, congressional members put 
substantial demands on their newest inhabitants.  They required Louisianans to accept 
Americanization programs that promised to give them knowledge of republican principles and 
foster a strong cultural attachment to the Union.  To American lawmakers, until Louisianans fulfilled 
all of these crucial requirements the incorporation process was incomplete.  For Louisianans, 
however, incorporation rested more on their political integration and assimilation as they learned 
and participated in the republican government.  In essence, Louisianans were ready to be an 
integral part of the American political apparatus.  To them, their cultural ties to their colonial 
heritage in no way affected their ability to be good American citizens.  These varying interpretations 
of the incorporation process conditioned the turbulent territorial period that followed the Louisiana 
Purchase.    
    Historians today have almost as much trouble determining when Lower Louisiana’s incorporation 
ended as American leaders and Louisianans did in defining what it meant.  Many historians 
designate statehood, in 1812, as the conclusion of Louisianans’ incorporation since they were 
brought into the Union on an equal footing with other American states.  Other historians contend 
that Louisianans were incorporated only after 1820 as they fully engaged in national politics.  
Immediately following the Louisiana Purchase, Louisianans remained largely focused on local and 
regional issues.  Yet with the admission of the state of Missouri into the Union, Louisiana 
lawmakers, as one historian noted “exchanged regionalism for sectionalism.”  Louisianans aligned 
themselves with other Southerners to ensure the addition of a new slave state.  Louisianans’ 
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participation in national politics allowed them to foster a Southern identity that made them a 
fundamental part of the slaveholding South.1  Although these historians provide cogent arguments, 
their disagreements regarding Louisianans’ incorporation process reveal almost as much as their 
conclusions.  Much like American lawmakers and territorial Louisianans, historians have their own 
views of incorporation and when and how Louisianans completed this process.   
    I tend to judge Louisianans’ incorporation the same way American lawmakers did in 1803.  They 
wanted Louisianans to be politically and culturally integrated into the Union no matter how much 
they protested.  In my view, Louisianans never achieved the degree of cultural incorporation that 
American lawmakers initially desired.  Louisiana did come into the Union as an American state in 
1812 and became politically amalgamated by the second decade of the nineteenth century.  
Louisianans, however, dictated the degree of their cultural attachment to the United States—
incorporating on their own terms.  The fact that today many refer to New Orleans as “America’s 
most European city” reveals that there is a unique blend of cultural forces present in Louisiana.2  A 
brief stroll through the streets of New Orleans only reinforces this reality as one immediately 
encounters the juxtaposition of French and American culture.  Jackson Square, one of New 
Orleans’ biggest tourist attractions, is located on what used to be the Place d’ Armes that served as 
the center of the city where people congregated, celebrated major events, and mustered for 
military service.  It was also where Noel Carrier Sr. watched the transfer of Lower Louisiana to the 
United States.  The statue of Andrew Jackson, placed in the center of the square, complements but 
in no way overpowers the towering figure of St. Louis Cathedral.  The historic church sits on the 
site where Louisianans had practiced Catholicism since 1727.  It was also in this religious 
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sanctuary that many territorial inhabitants such as the Favrots received sacraments and adhered to 
Catholic doctrine.  In Jackson Square alone, tourists encounter the relics of Louisianans’ French 
and Americans past.   
    As the city of New Orleans illustrates Louisianans’ strong French and American ties, Louisianans 
themselves support this Franco-American culture.  My conversation with the Louisiana school 
teachers demonstrates that many Louisianans continue to preserve their ancestors’ colonial 
heritage.  Today, many Louisianans choose to speak French rather than English.  They even resort 
to political activism through different organizations to protect the French language in their 
communities.  More than 200 years after the Louisiana Purchase, their efforts resemble the 
strategies of negotiation that territorial Louisianans employed to safeguard their native tongue and 
legal systems.  These modern-day Francophones certainly prove the success early Louisianans 
had in preserving their French culture.     
    Today Americans celebrate Louisiana’s Franco-American culture.  From eating powdered 
beignets to catching beads at Mardi Gras, Americans enjoy Louisiana’s many special features.  
Moreover, Americans today seem unconcerned by the fact that Louisiana remains the only state in 
the Union that practices civil law in addition to having many residents unwilling to speak English.  
Today these are just pleasant anomalies that give Louisiana a unique flair and appeal.  Yet for 
American lawmakers in the nineteenth century, these aberrations engendered apprehension and 
anxiety.  To them, Louisianans’ preference for civil law and the French language indicated that their 
newest inhabitants refused to make the cultural attachments that lawmakers deemed essential and 
necessary.  So what has changed?  What allows Americans today to celebrate Louisiana’s French 
heritage when their predecessors agonized over it?  The answer rests largely in the Battle of New 
Orleans.   
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    The Battle of New Orleans proved a watershed event in Louisiana history.  After years of 
negotiation and conflict with American lawmakers, the historic battle earned Louisianans 
acceptance.  Louisianans’ efforts on the battlefield alleviated doubts regarding their loyalty and 
attachment to the United States.  From that point on, Americans had a much different perception of 
their Louisiana countrymen.  No longer did Americans question Louisianans’ allegiance or worry 
that they would turn to a foreign power.  Louisianans’ willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect 
the United States gained Washington lawmakers’ trust and made Louisianans true Americans.  
This new-found approval did more than just pacify American doubts regarding Louisianans.  It 
allowed American lawmakers to acquiesce to Louisianans’ colonial past and their Franco-American 
culture.  The Battle of New Orleans, ultimately, replaced doubt with acceptance and allowed 
Americans to enjoy Louisiana’s unique character and particularities.   
**** 
    As the Battle of New Orleans gained Louisianans acceptance as Americans, it served as a 
pivotal moment for the characters that comprise this study.   The main historical actors featured in 
this project followed different paths after January 8, 1815, but all of their lives were profoundly 
shaped by the battle at Chalmette.  For Edward Livingston, the Battle of New Orleans rejuvenated 
his career.  When he served as the chairman of the Committee of Defense, Livingston once again 
gained the confidence of Louisianans.  In December 1814, he was appointed General Jackson’s 
aide-de-camp which supplied him a chance to defend New Orleans and his country.  His wartime 
activities allowed him to revive his political career.  In 1820, he was elected to the Louisiana House 
of Representatives.  By 1822, he made his way to Washington to serve in the House of 
Representatives and later the Senate.  After twenty years of rebuilding his reputation, Livingston 
returned to Washington, not as a political resister, but as a friend of the American government.  
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Livingston’s participation in the Battle of New Orleans soon gained him more political prestige.  
While serving as Jackson’s aide-de-camp, Livingston fostered a close friendship with Old Hickory 
that continued after Jackson’s departure from New Orleans.  In 1831, Jackson appointed his 
longtime friend as his Secretary of State.  Just two years later, Livingston became the American 
Minister to France, a position once occupied by his older brother Robert.  By 1835, Edward 
Livingston retired to his home in New York having restored his reputation and fulfilled his own 
personal political ambitions.  The Battle of New Orleans provided the one-time political pariah the 
opportunity to polish his tarnished image as well as salvage his career.3   
    Much like Livingston, Julien Poydras found that the Battle of New Orleans satisfied his political 
aspirations.  A well-respected leader during the territorial period, Poydras continued his successful 
career in the postwar years.  From 1819 to 1821, he served in the Louisiana state Senate.  During 
this time Poydras continued to work towards the proliferation of public schools in Louisiana, serving 
on the Orleans University Board of Regents until his death in 1824.  Beyond his political 
contributions, Poydras left an impressive philanthropic legacy.  His generous financial support 
allowed the Poydras School for Women to remain open until the Civil War.  Also his compassion 
for Louisiana’s poor and sick led to the establishment of both the Poydras Asylum and Poydras 
Home which cared for destitute women and children.  The Poydras Home, located in New Orleans, 
remains open today.  For Poydras, the Battle of New Orleans rewarded his years of political toil to 
bring Louisiana into the Union.4 
    As public figures found the Battle of New Orleans an advantageous event, the Favrot family 
used the battle at Chalmette to begin a new family legacy in politics.  Following the Battle of New 
                                                 
    
3
 Kastor, The Nation’s Crucible, 226-227.  See also Hatcher, Edward Livingston; Hunt, Life of Edward Livingston.     
 
    
4
 Brian Costello, The Life, Family and Legacy of Julien Poydras, 36, 46-48; Sam Mims, Trail of the Pack Peddler.  
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Orleans, Louis Favrot retired as a major in the Louisiana militia.  No sooner had he arrived home 
than Governor Claiborne appointed him tax collector of West Baton Rouge.5  Philogene also 
remained in the military for only a short time before he turned his attention to politics.  In March 
1816, he informed his sister that “since a rumor about my talents has spread around, there is 
already talk of my being given the important position of Syndic with the hope of obtaining the 
position of Justice of the Peace before long.  How important it sounds!”6  Several years later he 
became a judge in West Baton Rouge where he remained until he was killed in a duel in 1822.  
Louis assumed his brother’s vacant bench after this tragic event.  Before his death in 1824, Pierre-
Joseph watched his sons capitalize on their wartime experiences to become American statesmen.     
    Throughout the nineteenth century, Favrot men contributed to the family’s bourgeoning military 
and political legacy.  Henri Favrot, Louis and Philogene’s younger brother, received distinction for 
his service in the Mexican War.  Later, Louis’ son Henry was elected to the Louisiana Legislature 
and fought in the American Civil War.  In 1898, Louis’s grandson, Henry Louis Favrot, would fight 
in the Spanish-American War and go on to be a Louisiana senator.  The Battle of New Orleans 
propelled the one-time Creole family to the forefront of American politics and fostered a legacy of 
public and military service that Favrot descendants have carried on to the present day.7  
                                                 
    
5
 Commission Issued to Louis Favrot By Governor William C.C. Claiborne, 11 January 1816, The Favrot Family 
Papers, V: 316-317.   
 
    
6
 Philogene Favrot to Josephine Favrot, 19 March 1816, Ibid., V: 326-327.   
 
    7 The Favrot Family Papers, although incomplete, provide some information regarding the lives of many of the 
Favrot family members after the Battle of New Orleans.  Also see Louisiana: Comprising Sketches of Parishes, Towns, 
Events, Institutions, and Persons, Arranged in Cyclopedia Form,  ed. Alcée Fortier  (Century Historical Associations, 
1914) III: 158-160.  The Historic Highland Cemetery, where many of the Favrots are buried, has a registry that provides 
useful information about many of the family members.  The cemetery is located in Baton Rouge, just miles from the 
Favrot’s old plantation.    
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    The Battle of New Orleans had a positive impact on many of the characters discussed in this 
study by providing opportunities for political advancement.  For Louisiana’s free people of color, the 
battle marked the zenith of their efforts to secure their colonial rights.  Prior to the battle, free 
blacks finally received the military recognition they long desired and fought alongside American 
troops to defend their country.  Free blacks, however, were forced back into subordinate positions 
as wartime necessities diminished and Americans’ racist ideology intensified.  Two months after 
the Battle of New Orleans, the Battalion of Free People of Color was placed back under the state of 
Louisiana’s jurisdiction.  For several years, there was little discussion regarding the fate of the 
battalion as its leaders continued to hold regular musters and drills.  Larger sectional tensions, 
however, put the Battalion of Free People of Color in serious jeopardy.  By 1820, the Missouri 
Compromise forced the issue of slavery to the center of national politics.  As Northern and 
Southern politicians wrestled to maintain the crucial congressional balance, they were also 
confronted with serious questions regarding the fate of the institution of slavery.  Concomitantly, 
the mushrooming abolitionist movement posed new threats to the South’s “peculiar institution.”  
Ardent abolitionist tracts such as David Walkers’ Appeal, which encouraged slaves to “take their 
freedom” by killing their masters, planted the seed of paranoia among Southerners.   
    In this litigious atmosphere, white Louisianans began to look suspiciously at their free black 
neighbors, afraid they might incite slave unrest.  In March 1829, Creoles’ fears were only 
vindicated when a small slave insurrection broke out forty miles from New Orleans.8  As white 
Louisianans, like so many Southerners, solidified their commitment to slavery and white 
supremacy, the Battalion of Free People of Color seemed incompatible with their strong racist 
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ideology.  As a result, in April 1829, the Louisiana Legislature passed several acts to redefine the 
status of libres.  One provision of the new law sought to control and limit the free black population 
by prohibiting free people of color from entering the state after 1830.  These new laws aimed to 
systematically reduce the number of libres and thus the threat they posed to Louisianans’ strict 
racial hierarchy.   
    In 1834, state legislators mounted their final assault on free blacks in a new bill that stipulated 
that the state’s militia be composed solely of “white” citizens.  This new legislation repealed the 
1812 bill that erected the Battalion of Free Men of Color.9  As the country polarized over the issue 
of slavery, free black units were disbanded and libres were once again demoted to second-class 
citizens.10  Noel Carrier Jr. never confronted the anguish of being stripped of his military privileges, 
dying just one year after the passage of the 1834 bill.  Yet his life after the Battle of New Orleans 
reveals that despite marginalization, free blacks continued to thrive in the commercial sector.  
Carrier continued his cooper business which remained steady as more Americans moved into the 
bustling port city.  Moreover, he used his profits to amass a small fortune.  Upon his death, Noel 
Carrier Jr. left nearly five city lots, several slaves, and a large sum of money to his beneficiaries.11  
Although the Battle of New Orleans failed to render Carrier the same advantages as his white 
counterparts, it did momentarily allow him to fulfill his longtime hopes of following in the footsteps of 
his father and other chosen men of color.  
                                                 
    
9
 Ibid., 103-104.   
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 Ibid., 108-109.  Despite the new militia law, several free black soldiers from the Battle of New Orleans received 
pensions.  Alexis Andry, who lost his eye from a wartime injury, was awarded a pension not long after the battle.  
Vincent Populus, Jean Baptiste Hardy, and the widow of Luis Simon would later be awarded pensions by the Federal 
government.   
 
    
11
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    For the individuals featured in this project, the Battle of New Orleans was truly a pivotal event in 
their lives.  For some it imparted new opportunities for social advancement.  For free blacks it 
marked the beginning of the end of the Battalion of Free Men of Color and dimmed libre hopes to 
live as free men in the United States.  Despite the various paths these individuals took in the 
postwar years, the Battle of New Orleans earned them acceptance and allowed them to shape the 
incorporation process.   
**** 
    On my most recent trip to New Orleans, I could not help but be reminded of my characters 
everywhere I went.  As I walked down Poydras Street to the Public Library or crossed Claiborne 
Avenue on my way to Treme, I realized that these major territorial leaders and their contributions 
have been preserved in time and honored by the street signs that bear their name.  As I passed by 
Jackson Square, I wondered how many times Noel Carrier walked by this same spot headed to 
church or to a military muster.  I also tried to picture the festivities held here on January 23, 1815, 
as Louisianans watched Andrew Jackson walk under a triumphal arch in celebration of their victory 
at the Battle of New Orleans.  While touring the Louisiana State Museum, I was reminded of the 
Favrot family’s military legacy as I located Philogene Favrot's epaulette from the coat he wore 
when he served as a lieutenant in the 24th Infantry of the United States Army.  Truly America’s 
most European city provides plenty of evidence of the extraordinary lives and conscious 
negotiations of territorial Louisianans who helped create Louisiana’s Franco-American culture.   
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